Understanding the Impact of Police Stops

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This report was prepared for the Toronto Police Services Board. The views expressed in it are our own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Toronto Police Services Board or any other organization.
Introduction

Imagine that technology existed such that the police could, electronically, identify and track everyone and every motor vehicle in the city and that this information were stored electronically and available to the police, as required, for solving crime. Even if such information was not admissible as evidence, one could easily see its possible value in solving crime. If a home were broken into, one only would have to search a database to find out who had been in the neighbourhood. If a pedestrian were hit by a car that did not remain at the scene of the accident, one would only need to see what vehicles had been at that scene around the time of the accident to narrow down the possible suspects considerably. If a person were found to be using or in possession of drugs, one would only need to see whom that person had been in close contact with in recent times to identify a fairly small group of suspects as the source of those drugs. If a person were thought to be a member of a gang, it would be easy to find out whom that person associated with on a regular basis.

We don’t live in such a society. Obviously the information that the police have about the non-criminal activities of ordinary citizens is much more limited than that described in the previous paragraph. But what if it turned out we did live in the world described in the previous paragraph and people suddenly expressed the desire no longer to live in a world with constant and complete police scrutiny of their ordinary activities? One could imagine the suggestion would be made that not allowing police the kind of surveillance described in the previous paragraph would limit their ability to solve crime.

We raise this hypothetical scenario for a particular reason: There is no point in arguing whether complete or highly detailed information about the day-to-day movements or meetings that Canadians have might be useful to the police in solving crime. At a more mundane level, we see on an almost daily basis that footage from ‘security’ cameras is now routinely used to solve crime in a manner not too different from that described above.

Our second example comes closer to the issue of police stops. Imagine that there were no controls whatsoever on the power of the police to stop pedestrians and motorists and ask them to identify themselves. Even if, in law, citizens were not required to identify themselves or to answer any questions, one could argue that maintaining whatever information was obtained could be useful if a crime took place in that neighbourhood or someone associated with the person who had been stopped was suspected of some wrongdoing. That this information could potentially be useful is not the point. The question that needs to be raised in both of these examples is a much more complex one: What might be the ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ to society of these kinds of data gathering programs?
Even these two hypothetical scenarios are missing something crucial: comparison groups. The question, in most public policy areas, is not whether there are some successful outcomes from a particular procedure, but whether there are better outcomes overall than there might be under some other procedure. For example, in each of the hypothetical scenarios described above, it might be that deployment of resources in some quite different way or a decision to address some quite different problem would serve the community better than the scenarios described. Or such procedures as described earlier might help solve crime but would lessen cooperation with the police on important matters. Comparison groups or procedures typically are not employed adequately when assessing possible policy choices, but in reality the need for a ‘comparison’ is usually important. In a discussion about police equipment (e.g., body worn cameras), not only might one want to know whether they affect police or citizen behaviour (implying a comparison with how police or citizens behave without the device), but a serious policy analysis should include an analysis of alternative uses of the resources that would be required for the purchase and use of the devices.

An example of the inappropriate use of implied comparisons is when changes in police strength or police tactics are implemented after an unusual (e.g., serious, violent) incident. When police, understandably, change their approach to policing a neighbourhood that experienced an unusual incident or high concentration of serious incidents, they sometimes infer that any subsequent return to ‘normal’ levels of crime is ‘caused’ by changes they made in their presence in the neighbourhood. Without adequate comparison areas (e.g., areas that experienced a ‘spike’ that did not result in changes in policing), such causal inferences simply aren’t defensible.

The issues become more complex when one moves closer to reality. One fact about crime that noone questions is that it is not evenly (or even randomly) distributed across people, groups of people, or neighbourhoods in our society. Young males, for example, are disproportionately more likely to be involved in a variety of different kinds of crime than other people. People who live in certain kinds of neighbourhoods are more likely to commit offences than people in other neighbourhoods. But some neighbourhoods themselves appear to have characteristics that make them more likely to be the sites for crime above and beyond the characteristics of the individuals who live in them (see, for example, the research summaries provided on pages B1 and B2: 1-2-2; 6-2-7). In this context, a policing

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1 Hereafter, we will simply cite the page number in Part B of this report for the full summary from Criminological Highlights. The numbers that follow are the Criminological Highlights reference (volume, issue number, item number). The “Part B” page numbers are at the bottom right of each page.
perspective that did not consider any other concerns could justify focusing surveillance resources on certain neighbourhoods or types of people (e.g., young males). The problem is that there almost always are other concerns, and concerns that could easily have the effect of undermining the crime control goal of proactive policing activities, such as police stops.

This report examines some of the more reliable research that has been carried out on issues broadly related to ‘street stops’ of ordinary citizens. It makes the assumption that stops can have more than one effect and that some of these effects might, broadly speaking, be favourable and others unfavourable. Hence this report is more than an attempt to answer the question of whether street stops have a short term effect on local crime.

We are not claiming to provide an exhaustive review of the literature that summarizes all of the research on issues related to street stops. Were we to do so, we would spend considerable resources reviewing and discarding inadequate research papers. Instead we are relying on Criminological Highlights, a research information service, produced by the Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies of the University of Toronto.² The papers summarized in this information service not only have been reviewed by reputable social science journals, but also by our editorial board (currently of about 11 people), which has read and evaluated each paper that is summarized in Criminological Highlights. The one page summaries of articles we cite are attached to this report and are an integral part of it. Most importantly, these summaries make it easy for readers to evaluate the information on which our conclusions are based.

² Criminological Highlights is produced by a group of faculty (at the University of Toronto and at nearby universities), criminology doctoral students, and the criminology librarian. To find items appropriate for Criminological Highlights, we scan more than 100 journals that are (largely) available electronically. From time to time, we also consider papers published in journals in related fields. A short list (typically of about 20-30 articles per issue) is chosen and the group reads and discusses each of these papers. For a paper to be included in Criminological Highlights it must be methodologically rigorous and it must have some (general) policy relevance. From September 1997 until April 2011 (Volume 11, Number 6) Criminological Highlights was funded by the Department of Justice, Canada (and for a few years by the Correctional Service of Canada). From August 2011 onwards, the project has been funded by the Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario. Views – expressed or implied – in this publication (and in the commentary that follows) are not necessarily those of the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General nor are they necessarily those of the Department of Justice, Canada, or the Correctional Service of Canada. The project is directed by Anthony Doob and Rosemary Gartner. Copies of all issues are available on our website: http://criminology.utoronto.ca/criminological-highlights/. On occasion, we have included in this report sections taken directly from the summaries we wrote. In any case, the full summaries are available in Part B. The summaries also have the full references to the original research articles.
Evaluating the evidence on ‘police crackdowns’

One of the difficulties in separating effective policing strategies from ineffective ones is that during the time that the most experimentation on these issues was carried out – starting in the early 1990s – crime was decreasing in many areas of the US, Canada, and in some other countries. Hence, where the comparison was ‘what was happening before the change in police activities,’ almost any policing strategies appeared to be effective. Perhaps the most famous example of this was in New York City where the police chief (William Bratton) took credit for a drop in crime, suggesting that aggressive policing of disorder was responsible for a more than 50% decrease in homicides. His argument would have been more persuasive if relatively comparable drops in crime had not occurred in a number of US cities that did not change their policing strategies (B3:1-4-5). But in addition, the overall pattern of the decreases in homicide (e.g., similar decreases in firearms homicides for men and women; decreases in non-firearm homicides for all age groups) do not fit the conclusion that it was aggressive policing per se that was responsible for the drop, though it is possible that massive attempts to keep firearms off the street and out of public places could have had some impact, at least on firearms homicides (B4:2-5-7).

A careful analysis of the changes in policing strategies and crime rates that took place in three cities illustrates this problem. All three cities had police interventions. All three cities also experienced decreases in their homicide rates. A careful analysis of the effects in two cities (New York and Boston), which compared their crime trends with those of 95 other cities, showed no consistent effects of the interventions. Only in Richmond, Virginia, was there some evidence that the police intervention had an impact. However, one simple fact makes that conclusion problematic: Richmond’s homicide rate varied from about 80 to 36 homicides per 100,000 residents; the 95 “comparison cities” varied from about 20 to 13. Clearly the “comparisons cities” were much safer that Richmond to begin with and so could not be considered to be appropriate comparisons (B5:7-5-2).

The need, in research on issues such as the effectiveness of police interventions, is not just for any comparison group. What is needed is a comparison city (or other location) that is similar in all ways other than the fact that an intervention took place.

The police and crime: Hotspots and intensive police activities

Nobody seriously questions the importance of the police as a key agency in the criminal justice system. The disagreements that arise about the importance of the police in preventing crime arise largely in discussions about the degree to which the police can affect the amount of crime that occurs in society and whether particular broad approaches to policing can be relied on to reduce crime.
Some issues aren’t necessary to discuss. For example, the issue of what crime rates would look like if there were no police (e.g., if a strike were to take place) has little bearing on the issue of what effect variations in the normal activities or concentration of police might have on crime. At the same time, it is worth remembering that police services are not the only important determinant of crime, or of variation in crime over time. Various scholars have noted that police services are not well placed to stop a good deal of crime. The apprehension, and contributions to the successful prosecution, of those who offend is important in and of itself. But other organizations are also involved in crime prevention. For example, one of the apparent ‘crime prevention’ successes in recent years – reduction in auto thefts – relates more to engineering and design than to traditional policing (see B6:7-5-1, and B7:16-1-8).

This is not to say that the police cannot affect crime rates in a neighbourhood. There is sufficient research on the policing of so-called ‘hot spots’ – locations in which high rates of crime take place over an extended period of time – to know that ‘hot spot’ policing can reduce crime. Fortunately, there is sufficient evidence on this issue that it is plausible to draw certain (at least tentative) conclusions.

The context for one study was concern about firearms misuse in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In response to this concern, concentrations of police were increased dramatically (20% to 50%) in local areas in which there was evidence of illegal carrying of firearms in public places. The increased police presence occurred at times and locations that had been high in crime. These newly deployed police did not respond to normal calls for service but, instead, concentrated on ‘stopping and talking’ to people whom they considered to be at high risk for carrying firearms. Essentially, visible police presence increased dramatically. Using “assault related gunshot injuries” and reports of “shots fired” as measures of success, it appeared that this high concentration of police in small local areas was successful in suppressing firearms violations while the police were there. Perhaps not surprisingly, however, the effectiveness of the strategy seemed to be limited to the times and locations in which the police concentration was high (B8:7-6-1).

A very similar result (in the same city) was found for concentrated enforcement of drug laws in locations that the police had identified as ‘nuisance bars’ where illegal drug sales were taking place. Although the results are somewhat complex, essentially the ‘positive’ impact of concentrated police action was quite local (suppressing drug sales in the establishment that was targeted and the immediate area only) and, more importantly, the reduction in illegal drug activity did not last long after enforcement was reduced to normal levels (B9:6-3-5).

Sometimes there is a conflict between what the police say about a targeted program and what systematic evidence demonstrates. An effort by London, England, police to interrupt
drug trafficking by arresting those selling drugs on the street provides such an illustration. The goal had been to make drug purchases more difficult and more expensive. Though the police described it as a “spectacular success”, systematic evidence collected from drug users suggests that this wasn’t the case (B10: 4-5-3).

These findings are similar to the impact of intensive foot patrols on crime. In Philadelphia, in 2009, 120 ‘hotspots’ for serious crime (homicide, aggravated assaults, robberies) were identified. In 60 of them intensive patrols were instituted; the other 60 locations served as controls. The locations that got the intensive patrols were randomly assigned; hence prior to the intervention it is reasonable to assume that locations the received intensive patrols were similar to those that did not. A careful analysis of the project demonstrated that there was approximately one crime averted in the areas subjected to intensive patrols for every 2174 person-hours of patrol (B11:12-3-3). However, these effects were short lived. After the high concentration patrols stopped, the effects disappeared (B12:13-3-2).

The mechanism for these effects appears to be fairly simple: People do not offend when they perceive there is a high likelihood of being apprehended by the police. However, even these effects seem to be more pronounced when the police concentrate their ‘suppression’ efforts on specific named individuals who are thought to be involved in crime (B13:15-2-3). Presumably, focusing activities that make the presence of police salient to those most likely to commit offences is, simply, more efficient. In another study, it was shown that high density patrols in which police officers engaged in various activities, such as checks of buildings, vehicles, and pedestrians, as well as other activities that made their presence known, had some favourable impacts on certain crimes. What was a bit surprising, however, is that the effects were limited to reducing non-domestic firearms assaults (and not, for example, firearms robberies). It appeared that focusing police attention on arrests and checking occupied vehicles accounted for the crime reducing effect. One important aspect of this study was that it dealt with very small geographic areas (each area had an average of 128 residents). These geographic areas were randomly assigned to receive policing as usual, high density (ordinary) policing, or high density ‘active’ policing. Without the control conditions, it would have been impossible to determine what the effects really were since firearms crimes decreased in all areas (B14:14-5-3).

Clearly under some circumstances high visibility active police presence in a community can reduce crime. One obvious mechanism, already mentioned, is that such activities increase the perceived likelihood of apprehension for those who might otherwise commit offences. Police enforcement programs for traffic offences that are visible to ordinary drivers – often because their implementation is combined with media campaigns – can be effective in reducing serious traffic accidents in large part because people change their behaviour if they
perceive a high likelihood of apprehension (B15:7-6-7). It has been suggested, more generally, that police should, in their crime control efforts, focus on activities that increase the perceived likelihood of apprehension (B16:11-6-1).

It is important, however, to note that simply increasing the number of police officers in a jurisdiction does not necessarily lead to a decrease in crime. During the period 1995-2000, the US Department of Justice gave some local police services funds for the hiring of more police officers. Since funds were not distributed equally across cities, it was possible to see whether the new funds had a consistent impact on crime. There were no consistent effects (B17:8-6-6), perhaps because the size of the increases in police was, on average, quite small.

The lesson seems to be that ‘more’ is not necessarily better; resources need to be targeted to activities that can be demonstrated to have favourable impacts.

“Broken windows” policing and proactive police stops and searches: Effects on crime.

In considering whether ‘disorder’ in neighbourhoods should be viewed as a ‘crime problem’, probably the first thing to assess is whether ‘neighbourhood disorder’ is causally linked to crime. One study (B18: 3-3-1), carried out in Chicago, examined this directly.

Social disorder (e.g., adults loitering or congregating in public places, public alcohol consumption, drug selling) and physical disorder (e.g., presence of garbage or litter, graffiti, abandoned cars) were quite highly correlated. Not surprisingly, “disordered” neighbourhoods were poorer, more likely to have high concentrations of immigrants, and lower in “collective efficacy” (i.e., the willingness of neighbours to “do something” in response to problems, trust in one’s neighbours, neighbourhood social cohesion, etc.). Collective efficacy has been found in previous studies to be an important predictor of neighbourhood crime above and beyond characteristics of the individuals in the neighbourhood.

The most important findings, however, were that measures of social and physical disorder (what some have termed “broken windows”) were not related to personal violence and household burglary (assessed by victimization measures) once characteristics of the neighbourhood (e.g., collective efficacy, mixed land use) were controlled for. “The results are consistent and point to a spurious association of disorder with predatory crime” (p. 627).  

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3 Page references for quotes are the page in the original article where the quote appeared. The citation can be found in the cited Criminological Highlights summary in Part B.
When examining officially recorded crime, “disorder” once again disappeared as a predictor of homicide and burglary once measures of collective efficacy and prior crime rates were controlled for. “The key result is that the influences of structural characteristics and collective efficacy on burglary, robbery, and homicide are not mediated by neighbourhood disorder” (p. 629). The exception was officially recorded measures of robbery where there was a relationship with disorder even after controlling for other factors. Whether this is due to a “complex feedback loop” (p. 637) or an artifact of official data (e.g., “citizen calls to the police or police accuracy in recording robberies is greater in areas perceived to be high in disorder” --p. 638) is not clear.

The authors of this study concluded that: “The active ingredients in crime seem to be structural disadvantage and attenuated collective efficacy more than disorder. Attacking public disorder through police tactics may thus be a politically popular but perhaps analytically weak strategy to reduce crime, mainly because such a strategy leaves the common origins of both [disorder and crime], but especially [crime] untouched. A more subtle approach suggested by this article would look to how informal but collective efforts among residents to stem disorder may provide unanticipated benefits for increasing collective efficacy... in the long run lowering crime” (p. 638).

In this context, then, it is not surprising that attempts to deal with serious crime by focusing on those responsible for minor disorder (e.g., those using drugs in public) are not likely to be effective. One study (B-19: 8-5-8) noted that if the police ‘theory’ is that the way to deal with important crime is to crack down on less serious matters, such as using marijuana in public view, then the police can easily (though not necessarily purposefully) create findings that make it seem that a crackdown was effective. This study found that the locations with the biggest drop in crime were those with the largest increases in crime in the period immediately before marijuana arrests had been instituted as a crime control technique. The police, presumably believing that public order arrests would reduce crime, focused on those locations with the largest increases in recent years. In fact, the precincts with the largest violent crime decline after the public order arrests started were those that had the largest increases in crime in earlier years and, coincidentally, the largest ‘crack down’ on using marijuana in public places. When the violent crime rate prior to the marijuana crackdown or the change in violent crime prior to the marijuana arrest policy is taken into account, those locations with the most marijuana arrests had higher, not lower, levels of violent crime.
These findings are very similar to another study (B20: 8-4-1) that demonstrated the necessity of controlling adequately for pre-existing changes in crime rates.4

Not surprisingly, the research on the impact of ‘order maintenance policing’ – the aggressive targeting of minor problems (vagrancy, loitering, littering, prostitution, etc. – is not entirely consistent across studies. One study (B21:9-1-2) suggested that about 4% of the decline in homicide and robbery in New York between 1988 and 2001 was due to variation in the implementation of order maintenance policing. The other 96% of the decline was, presumably, due to other factors. It is possible, however, that the precincts in which order maintenance policing was implemented most aggressively also implemented other policies related to crime. In any case, it is almost certainly safe to conclude that variation in this form of aggressive policing was not responsible for much of the drop in crime in New York City during this period.

One theory used to justify ‘order maintenance policing’ is that frequent police stops and ‘zero tolerance’ policies for minor infractions send a message to the community that crime of any sort won’t be tolerated. Unfortunately, it doesn’t seem to be that simple. One study (B22:4-5-4), for example, found that targeting aggressive enforcement at minor infractions might have increased compliance with these minor matters, but had little measurable impact on real crime. The authors of the paper concluded that “[q]uality of life initiatives are often employed without the benefit of careful problem identification or analysis, without any effort to identify underlying conditions and causes, and without careful consideration of a wide range of possible alternatives” (p. 880).

One study (B23:15-5-2) that looked at 28 relatively high quality studies of ‘policing disorder interventions’ found very small effects on crime, but all of the favourable (crime reducing) effects were attributable to those studies involving community problem solving. Those programs that attempted to carry out ‘aggressive order maintenance’ programs (e.g., focusing on minor forms of disorder such as public drunkenness, prostitution, vandalism, disorderly youth, or traditional arresting of those thought to be gang members) did not show statistically significant effects. The authors concluded that “When considering a policing disorder approach, police departments should adopt a ‘community co-production model’ rather than drift toward a zero-tolerance policing model, which focuses on a subset of social incivilities…” (p. 581). This latter approach appears to be ineffective.

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4 Essentially what we are referring to here is a phenomenon sometimes called “regression to the mean” which refers to circumstances where, when an observation that is first made is extreme, it will ‘naturally’ tend to be closer to the mean on a subsequent observation. A mundane example might be that if it is unusually cold on Day 1, it is more likely that the Day 2 temperature will be warmer (closer to the mean) on Day 2.
“Stop, question, and frisk” (SQF) approaches to order maintenance have been criticised on a number of grounds, including that they are racially targeted. In New York City, for example, it was found (B24:14-5-4) that there were 26 stops of Black people per 100 Black residents, compared to 3 stops of White people per 100 White people. The results reported in this study regarding crime, however, were less clear. The results “show few significant effects of several ‘stop, question and frisk’ (SQF) measures on precinct robbery and burglary rates” (p. 116) and the significant results did not hold across crimes or type of analyses. A cautious conclusion, according to the authors, might be that one “cannot conclude from the current investigation that SQF has no impact on crime in New York. But we can be more certain that, if there is an impact, it is so localized and dissipates so rapidly that it fails to register in annual precinct crime rates, much less the decade-long citywide crime reductions that public officials have attributed to the policy. If SQF is effective, but its effects are highly focused and fleeting, policy-makers must decide whether expansions in a policy that already produces nearly 700,000 police stops a year are warranted, especially given the ongoing controversy regarding the disproportionate impact of SQF on racial and ethnic minorities and the possibility that it reduces police legitimacy, which may erode its crime-reduction effects over the long term” (p. 117-118).

Another study (B25:15-6-3) that looked in detail at SQF approaches in New York City found that “in the peak years of SQFs in NYC, the almost 700,000 SQFs would lead to only a 2% decline in crime” (p. 47). Attributing the decline in crime solely to SQF is problematic in that it is impossible to separate out the effect of SQF on crime from the mere presence of police. In addition, attributing this modest drop in crime to SQF ignores the “degree that SQFs are coupled with other policing strategies” (p. 49). Specifically, “[i]n light of research findings on the effectiveness of directed patrol, the prolonged presence of police in a crime hot spot might very well be the active ingredient of SQFs, as opposed to anything that the police were doing” (p. 61). As one commentator noted “the efficacy of the SQF tactic, at least from the standpoint of marginal deterrence, is considerably more ambiguous than its advocates might like to admit” (p. 62). Finally, even if there is a small effect, it is impossible to know whether this effect relates only to certain types of SQFs (e.g., those involving actual offenders).

Changes in policing do not necessarily have simple effects. For example, the previous study (B25: 15-6-3) noted that “The aggressive use of SQFs could erode citizens’ willingness to report crime to, or to cooperate in investigation or intelligence gathering with, the police. In a recent survey… young respondents who were stopped more frequently reported less willingness to report crimes even when they were the crime victims” (p. 63). Even if it could be shown that the apparent effects of SQFs on crime are due to SQFs and not some other correlated factor, “[t]he question is whether this approach [SQFs] is the best one for crime
prevention at hot spots and whether its benefits are greater than its potential negative impacts on citizen evaluations of police legitimacy” (p. 50). But in addition, one study (B26:10-3-4) found that intensive policing of some neighbourhoods in which the police engaged in crackdowns on street-level disorder increased, rather than decreased, the likelihood that people would feel unsafe in their neighbourhoods.

**Police stops: Race**

It would be almost impossible, and inappropriate, to discuss police stops of citizens and not talk about race. We hasten to point out, however, that we do not think that the issue of race is the only one relevant to concerns about police stops. Nevertheless, it is hardly controversial to suggest that race is an important factor to be concerned about.

One of the reasons that we should be concerned about the relationship of race to the likelihood of being stopped is that the perception that racial profiling takes place leads to inferences by many citizens that the police are acting in an illegitimate fashion (B27:7-1-4).

A number of different studies have attempted to determine whether police stops (and searches) disproportionately target members of certain racialized groups. One Canadian study (B28: 12-5-5), using a nationally representative survey of 4,164 youths, found that youths who were Black, Arab/Middle Eastern or Aboriginal were more likely to be questioned by the police than other youths (White or East/South Asian) even when other potentially relevant factors were controlled for. These ‘other factors’ included such things as staying out late or low income. But in addition, controlling for three forms of self-reported delinquency did not reduce the higher likelihood that youths who were Black/Aboriginal/Arab/Middle Eastern would be stopped. More interesting, perhaps, is the finding that among youths who reported involvement in violence in the previous year, those who were Black/Aboriginal/Arab/Middle Eastern were no more likely to be stopped by police than other youth. However, there was a sizable difference in level of police contact for youths who had not been involved in violent crime in the previous year: 28.5% of Black/Aboriginal/Arab/Middle Eastern youths had contact with the police compared to only 10.1% of the other youths. The overall finding, and the fact that the effect was due largely to differential treatment of non-violent youths, lends some support to the conclusion that the difference in treatment of the two groups relates to racial targeting by the police.

These findings are fairly similar to those from a representative survey of Toronto high school students (B29: 16-3-4), which found that Black high school students were considerably more likely to be stopped at least once than were white high school students (63% vs. 41%). 30% of high school youths of other races reported being stopped at least once. Other variables also predicted stops and/or searches including social class, the level of
engagement in public activities on the street, involvement in partying, frequency of driving, involvement in illegal activities, and membership in gangs. However, while these factors independently predicted stops and searches, being Black had an impact above and beyond these factors for Toronto high school students. This study also included a sample of ‘street youths’ – those living on the street or in a shelter. For the street youths, race did not predict stops or searches. 66% of the street youths met the criteria set in the study for being ‘highly involved in illegal activities.’ It would seem that “high criminality exposes people of all races to equal levels of police scrutiny” (p. 341). Hence, street youths, as a group, had a very high likelihood of being stopped and searched no matter what their race. At the other end of the spectrum, however, for youths who reported no involvement in illegal activities, 4% of the White youths and 27% of the Black youths reported multiple police stops. It seems that “good behaviour does not protect Black youth from police contact to the same extent that it protects White youth” (p. 340).

There have been a number of studies in various countries about the differential treatment of people of different races by the police. As various authors have pointed out, (e.g., B30: 7-2-2), determining what the ‘expected’ rate of stops for any group is not simple. But in addition, the vulnerability of different groups to being stopped seems to vary across areas. People who appear to be ‘out of place’ (e.g., Black motorists in predominantly white areas) appear to be particularly likely to be stopped (B31:5-4-2).

There are even more complex findings on what happens after citizens are stopped by the police. A study (B32:13-2-8) in St. Louis, Missouri, found that after a stop of a motorist for a traffic violation, searches were most likely to take place when White officers stopped Black drivers (searches took place in 8.2% of stops) and were least likely when Black officers stopped White drivers (1.5% of stops). Between these two extremes, White officers were more likely to search White drivers (5.1% of stops) than were Black officers who stopped Black drivers (3.9% of stops). But in addition, this pattern varied according to the racial makeup of the neighbourhood in which the stop took place.

The consequences of being stopped also appear to vary across race. One study (B33: 6-4-4) based on a survey of US residents found that Blacks and Hispanics who are stopped were more likely to be subject to police actions (such as being ticketed, arrested or being subject to the use of force). However, Blacks and Hispanics were less likely to be found to be involved in any criminal wrongdoing, suggesting, perhaps, that “targeting drivers solely or even partially on the basis of their race/ethnicity is not an effective, efficient, or responsible policing strategy at the national level [in the U.S.]” (p.82). These findings are similar to those of another study (B34: 12-1-7) which summarized the findings from 27 independent high quality studies of what happens to suspects when they come in contact with the police.
Depending on exactly what outcome was considered, between 19 and 24 of the 27 studies show effects supporting the conclusion that minorities are more likely to be arrested than whites. Pooling across the 27 studies there was a significant effect of race. On average the arrest rate for whites was about 20%; for minorities it was about 26%. Studies varied, of course, on how adequately they controlled for legally relevant factors. However, the adequacy of the controls for legally relevant factors was not related to the race effect: Even in the best studies, Blacks were more likely to be arrested than Whites. Similarly, those studies that attempted to control for the demeanour of the suspect showed race effects on the outcome of police decisions as large as those that did not.

In this context, then, it is not surprising that Blacks are more likely than others to perceive that policing decisions are made, in part, along racial lines (B35: 3-1-3).

Importantly, one does need to consider that even stops that don’t lead to any formal criminal justice consequences can have negative impacts on people. It appears (B36:14-5-2) that people become less engaged with their communities if they are subject to what might be considered ‘unproductive’ police stops.

**A related issue: Warnings**

Although warnings given to those stopped and questioned by police are not central to the question about the ‘impact’ of police stops, there is a growing literature on this topic. A question underlying much of this research is a simple one: Do warnings effectively convey to people what they legally do and do not have to do? Said differently, if people agree to answer questions, or agree to being identified and searched after being warned about potential consequences, is it safe to assume that they understand the warning? We won’t go into this literature in great detail but we think it should be considered in when thinking about the effects of police stops.

The first finding – and one that may help explain other findings from this line of research -- is that “warnings” given to suspects by the police do not seem to affect the ability of an accused person to resist giving a confession (B37: 5-5-5). Another (US) study (B38: 13-4-2) similarly found that warnings do little to protect accused youths from the consequences of making statements.

More relevant are two Canadian studies that examined whether warnings given to adults (B-39: 11-3-7) or to youths (B40: 15-6-7) are adequately understood by those who receive the warning from the police. The conclusion of these two studies is simple: Warnings are not well understood by either adults or youths.
The study of warnings given to Canadian youths concluded that perhaps because warnings are often long and written in language that is difficult for youths to understand, it is not surprising that young people do not fully understand the warnings that are normally used by police. “Also of importance was the fact that participants [who were read the warnings used by their local police] reported high levels of confidence in how much they understood and almost always confirmed that they understood the rights that were presented – despite the overall low level of comprehension. This finding suggests that simply asking youths whether they understood the rights is not a useful procedure for ensuring that youths actually understand their rights” (p. 821). But, in addition, other research suggests that even if they understand the ‘words’, youths may not be able to resist the pressures to make statements to the police.

The importance of fair treatment by the police

The view that fair treatment of ordinary citizens by the police is important is, we think, widely shared. Society asks police to do certain jobs and grants the police certain unusual powers (e.g., the use of force) but in return expects fair treatment. There is considerable evidence that procedurally fair treatment by the police is important in motivating ordinary people to cooperate with the police. Furthermore, procedural justice appears to be just as important for youths as it is for adults (B41: 15-1-5).

But there are other important reasons for wanting fair treatment from the police, most notably that unfair treatment by the police leads people to question the legitimacy of the police and their right to use force. One study (B42: 15-3-2) found that perceptions of the legitimacy of the police are correlated with perceptions that the police act in a procedurally fair manner. Furthermore, it showed that those who see the police as acting with legitimacy are less likely to support ordinary people’s use of violence for personal protection, to resolve disputes, or to achieve political goals.

Another (Australian) study (B43:15-4-3) found that being treated in a courteous, friendly way and being given an explanation for a stop by the police was “consistently important for influencing both emotional reactions and compliance [with the law and the police]…. By engaging with the public in a polite, respectful, and empathetic manner, police officers will be able to reduce negative sentiments and emotion directed at them, thereby increasing people’s willingness to comply with them both immediately and in the future” (p. 269). “If the police wish to be able to effectively manage citizen behaviour and promote compliance with the law, the findings… suggest that they ought to treat people with procedural justice” (p. 270).
There also is evidence (B44: 12-5-6) that the degree of “legal cynicism” in a neighbourhood – lack of support for the legitimacy of laws and lack of confidence in the police – is related to crime rates in the neighbourhood. Simply put, if the law is unavailable because citizens do not trust the police, people may resolve their grievances in their own ways, which may include violence.

One longitudinal study (B45:16-3-7) of 689 African American youths noted that “For the state to secure voluntary compliance from the public, it is necessary for it to be perceived as morally credible” (p. 520). It found that the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of young Black Americans is undermined most dramatically when negative interactions with the police occur to those who live in neighbourhoods with high levels of legal cynicism. These results are independent of individuals’ record of offending, arrests or other criminal justice contact.

How the police behave toward citizens, then, can affect crime. A study of officially recognized police misconduct in New York City (B46:7-6-3) found that in highly disadvantaged neighbourhoods, the level of police misconduct predicted the violent crime rate. “In [the poorest] communities, residents may feel the most marginalized and socially dislocated and they may respond the most adversely to (real or apparent) violations of procedural justice norms by the police, who represent the most visible agents of official social control … These findings suggest the importance of police departments meeting procedural justice expectations, specifically in extremely disadvantaged communities” (p. 492).

Citizens’ views of the police.

The quality of the treatment that people receive affects people’s views of the justice system. In fact, it appears that the quality of the treatment – as opposed to factors like the ability of the police to reduce crime – is most important in understanding people’s views of the justice system (B47:4-4-1).

Statistics Canada survey data suggest that, in general, Canadians have quite positive views of the police. A study\(^5\) using the 2009 Statistics Canada General Social Survey data that looked at urban Ontario residents’ views of the police found variation across racial and ethnic groups in how the police were viewed, but in general, the police were given quite positive ratings. In the table below, the scores are on a 3-point scale where 1=poor, 2=average, and 3=good. The dimensions on which the police were rated were divided into two groups:

(a) “Technical” dimensions: enforcing the law, promptly responding to calls, supplying information to the public on how to prevent crime, ensuring safety.

(b) “Interpersonal” dimensions: being approachable and easy to talk to, treating people fairly.

Looking at the 98% of urban Ontario residents who identified themselves using one racial group, we see that all groups of urban Ontario residents, on average, rated their local police as being between ‘average’ and ‘good’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpersonal Questions</th>
<th>Ontario – Technical questions</th>
<th>Ontario – Interpersonal Questions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>(2.57^{AB}) (3288)</td>
<td>(2.63^{AB}) (3223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>(2.51^c) (160)</td>
<td>(2.50^A) (150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>(2.67^{ACD}) (261)</td>
<td>(2.65^c) (256)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>(2.56) (154)</td>
<td>(2.41^{BC}) (143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal</td>
<td>(2.41^{BD}) (78)</td>
<td>(2.46) (77)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: 1=poor, 2=average, 3 =good (weighted N’s in parentheses).
Cells in the same grouping (province and type of question) with a superscript in common are significantly different from each other.

Without going into too much detail, there are, in addition to the generally favourable ratings, three findings that are worth keeping in mind.

1) The racialized groups differ from one another in their views of the police on these two dimensions.

2) The pattern of the ratings of the police across groups for the “technical questions” is not the same as for the “interpersonal” questions.

3) In their ratings of the police on “technical” matters, Black residents are almost identical to White residents, but on the “interpersonal” dimensions Black residents rate the police lower than do Whites and South Asians.

It would appear, then, that people do differentiate between certain technical aspects of police work and how fair/approachable the police are seen.

Citizens’ views of the police do seem to reflect how they are treated by the police. One study (B48: 8-5-5) of citizens’ views of encounters with the police in Chicago found that it was important to differentiate between citizen- and police-initiated encounters. For citizen-
initiated encounters, overall satisfaction with the police was related to whether the citizen thought the police had behaved well (e.g., had been helpful, polite, thorough in their explanations, etc.) and not to the citizen’s age or race. For police-initiated contact, there was a ‘race’ effect, but it was considerably smaller in magnitude than were the effects of the quality of the encounter itself (e.g., whether the police officers explained their actions, or whether they were perceived as fair and polite).

The data would suggest, then, that the impact of race on ratings of the police is largely due to differential ratings of the quality of the police-initiated contact.

The problem for the police, however, is that negative experiences with the police have large (negative) impacts on ordinary citizens’ views of the police. Positive interactions, however, are much less important determinants of citizens’ views of the police, perhaps because ‘good behaviour’ is seen as expected (B49: 8-2-1). “For both police-initiated and citizen-initiated encounters [with the police], the impact of having a bad experience is four to fourteen times as great as that of having a positive experience. The coefficients associated with having a good experience – including being treated fairly and politely, and receiving service that was prompt and helpful – were very small and not statistically different from zero” (p. 100). It would appear that it is more important for police administrators interested in improving citizens’ assessments of the police to focus on ways of avoiding negative interactions with the public than on creating opportunities for positive interactions.

The positive aspect of these findings is that citizens’ views of the police are within the power of the police to improve. Avoiding what might be considered to be ‘offensive language’, for example, appears to be very important (B50: 7-2-3). The nature of the interaction between citizens and police officers is clearly important.

In a study of crime victims (B51:13-2-5), for example, “Respondents who felt that police did not show enough interest were much less likely to be satisfied… regardless of whether the offender [related to their victimization] had been identified and/or charged. Those who felt the police had shown enough interest, by contrast, were more likely to be satisfied… regardless of what had happened in relation to the offender” (p. 413). Outcomes did matter, but the positive impact of the outcome was considerably less in cases where police seemed uninterested in the case compared to cases where citizens thought police showed appropriate interest. Hence, police officers or police organizations that focus solely on “getting a result” (p. 417) run the risk of losing the support of the public they serve.

A policing style oriented toward procedural justice is likely to have a positive impact on public satisfaction. Aside from anything else, being effective in dealing with crime is largely out of the control of an individual police officer; but the police officer can nevertheless
enhance the public’s view of police by demonstrating that a citizen’s concerns are taken seriously (B52: 11-2-3).

**Ensuring cooperation with the police**

Given the research findings already summarized in this report, it should not be surprising that a study (B53: 13-5-6) of residents of London, England, found that voluntary cooperation with the police (e.g., by offering to provide them with information) appears to be related to some extent with feelings of obligation to obey the police. But in addition, high ratings of the police on lawfulness, procedural fairness and distributive fairness were also associated with the citizens’ willingness to voluntarily provide the police with crime-related information.

In a world in which terrorism appears to be a more salient problem than in the past, it is probably particularly important for the police to be able to count on members of the public to bring to their attention people or events that are potentially significant. In a study (B54: 11-4-1) of Muslim Americans’ views of cooperation with the police in New York City, it was found that broad integration into American society was important in ensuring cooperation.

Those respondents who thought that the police acted in a procedurally fair manner within their (Muslim) communities were more likely to indicate their willingness to alert the police to possible terrorism threats. In addition, those respondents who believed that anti-terrorism policies had been created in a legitimate fashion (e.g., that the community had been given an opportunity to provide input and community views were considered) were more likely to cooperate with the police in averting terrorism and they were more willing to alert the police to possible terrorism activities. Muslim Americans who reported experiencing discrimination at school, work, or in dealing with authorities, were less willing to cooperate with the police or report possible terrorism activities to the police. Finally, those respondents who had strong identification with America (e.g., who agreed with the statement that “Being an American is important to the way I think of myself as a person”) were more willing to alert the police.

Most New York Muslim respondents indicated that they would engage in cooperative actions if asked to do so by the police, and most indicated that they would report possible terrorist related activities to the police. The variation that did exist in Muslims’ willingness to combat terrorism appears to be in large part affected by the degree to which Muslims have had positive versus discriminatory interactions with others in American society. Those who felt excluded from American society through overt discrimination, for example, as well as those who reported that the police did not treat them fairly, were less likely to be cooperative on terrorism matters.
In another study (B55:12-5-2) it was found that “The shift in policing from crime control to counterterrorism does not appear to have changed public expectations of police behaviour or to have altered the basis on which police are evaluated…” (p. 435). Procedural justice mechanisms are just as important for Muslim Americans as they are for non-Muslim minorities and for whites. “Even when police confront grave threats, both minority and majority populations expect law enforcement officers to respect procedural justice values and are more likely to withhold their cooperation if they do not…. Non-Muslims, who rate the threat of terror as larger than do Muslims, are nonetheless sensitive to procedural justice in counterterrorism policing, particularly the targeting and harassment of Muslims” (p. 436).

“Three elements of procedural justice – neutrality in decision making, trust in the motives of the police, and treatment with respect – remain central to the definition of procedural justice and its effect on legitimacy” (p. 437). This is just as true in dealing with terrorism as it is in responding to ordinary crime.

A study (B56: 13-3-1) of police legitimacy in another country not immune from terrorism – Israel – arrived at very similar conclusions. In this study, a high and a low threat/risk area were compared. The performance and the efficiency of the police were important in both the ‘high terrorism’ area and in the comparison areas, but, as predicted “under conditions of threat, evaluations [of performance] play a significantly larger role in predicting police legitimacy than when there is no specific threat in the background” (p. 18). More interesting, however, is the fact that procedural justice was equally important in predicting police legitimacy in both the ‘high threat’ and the ‘low threat’ areas. “The results of the present study suggest that the desire for procedural justice is an enduring, stable trait, regardless of the security situation. Under conditions of security threats, individuals do value police performance to a greater extent when forming evaluations of police legitimacy. However, there does not seem to be a zero-sum game between performance and procedural justice: under threat, while performance increases in importance, procedural justice does not decline in importance and indeed remains the primary antecedent of legitimacy, as is the case when there is no security threat in the background” (p. 19). In more mundane terms, the police cannot afford to minimize the importance of dealing with citizens in a procedurally just fashion just because the community is facing serious external threats.

**The effects of contact with the criminal justice system**

Obviously the police need to have direct contact with some youths. But there has been a fair amount of concern expressed about the possible crime-increasing effect of contact between youths and the police. In one longitudinal study (B57: 14-4-5) carried out in the US it was found that youths who were stopped and/or arrested by the police were more likely, subsequently, to reoffend than a matched comparison group. The results showed that after
matching youths on their propensities to experience police contact, those who were arrested were significantly more likely to engage in delinquencies than those who were only stopped, and those stopped were more likely to engage in delinquencies than those who had no police contact. Furthermore, there was a tendency for greater amounts of police contact to reduce commitment to school, increase the likelihood the youth would have delinquent friends, and reduce their feelings of guilt about offending. Stop-and-frisk interactions between youths and police “may have the unintended consequence of increasing future delinquent involvement. Thus police practices of engaging in high rates of stops, many of which are ‘unproductive’ or ‘innocent,’ may be counterproductive” (p. 956). “For both youth who are stopped and youth who are arrested, delinquency amplification is partially explained by the attenuation of prosocial bonds, changes in deviant identity, and increased involvement with delinquent peers” (p. 956-7). Another study (B58: 15-4-8) suggests that this effect may demonstrate itself most dramatically among those who have had some, but not much, experience in offending.

Many youths commit offences, but only a subset of them are ever apprehended or arrested by the police. Thus it is possible, with surveys, to identify pairs of youths who are very similar in terms of their backgrounds, including their involvement in offending, but who differ on whether they were ever arrested. The data from one such study (B59: 14-6-1) suggest that being arrested increases subsequent violent offending; and being arrested once increases the likelihood of being rearrested. Hence it appears that being arrested makes the youth more likely to offend. But quite independent of offending rates, “a first juvenile arrest seems to increase subsequent law enforcement responses to those youth compared to other youth who offend at a comparable level but have managed to evade a first arrest. This could result from increased scrutiny of the individual’s future behaviour, by police as well as others… as well as from reduced tolerance by police … of an arrestee’s future transgressions” (p. 363). Part of the reason that being arrested may be ineffective in reducing subsequent offending is that being arrested does not affect the perceived likelihood of being apprehended in the future (B60: 8-1-7).

These findings are not unique. One paper (B61:11-4-3) reviewed 29 separate sets of findings in which youths were, in effect, randomly assigned to receive formal court processing or less formal approaches. It found that, overall, court processing appeared to create, on average, small increases the likelihood that youths would be involved in at least some subsequent offending, though there were non-trivial differences across studies. Youths processed by the courts were, on average, involved in more crime than those processed in other ways. Similar effects were found for severity: Formal court processing of youths, if anything, increased the severity of subsequent offending.
A conservative conclusion would be that court processing does not reduce subsequent offending. “Given that the evidence indicates that there is no public safety benefit to [youth justice] system processing, and its greater costs when compared to release, even the most conservative cost-benefit analyses would favour release over [youth justice] system processing” (p. 38). Obviously some youths, because they have committed serious offences, will be brought to court in any jurisdiction. Furthermore, one cannot generalize the findings from these “matching” studies to those youth because these studies focused largely on youths charged with relatively minor offences.

At the same time it should be noted that “the data from these studies do not support a policy of establishing [formal] diversion programs for juveniles who normally would not have been officially processed…” (p. 39).

In another study (B62: 6-5-3) it was found that a youth’s likelihood of graduating from high school was lowered as a result of police or juvenile justice involvement even after controlling statistically for previous offending, parental poverty, and school ability (at age 12). A separate analysis found that “experiencing official [criminal justice] intervention in adolescence is significantly associated with reduced odds in favour of staying in school in a subsequent period” (p. 1301). An analysis of self-reported criminal activity at age 19-20 demonstrated that police or juvenile justice intervention earlier in adolescence was associated with increased criminal behaviour in early adulthood. The effect of police or juvenile justice intervention “has stronger crime amplification effects among the disadvantaged [African American youths living in poverty]” (p. 1306).

Part of the negative effects of criminal justice processing may relate to its effect on an important determinant of a person’s life chances: graduating from high school. The evidence (B63: 14-6-2) seems quite clear that “Arrest in adolescence hinders the transition to adulthood by undermining pathways to educational attainment.” (p. 54). Youths who are arrested are more likely to drop out of school than are equivalent youths who are not arrested while in high school. Given the effects of arrest on high school completion and on enrolment in 4-year post-secondary programs, juvenile arrest can, therefore, be viewed “as a life-course trap in the educational pathways of a considerable number of adolescents in contemporary American cities” (p. 55).

A first time court appearance for a youth appears to have more negative impacts on education outcomes than a first time arrest that does not eventually lead to court (B64: 8-5-4). These findings are similar to those reported for adults: Arrests, even when they do not lead to convictions, make it harder for someone to get a job (B65: 15-1-7).
Conclusion

The police have a number of important roles to play in public safety and in the operation of the criminal justice system. The findings that we cite here which suggest that certain approaches to crime and public protection either do not work or have overall negative impacts should be placed in this larger context.

Perhaps the conclusion that one could come to that might be the least controversial would be the need to monitor and evaluate police policies related to police stops to ensure that the benefits outweigh the possible harm that could come from the intervention. This is the same conclusion that one could apply just as easily to medical or educational interventions as to police interventions.

An important point to remember is that one cannot conclude that something is effective, just because assertions are made that it is. Data are important. And sometimes, the findings are complex. Certain kinds of activities of the police can have quite positive effects if the community is engaged in an appropriate fashion (see, for example, B66:1-6-3).

But looking at the issue that we started with – street stops by the police of people who have not apparently committed an offence – it is quite clear to us that it is easy to exaggerate the usefulness of these stops, and hard to find data that supports the usefulness of continuing to carry them out.

This is not to say that the police should not be encouraged to continue to talk to people on the street. But the evidence that it is useful to stop, question, identify, and/or search people and to record and store this information simply because the police and citizens “are there” appears to us to be substantially outweighed by convincing evidence of the harm of such practices both to the person subject to them and to the long term and overall relationship of the police to the community.
Communities where residents can count on their neighbours to intervene when there is minor trouble, and where residents trust one another, are likely to have low levels of violence above and beyond the characteristics of the individuals who live in that neighbourhood.

Background. In the previous issue of Criminological Highlights, we presented a paper demonstrating that communities which teach their members to have social and moral obligations to others have less crime. The idea that there are characteristics of communities above and beyond the characteristics of individuals that are important in understanding levels of crime is not new, but at the same time, it is not an idea that has received much systematic research attention. This study, coming from the “Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighbourhoods” demonstrates that there are characteristics of communities -- above and beyond the characteristics of individuals -- that are important “protectors” from crime.

This study. This study looked at victim reported crime in 343 “neighbourhood clusters” in Chicago. These clusters were relatively small -- about 8000 people each -- and were designed to approximate local neighbourhoods in Chicago. A measure which the authors call “collective efficacy” was assessed by interviewing 8782 people (at least 20 per neighbourhood cluster). Respondents were asked how likely it was that their neighbours could be counted on to intervene in various ways if children were misbehaving, or committing minor offences, or if their local fire station was threatened with budget cuts. In addition, they were asked various questions relating to social cohesion: whether neighbours are willing to help one another, whether people in the neighbourhood can be trusted, etc. The answers to ten such questions were combined, for each neighbourhood, into a scale value of “collective efficacy.” Various measures of the characteristics of those living in the neighbourhood were also obtained. There were three measures: (1) How often residents reported various forms of violence to have occurred in their neighbourhood in the previous six months, (2) whether they, or a member of their household, had experienced any violence while in the neighbourhood, and (3) whether a homicide had been recorded by the police as having occurred in the neighbourhood during that year (1995).

“Collective efficacy” obviously does not stand alone. It turns out to be negatively related to some other factors. Such factors included the concentration, within the community, of “disadvantaged” people (the unemployed, those below the poverty line, single-parent families, etc.). In addition, “collective efficacy” was lower in neighbourhoods that had higher proportions of those born outside the country and higher levels of “residential instability” (e.g., where people have moved a lot). These relationships make sense for obvious reasons: communities where there may be a language barrier, or where people have not lived in the neighbourhood for long may “impede the capacity of residents to realize common values and achieve informal social controls.”

Findings. Above and beyond the other factors, “collective efficacy” (neighbourhood informal social control and cohesion) was a predictor of perceived neighbourhood violence, whether or not respondents had been the victim of violence, and whether a homicide had occurred in the neighbourhood.

Conclusion. “Collective efficacy” (or neighbourhood informal social control and cohesion) is, in part, shaped by social and economic factors. However, given its apparent independent impact on all three measures of violence, it appears that one way to address problems of crime is to consider how neighbourhoods themselves can be strengthened.

Women who live in economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods are more likely than other women to experience violence at the hands of their intimate partners. This finding appears to be a true *neighbourhood* effect – that is, it holds true even when relevant characteristics of the couple are statistically held constant.

**Background.** “There is evidence that intimate violence against women is associated with economic disadvantage at both the neighbourhood and individual levels” (pp. 207-8). The challenge is clearly to determine whether the effects that appear at the neighbourhood level are due to characteristics of the victim and offender or, alternatively, to those of the neighbourhoods in which they live. While traditionally less studied in the criminological literature, the latter explanation is not without theoretical support. According to social disorganization theory, “residents of structurally disadvantaged areas are more likely to have weak social bonds to their neighbours than [are] residents of advantaged neighbourhoods” (p.209). As such, this lack of social cohesion may lead to increased risk for domestic violence because potential victims are isolated and their neighbours are less likely to intervene or call the police.

This study examines data from a U.S. longitudinal survey and focuses on 5031 couples identified in 1994 as having lived together since they were initially interviewed in 1988. If at least one of the two partners indicated that violence had been used against the woman in the previous year, the case was described as being one in which wife assault had taken place. Using 1990 census data, respondents were divided into four equal groups according to the level of disadvantage of their neighbourhood in 1994. In neighbourhoods falling into the three most advantaged groups, the rates of violence against the female partner were remarkably similar (roughly 3.5%). In contrast, the rate of violence in the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods was almost twice as high (6.9%). In other words, “[i]t is only in the upper end of the distribution [of economic disadvantage] that the crime-related effects of disadvantage [on wife assault] are manifested” (p.218).

The results focus on the level of wife assault in 1994 holding constant not only the level of intimate violence that she experienced in 1988 but also various other characteristics of the couple (e.g., several income measures, whether the male was reported to have a drinking problem, instability of employment of the male, age, race, and education). Not surprisingly, women who had experienced violence in 1988 were more likely to have been assaulted six years later. Male employment instability was also associated with high levels of intimate violence against the female partner in 1994 (consistent with findings reported in *Criminological Highlights*, 3(2), Item 6).

Most interesting were the neighbourhood effects. It is often difficult to disentangle neighbourhood effects from individual effects because it may be the case that the couple’s own disadvantaged socioeconomic status puts them at risk for both living in a disadvantaged community and increased domestic violence. However, this study demonstrated that when the couple’s own socioeconomic status was controlled for, the average socioeconomic status of the neighbourhood affected the likelihood of domestic violence. Indeed, those women living in neighbourhoods with either the highest level of concentrated disadvantage or high concentrations of people who had moved during the previous five years (a measure of neighbourhood instability) were most likely to have experienced violence at the hands of their partners.

**Conclusion.** The likelihood of being the victim of wife assault is a function not only of the characteristics of the couple, but also of the neighbourhoods in which they reside. It would appear that the risk to *any* woman of being the victim of wife assault increases if the couple lives in a neighbourhood whose level of social and economic disadvantage is severe.

Crime may have decreased in New York during William Bratton’s reign as chief of police. But it almost certainly did not happen because he endorsed a “zero tolerance” strategy toward minor crime and other irritants. For one thing, murders decreased in other cities (e.g., San Diego where murders decreased 41%) that had completely different approaches to policing. But more importantly, the idea that crime was reduced in New York through a “zero tolerance” approach simply does not fit the facts: there were far too many other things going on in New York to make it plausible that simple changes in police strategies made a difference.

Context. William Bratton was chief of police in New York City for a few years beginning in January 1994. This was good timing: murder rates peaked in or around 1993 in many cities and states in the U.S. and began to decline thereafter. The reductions were as dramatic as the increases in the late 1980s had been. Criminologists have debated, and still are trying to explain, both the 1980s increase and the 1990s decrease in violent crime. William Bratton must find such debates rather senseless. He takes full credit, in this short article, for the decline in crime in New York. As he states the case, “The murder rate has declined by over 50 per cent in New York City because we found a better way of policing” (p. 41). [The reader should understand that the “we” is a “royal we.”]

Most thoughtful analysts disagree with Bratton. One -- Charles Pollard, the Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police notes that the rhetoric associated with New York’s “new” police style is “concentrated on aggression: on ruthlessness in dealing with low level criminality and disorderliness... of confrontational accountability systems.. and on the single-minded pursuit of short term results” (page 44).

These papers. The first of these papers is a simple clear statement by Bratton himself about why he takes personal credit for the crime reduction that occurred in New York. The second, by Chief Constable Pollard is a thoughtful -- and gentle -- critique of Bratton’s paper. He points out, for example, that “zero tolerance” and the “broken windows” theory of crime are not the same. The latter implies that “minor incivilities”, if unchecked and uncontrolled, produce an atmosphere in a community or on a street in which more serious crime will flourish.” Minor problems give a sign that disorder will be ignored. This is quite different from the “zero tolerance” notions so favoured by the right which imply “aggressive, uncompromising law enforcement.”

Pollard points out that “zero tolerance” law enforcement has the unintended effect of taking most of one’s police officers off the street and out of the communities since they will be spending all of their time processing minor criminals through the criminal justice system. Furthermore, it could well undermine the legitimacy of the police since it implies that all problems of order are police problems and should be dealt with harshly rather than sensitively. Finally, Pollard points out that Bratton’s own description of what went on in New York can be challenged on empirical grounds: he noted how easy it is for the data to be manipulated by police highly motivated to do so (page 52-3).

Conclusion. In responding to William Bratton’s self-serving description of policing in New York, Chief Constable Charles Pollard of the Thames Valley (England) Police points out that the “New York miracle” has to be examined carefully and when it is, it is found to be wanting. More important is his observation that “law enforcement on its own has only limited capacity to deal with crime, disorder and fear.” And when the limits of aggressive policing are met, there is nowhere to go: “The police will have lost touch with the community. Confidence will have drained away” (p. 54). Zero tolerance policing provides just one more example of how simple solutions rarely solve complex problems.

The so-called “New York Miracle” -- the large decline in homicides that took place in the early-mid 1990s was not as unusual as some have suggested. In fact, it is made up of two quite different trends: a slow and steady decline in non-gun homicides and a big decrease (after a large increase) in gun homicides. Simple explanations do not fit the data.

In searching for an explanation for the drop in homicides in New York from 1991 to 1996, the single most important fact to keep in mind is that there are actually two trends.

- From 1985 to 1995 there was a gradual but remarkably steady decrease in the number of non-gun homicides such that by 1996, there were about half as many as there were in 1985.
- Gun homicides, on the other hand doubled between 1985 and 1991. By 1995 the number had returned to its 1985 level and in 1996 was lower than its 1985 level.

In other words, masked by the large increase and equally large decrease in gun homicides, there has been a large decrease, for a long time, in non-gun homicides. The data are inconsistent with the suggestion that there was simply a shift from non-gun to gun homicides.

Any attempt to explain the drop in homicides in New York (1991-96, a 51% drop) must take into account the following facts:

- There have been larger declines since the mid-1980s in homicides in two other cities (a 59% drop in Houston and a 61% drop in Pittsburgh).
- The decline in gun homicides (1991-96) was similar for men and women.
- All age groups showed roughly the same pattern for gun homicides: increasing from 1985 to the early 1990s and then going down.
- Non-gun homicides went down (1985-95) for all age groups.
- Gun assaults and non-gun assaults showed patterns that paralleled, more or less, the homicide data.

When one looks to possible explanations, the data suggest the following:

- Policing changes cannot explain, in any way, the long term trend downwards in non-gun homicides.
- “The increase in [police] patrol strength beginning in 1991 may have had had a positive effect on reducing visible homicides [homicides taking place in public places, which began declining in that year]” (p. 1316). “The pattern... is much more consistent with gun-oriented policing [policing strategies that focus on keeping guns off the street and out of public places] than with indiscriminate quality of life interventions as a cause of decline” (p. 1322).
- “Incarceration trends seem to be unrelated to homicide trends” (p. 1317).

What can be concluded?

- The gradual decline in non-gun homicides must reflect some type of gradual changes that were taking place over a period of a decade. “Attributing non-gun homicide declines to law enforcement changes was premature and unjustified” (p. 1333).
- Some of the decline could have been simply “regression” -- “natural” return to traditional levels. Some, however, could be due to changes in police practices (e.g., a focus on guns). However, the case for regression is strong. New York, compared to other large states, had, relatively speaking, a much larger number and higher rate of homicides during the 1988-90 period (p.1494-5). In any case, some “compensatory” force (p. 1494) appeared to be important in returning gun homicide rates to their “natural” level.

Widely publicized police interventions in three American cities show more consistency in their claims than in their effects in reducing homicide rates.

During the 1990s, homicide rates were dropping in many American cities. It was inevitable, therefore, that there would be a “chorus of self-congratulation” from politicians and police chiefs who could claim to have changed some part of the criminal justice system prior to or during the drop in reported crime. Hence aggressive policing, youth curfews, targeting career criminals, adding more police officers, and policies that encouraged community policing were all used to explain local crime drops. These explanations ignored the fact that the programs were typically implemented locally, but the “crime drop” was widespread.

This study looked at homicide rates in three cities with highly publicized crime reduction programs: Boston (Operation Ceasefire), New York (Comstat) and Richmond, Virginia (Project Exile). Using data from 95 large U.S. cities, the basic design involved examining the change in homicide rates in each of these three cities to see if the change could be attributed to the program implemented in that city, given the pre-existing downward trends across the country as well as the known determinants of homicide rates (e.g., resource deprivation).

Boston’s Operation Ceasefire focused on communication with gang youth, telling them in face-to-face meetings that firearm possession would not be tolerated, and that a tough approach toward youth gangs would be followed as long as the problem existed. Those apparently responsible for violence were also told that “all available levers would be pulled to ensure swift and tough punishment of violators” (p. 423). New York’s Comstat focused on being intolerant of minor crimes and disorder and aggressively restoring order, as well as making the police managers “responsible” for crime patterns in their districts. Richmond’s Project Exile used a traditional deterrence and/or incapacitation logic, focusing on harsher penalties for violence or drug crimes in which firearms were used. Extensive use was made of advertising the criminal justice consequences of illegal firearm possession and use.

All three cities, like U.S. cities on the whole, showed decreases in homicide rates. At the beginning of the interventions, Boston’s homicide rate was about 18 (per 100,000 in the population), New York’s was about 20, and Richmond’s was about 70. [In contrast, homicide rates in Canada’s 9 largest cities have averaged between 1.25 and 2.86 in the last decade.] In Boston, the drop in youth firearms homicides was insignificant once existing trends in other cities and other known contributors to homicide were taken into account. In New York there was no evidence of an effect of the police intervention program on homicides overall, or on firearms homicides in particular. In Richmond there was a significant decline in firearms homicides when other known determinants of homicide were taken into account, but not when looking at homicide rates in isolation from other factors.

Conclusion. One of the difficulties with all evaluations of single-city programs such as these is that the programs themselves are multi-faceted, and the manner in which they are implemented and the cities themselves vary considerably. In addition, different evaluations of these same programs have arrived at a range of different findings. The variation in findings is not surprising, given that there is no unambiguously “best” or broadly accepted model for evaluating programs such as these. Indeed, part of the problem may be that homicide rates themselves vary dramatically and the effect of interventions may be specific to local conditions, including local homicide rates. Richmond’s homicide rate varied from a low of about 36 per hundred thousand in the population (in 2001) to a high of 80 (in 1994) – rates that are dramatically higher than the average U.S. city. Large Canadian cities show much less year-to-year variation. A conservative conclusion, therefore, might be that one cannot be confident that any of these highly publicized programs would have a significant impact on homicides (or gun homicides) in cities in which they might be implemented.

Why don’t the police stop crime? Largely because they are not well placed to do so.

The public often looks to the police to stop almost all types of crimes – from household burglaries, vandalism, and impaired driving to domestic violence, gun crimes, gang violence, and pornography (though they typically are not seen as responsible for preventing crimes involving senior officers of large corporations such as Hollinger, Inc.) If this is the way in which they are seen, why do we have so much crime? A number of different answers can be offered.

First, their main role in dealing with crime has to do with apprehension of offenders and aiding in their prosecution. This has little effect on crime rates. Though some crime is avoided through the apprehension and imprisonment of serious offenders, the impact of these activities on overall crime rates is limited (see Criminological Highlights, 3(1)#1). The presence of the police generally may have a deterrent effect. This is sometimes evident in property crime sprees when police go on strike or when, for other reasons, they are not available for apprehending offenders. However, their overall impact on crime in normal circumstances is clearly limited, and it is probably limited to certain types of offences.

Second, “there is increasing recognition that policing is not just the business of … police forces,” and that “problem oriented strategies involve cooperation in crime reduction with a wider range of departments and agencies” (p. 5). Long term trends in crime rates (e.g., the decrease in reported rates of serious violence that have occurred in the U.S. and to some extent in Canada in the past 10-15 years) appear to have little to do with the police. Though the police sometimes take credit for crime drops (e.g., New York City – see Criminological Highlights, 1(4)#5 and this issue, #2), the evidence often is otherwise.

Third, it appears that many traditional police tactics are not very effective. Much crime is not detectable by the police and is unaffected by traditional unsystematic police patrols. This activity consumes large portions of police budgets yet it appears to have little overall impact. This is not surprising; crimes are rare events and it is unlikely either that a police officer would be in a position to intervene or apprehend offenders at the scene of a crime. Increasing patrol density does not appear to have an impact on crime just as decreased “response times” seldom affect crime levels. The theory that through dealing aggressively with minor incivilities, crime can be reduced, though popular, appears to be without empirical foundation (see Criminological Highlights, 5(1)#6; 3(3)#1). Police organizations have a range of legitimate priorities and concerns that may, at times, not be consistent with strict enforcement of the law.

Finally, even if certain techniques could be identified that were effective, the police organization is one that can easily resist change. In part change in police organizations is difficult to accomplish because “discretion increases as one moves down the hierarchy” (p. 15) in police organizations. Evidence-based policies are therefore, more difficult to implement than they would be in other organizations.

Conclusion. To say that the police are not an important force in preventing crime is not a criticism of police organizations. “[Police] need to be alert to the dangers of concentrating single-mindedly on traditional approaches to crime reduction. Doing so not only has inherent dangers, but it can also divert attention from other tasks and objectives of policing” (p. 19). One might suggest, therefore, that those responsible for policies related to policing should examine carefully how police resources can best be allocated to accomplish the various responsibilities allocated to the police. Such an approach might lead to a different, and more effective, allocation of scarce resources.

Most of the explanations that have been offered for the ‘crime drop’ that has occurred in many western countries are plausible sounding, but they are each almost certainly inadequate.

Whether one looks at the results of victimization surveys or police reported crime, it would appear that the rates of many categories of crime have dropped quite dramatically in recent decades in many countries including the US, Canada, England & Wales, Australia, and New Zealand.

Many explanations have been offered for the drop. This paper suggests that none of them is a sufficient explanation though some may offer a partial explanation for the drop in certain crime rates. Previous work has tended to suggest ‘single factor’ explanations, such as the aging of the population. However, changing demographics (see Criminological Highlights 2(6)#7, 5(4)#4) may account for a small portion of the drop for some offences but not all of it. Similarly, it can quite easily be shown that explanations based on a specific change in society, such as the availability of abortion, are almost certainly wrong (Criminological Highlights 9(6)#8).

This paper takes a different approach. It examines each of 17 hypotheses about the crime drop and uses four ‘tests’ of the ability of each explanation to account for the changes that took place, in recent decades, in crime rates. The four tests are the following:

1. Can the explanation be applied to different countries? On the ‘abortion’ issue, for example, the crime trends for Canada and the US are very similar, but only the US had changes in the availability of abortion at the critical time in question.

2. Before crime rates went down, they typically went up quite rapidly. Does the explanation account for this increase?

3. Some rates for some crimes have increased recently. Can the explanation account for that variation?

4. The timing of the crime drop. Can the explanation account for the fact that the changes in rates vary across types of crime?

Seventeen hypotheses have been proposed for the crime drop. These include the following: changing demographics, a strong economy, consumer confidence/prices inflation, laws that allow the carrying of concealed weapons, gun control laws, capital punishment, changes in rates of imprisonment, new or changes in policing strategies, more police, waning of the hard drug market, legalization of abortion, lead poisoning, immigration, civilizing processes, internet-induced changes in lifestyles, cell phone ownership and guardianship, and improved security systems.

As already noted, these explanations have one important thing in common: they choose a possible cause that could affect large numbers of people (e.g., the presence of lead), note that there is a change in that hypothetically causal variable, and then correlate that change in the causal variable to changes in crime (in this case, when youths who grew up in an environment when lead was presumably more likely to be in the atmosphere). The problem, however, is that the explanation may fit one set of data but not all the data. In the case of lead in the US, for example, “all proxies for lead increased dramatically from around 1910 through 1970. If the lead hypothesis is correct, then crime should have displayed a measurable increase between 1925 and 1985” (p. 451). Unfortunately for the hypothesis, crime rates were much more varied than one would expect.

Conclusion: Each of the 17 hypotheses that have been suggested as explanations for the crime drop was subjected to four separate empirical tests. No explanation for the crime drop was fully consistent with the data. One explanation – that we now have improved security (e.g., to protect from thefts of and from vehicles) – fits the data for certain crimes but is less persuasive for others. Variation in the propensity to commit crime within a society appears to be better understood than changes in crime rates within a society across time.

Though not all police crackdowns on gun violence are effective, some seem to be able to suppress gun violence, at least temporarily.

“Project Safe Neighbourhoods” brought over a billion dollars to cities in the United States to reduce crime, especially gun violence. The political debate about guns in the U.S. has focused largely on attempts to restrict access to guns by “high risk” individuals (e.g., youths or those with criminal records). More recently, however, “targeted enforcement” strategies have been used to try to reduce gun violence. It appears that such strategies are sometimes effective, but often are not.

It would seem that there are a few general principles that apply in this area: (a) efforts to reduce gun misuse are likely to be more cost effective than broad efforts to reduce availability, and (b) “for a given level of law enforcement spending, we may achieve a greater deterrent effect by increasing the certainty rather than the severity of punishment” (p. 680; See also Criminological Highlights, 6(2)#1). This paper, therefore, suggests that enforcement activities could be made more effective by prioritizing... targeted police patrols that seek to deter high risk people from carrying guns illegally” (p. 681).

A number of strategies that were part of Project Safe Neighbourhoods almost certainly were ineffective or have large costs relative to their value. These include providing gun locks (to prevent thefts), school prevention programs, better controls on gun purchases, and better tracing of guns involved in crime. Two programs that are sometimes seen as being effective – those in Richmond, Virginia and in Boston (see Criminological Highlights, 7(5)#2) – are shown to be largely ineffective: “Homicide rates in Richmond were trending downward even before the launch of Project Exile” (p. 693-4) just as the decreases in Boston were no larger than decreases in other parts of the state. Simply put, the flaw in simple claims of success with respect to many American “violence prevention” programs in the 1990s is that the programs were started during a period of broad decline in violence rates in many American cities. Said differently, crime rates went up in the latter part of the 1980s and then began declining before programs such as those in Richmond and Boston were implemented. Those cities that showed the largest increases in the 1980s showed the largest decreases in the 1990s. The gun homicide rate in Boston, for example, had decreased by about half prior to the beginning of the program. It then continued to decrease for about three more years.

One potentially promising strategy that appears to have been evaluated carefully was used in Pittsburgh. In response to concerns about guns being illegally carried in public places, concentrations of police on the street were increased dramatically (20%-50%) in high risk areas, during high crime periods (specified days and times). The police officers involved in this show of force did not have to respond to normal calls for service. Their focus, instead, was on traffic stops and “stop-and-talk” activities with pedestrians who appeared to have a high "risk" for carrying guns. The analysis involved comparisons of intensively policed areas with control areas, pre- and post-implementation during the targeted times and the "regular patrol density" times.

Using "assault related gunshot injuries" and reports of "shots fired" as the measures of success, there appeared to be larger decreases in the densely-patrolled areas during the times when there were many police present. Furthermore, perhaps because of intensive officer training, focused activities, and community involvement, the decrease in gun violence was apparently accomplished without aggravating community-police relationships. The concern, obviously, is that if targeted patrols of this sort were employed in a city, they could be seen giving the police a license to target certain racial (or other) groups.

Conclusion. It would appear that targeted increases in police patrols can suppress gun violence at least during the time that the police are present, and that with proper procedures, it is possible to do this without creating strained relationships between the police and the community. To the extent that the focus can be narrow (i.e., on people and locations likely to have a high rate of carrying illegal guns), and to the extent that there is "extensive officer training and... involvement of the] community in project design and implementation" (p. 682) the overall impact can be positive. Nevertheless, it would appear that the effectiveness of such strategies is likely to be limited to those times and locations in which the concentration of police is high.

Police raids on bars in which illegal drug selling apparently was taking place had a relatively brief effect on the suppression of drug dealing in the neighbourhood. In the long term, this intervention was almost completely ineffective.

Background. Given that crime is not evenly distributed across neighbourhoods within cities, there is a natural interest in identifying strategies that can be used to address problems of illegal activity in high crime areas. In some cities (such as the site of this study - Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), certain bars have sometimes been labelled by police as likely sites of illicit drug selling. A common response by police to such problems is to increase the frequency of raids on these locations. The underlying theory behind this practice is deterrence, based on the idea that certainty of apprehension is considerably more likely than severity of punishment to reduce criminal activity (p.259; See also Criminological Highlights, 6(2), #1).

This study examines the impact of police raids carried out between 1990 and 1992 on establishments that had been identified as “nuisance bars” by the Pittsburgh police narcotics squad. The number of raids as well as the period of time over which they took place varied considerably. The amount of drug dealing was estimated indirectly by using “drug-related 911 calls” in the area immediately surrounding the nuisance bar.

The results of this study are complex. First, it was found that enforcement – in the form of raids on these nuisance bars – suppressed drug dealing in the immediate 2 to 3 block radius. That is, within one month of the commencement of a series of drug raids, some reduction in the number of drug calls was apparent. However, this decrease was only temporary in nature. Second, the size of this decrease – assumed to be an indication of reduced drug dealing in the immediate area of the nuisance bar – increased as the amount of enforcement rose. Yet, while this effect continued after the enforcement ended, the suppression of drug dealing only lasted for a few months. Indeed, although “[l]arger reductions in drug calls accompany longer enforcement periods… enforcement effects achieved during an intervention do not persist after treatment is withdrawn” (p.286). An unexpected finding was that the closure of a nuisance bar appeared to increase the amount of visible drug dealing in the area – possibly constituting “further indirect evidence of limits on residual suppression effects after enforcement ceases” (p.279). Both of these outcomes – the relatively short duration of the initial enforcement effects and the negative impact of closing problematic establishments – highlight the importance of looking beyond the short term when evaluating enforcement strategies. Finally, the nature of the areas in which the bars were located was also important. For example, the (temporary) enforcement effects were largest in “low risk” areas (e.g., areas with little vacant land, few bars and a low proportion of commercial properties). However, “even these most responsive enforcement targets… show little evidence of being able to sustain the suppression effects achieved during periods of active police enforcement into post-enforcement periods” (p.290).

Conclusion. Though drug dealing enforcement - in the form of raids on bars in which dealing is thought to be occurring - can reduce drug problems on the streets during the time that the police are active in suppressing it, there is, unfortunately, “little indication that these reductions are sustained after the special enforcement is withdrawn” (p.289). In this light, claims that a crime suppression or deterrence program is successful should be tempered by the knowledge that the success of these programs may be a criminological will-o’-the wisp.

A police crackdown on drug dealers in London, England which was designed to “stifle the availability of illegal drugs on our streets” (p. 738) was described by the police as a “spectacular success” (p. 738). However, information obtained from drug users and drug dealers in this city suggests that it had no impact on drug availability or prices.

Background. Supply reduction is one of the most common anti-drug interventions in many cities. The theory is simple: interrupting the supply chain will make it difficult (or expensive) to obtain drugs and, consequently, drug availability and use will decrease. However, systematic studies of frequent drug users suggest that this population has multiple sources for its drugs (on average, they know more than a dozen dealers).

This study reports on the impact of a November 2000 blitz by the Metropolitan (London, England) police. In the first two weeks of this well publicized crackdown, more than 240 people were arrested for selling drugs. After these initial 14 days, drug users were interviewed. The findings question whether the drug crackdown was having its intended impact.

- Only 31% of the drug users were even aware that the police were doing anything special. For those who did notice the change, they did not attribute much significance to it. One person who had purchased crack every day during the crackdown reported having noticed more police activity, but saw it as simply an “occupational hazard” (p. 741).
- Of the 174 people interviewed (over 100 of whom had recently purchased heroin, crack, and cannabis), only seven reported an increase in drug prices during the two weeks of the crackdown. Most (over 80%) reported that no change had occurred. The rest reported a decrease in prices.
- Over 80% of those interviewed indicated that there had been no change (or an increase) in the purity and availability of the three drugs (heroin, crack, cannabis).

However, it should be noted that the possibility exists (though not tested in this paper) that increased police activity may deter irregular users. Nevertheless, this hypothesis seems relatively unlikely given that price and availability to frequent users did not appear to be affected.

Conclusion. The findings “offer no support for the suggestion that the markets for heroin, crack and cannabis are sensitive to increased police activity, at least not in the short term, even when such activity is associated with a number of significant drug seizures and with the removal of a large number of dealers from the streets” (p. 744). These results support the assertion that “supply reduction endeavours are not strongly linked to illicit drug market forces” (p. 744).

Very intensive foot patrols by police can have an impact on street crime.

Police foot patrols have been seen as a popular way to address crime, though the evidence that they actually deter crime has been weak. The public appears to believe that if there is an officer on foot patrol in their neighbourhood, they will be safe. From a management perspective, foot patrols are expensive. If, however, foot patrols are used selectively to target crime “hotspots” – locations where crime rates (or street crime in particular) are high – it has been suggested that they may be especially effective.

Unlike some studies that looked at relatively large geographic areas, this study examined the impact of intensive police foot patrols on street crime using a large number of small geographic areas. Crime hotspots were identified, in early 2009 in Philadelphia, by looking at the number of homicides, aggravated assaults, and robberies that had occurred outdoors in recent years. In all, 120 hotspots were located, each including at least one of the most violent street corners in the city. These hotspots had an average of 14.7 intersections and 1.3 miles of streets. These 120 hotspots were then divided into 60 pairs of hotspots with similar numbers of violent incidents. One of each pair was then randomly determined to be a ‘control’ hotspot (with no special change in police patrol intensity). The other received intensive patrols for 12 weeks in addition to normal policing. The intensive patrols consisted of 2-person foot patrols for 12 weeks from 10 a.m. until 2 a.m., 5 days a week (Tuesday morning to early Sunday morning). In all, then, 57,600 hours of 2-person police patrol (115,200 person-hours) were used during the 12 week period in the 60 intensive patrol hotspot areas. The activities of the police officers varied considerably across areas in terms of the number of recorded pedestrian and vehicle stops, arrests, and recorded disturbances and drug-related disorder.

Overall, there was a slight reduction in the average number of violent crimes recorded in the experimental areas, compared to the average number before the intensive foot patrols (a reduction of about 0.88 crimes per area during the 12 week period). In the control areas, there was a slight increase in the number of crimes during the ‘treatment’ period, as compared to the earlier period (0.52). However, this apparent relative reduction only occurred in the highest crime areas. These were the areas, not surprisingly, in which the foot patrol officers were most likely to have direct contact with citizens as a result of arrests or responding to various forms of disorder. In the relatively low crime areas (which were, of course, hotspots relative to the city as a whole), the patrols had essentially no impact on crime.

However, it would appear that some of the violent crime reduction in the intensive foot patrol areas was a result of displacement to adjacent areas. It was estimated that 90 violent crimes were averted in the target areas as a result of the intensive foot patrols, but an estimated 37 of these crimes were displaced to adjacent areas. Thus there were an estimated 53 fewer crimes as a result of the intervention, or one crime for every 1087 hours of 2-person patrols (or 2174 person-hours of patrol).

**Conclusion:** It would appear that highly intensive policing can modestly reduce the number of violent crimes that take place in an area. In part because the effect is small and is limited to the very highest crime areas, it is difficult to know whether to attribute the drop in crime to the mere presence of a police officer in the area or to the activities of the police in the neighbourhood. The data would suggest that it may be that foot patrols can only deter violent street crime in very violent areas. However, the investment of police time for each crime averted was non-trivial.

Intensive foot patrols by police can reduce street crime, but the effects don’t last after police strength is reduced to normal.

Previous research has demonstrated “that highly intensive policing can modestly reduce the number of violent crimes that take place in an area” (Criminological Highlights V12N3#3). This study is a follow-up of an earlier study that examined the impact on crime of intensive 2-person patrols during a 12-week period. The earlier study compared the rate of street crime in areas that received intensive 2-person foot patrols (as well as adjacent areas) to the street crime rates in similar locations that (on a random basis) did not receive intensified foot patrols. The crime reducing effect of the foot patrols was demonstrated, but the amount of crime reduction was not large. It was estimated for every 2174 person-hours of patrol, one crime was averted.

Aside from the cost of implementing high intensity police foot patrols in a neighbourhood, little is known about their long term impact. In particular, it is important to know whether the crime-reducing effects of intensive patrols remain after policing strength (and, therefore, visible presence) returns to ‘normal’ levels. During the ‘intensified foot patrol’ period of the original study, foot patrol officers were responsible for a 64% increase in pedestrian stops, a 7% increase in vehicle stops, and a 13% increase in arrests.

This study focuses on the first 15 month period after the intensive foot patrols ceased. From a practical perspective, this period is important because it tests whether the effects of intensive patrols were long-lasting, or whether the effect only lasted while the police officers were present and visible on the street. Previous research (e.g., Criminological Highlights V7N6#1) would suggest that one should not expect the effects of the intensive patrol to last after the patrols stop. In fact, that is what happened. As soon as the extra patrols left, the crime suppressing effect disappeared. “No significant differences were found between the treatment and control areas on levels of violence from the beginning to the end of the post-treatment period” (p. 83). In fact, there was no evidence of a gradual decay: the effects of the intervention ended abruptly when the intensive patrols ended. Crime, in effect, returned to expected levels.

The original study also looked at displacement of crime into adjacent areas. After the intensive patrols stopped, crime in the areas adjacent to where the intensive patrols had taken place went down suggesting that some crime might have moved back to the areas from which it had been displaced during the intensive foot patrols.

Conclusion: It would seem that “the effects of crackdowns [in the form of intensive police foot patrols] are short term and [they] decay rapidly” (p. 87). It has been suggested that intensive foot patrols deter crime because, in deterrence terms, they act as a “certainty communicating device.” “In Philadelphia, once the ‘certainty communicating device’ was removed, no differences between the treatment [high intensity foot patrols] and control locations were detectable” (p. 87). Since “most police agencies allocate patrol resources disproportionately at high-crime places…..it is questionable whether better funded crackdowns will elicit the aggregate crime reductions predicted. It would appear that “more holistic strategies” (p. 92) are needed to fulfill the goal of effectively reducing the amount of crime in a neighbourhood.

Putting extra resources into the policing of high crime areas isn’t enough. To reduce violent crime police need to focus their attention on specific individuals who were known or suspected to be involved in violent crimes – an approach that can be carried out without an increase in the indiscriminate stopping and questioning of ordinary residents.

There is some evidence that increased police presence in high crime areas can have some impact on crime, although the effects may be short-lived. Other research suggests that what the police do when policing a high crime area may be the key to understanding these effects on crime ‘hot spots’ (see Criminological Highlights 12(3)#3, 14(5)#3, 13(3)#2).

This study examined the impact of three different police tactics designed to reduce the incidence of violent crime in high crime areas. 27 areas (with an average of 3 miles of streets and 23.5 intersections) with high levels of violent crime were identified by the police as being appropriate for each of the three experimental treatments. 20 were randomly assigned to receive the treatment; 7 were randomly assigned to be policed as they always had been.

One third of the experimental areas were assigned to receive foot patrols for a minimum of 8 hours per day, 5 days a week. Typically officers patrolled in pairs. In another set of areas, officers were encouraged to engage in ‘problem-oriented policing’ and were given special training for this. The actual activities of these officers varied from area to area. In another set of areas, police officers engaged in ‘offender-focused policing’ in which residents of the area suspected or known to engage in repeat violence were identified by the police intelligence unit. Police officers made contact with these people or, in some cases, served arrest warrants for recently committed offences. More commonly, the police simply exercised surveillance on these people.

Each policing tactic was implemented for a minimum of 12 weeks and a maximum of 24 weeks. Violent crime in all areas (experimental and control) was monitored for 38 weeks. The “offender focused” approach caused a reduction in violent crime in the experimental areas of about 42%. Analyses of changes in crime in adjacent areas suggest that there was no displacement of violent crime to these areas. If anything, there was a reduction in violent crime in adjacent areas suggesting a “diffusion of crime-control benefits” (p. 42).

Neither the problem-oriented policing nor the foot patrols had significant impacts on violent crime. In fact, it was very difficult for police officers to implement the problem-oriented policing tactics. Even though the areas had been chosen because they were relatively high in violent crime, police officers reported that in many of the areas citizens did not see violent crime as the biggest local problem.

In the “offender focused” areas, there was no increase in the number of pedestrian stops, car stops, or narcotics incidents. This suggests that if the police have a specific set of individuals to watch, they will not bother those not on their list. This is a very different approach, then, from ‘saturation patrols’ in which ordinary people are indiscriminately stopped and questioned or in which people are arrested for minor (e.g., drug possession) offences.

Conclusion: A focus by the police on people known or suspected of involvement in serious violence appears to be an effective use of police resources in reducing violent crime. Furthermore, it can be done without the negative impact of increased use of stops of ordinary citizens. “By focusing police efforts on the problem people associated with the problem places, police can achieve significant crime reductions while avoiding negative community perceptions of their actions” (p. 46).

Focusing police patrols on high crime areas can reduce the incidence of some types of crimes if the police do more than merely increase the frequency of their patrols.

Recent research has suggested that high density police patrols targeting high crime areas (hot spots) can reduce crime, at least temporarily (Criminological Highlights 12(3)#3, 13(3)#2). However, little is known about what kinds of activities by police are necessary to have any impact.

This paper reports the results of an experiment in which small geographic areas (an average of 8 one-block segments with an average of 128 residents per area) in St. Louis, Missouri, were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. For the ‘control’ areas, policing was carried out in the manner in which it normally had been. In the ‘high density only’ areas, police spent a disproportionate amount of their time in these areas, but did nothing unusual while there. In the ‘enhanced high density’ patrol areas, police not only spent a disproportionate amount of time in the area, but also engaged in self-initiated activities while there. These activities included arrests, pedestrian checks, building checks, occupied and unoccupied vehicle checks, foot patrols, and problem solving. The special patrols took place over a 9 month period daily between 3 p.m. and 7 a.m. The goal was to reduce certain firearms violence (non-domestic firearms assaults and firearms robberies).

The importance of having a control group was demonstrated by the fact that there was a substantial reduction in firearms crime in the control areas (in which policing style and patrol density had not changed) during the 9-month period in which the study was carried out. In the ‘high density only’ patrol areas, the reduction in firearms violence was not significantly different from the reduction that took place in the control areas. However, in the ‘enhanced high density’ patrol areas, there was a significantly larger reduction in firearms violence than in the control areas. This was a result, completely, of the effect of the ‘enhanced high density’ patrols on non-domestic firearms assaults. For reasons that are not at all clear, there was no effect of increased police patrols (enhanced or not) on firearms robberies.

The effectiveness of the ‘enhanced high density’ patrols appears to be linked to two self-initiated activities by the police: arrest and checks on occupied vehicles. The other police-initiated activities appeared to be unrelated to drops in non-domestic firearms assaults. There did not appear to be displacement of crime into adjacent areas, or other time periods, or to other (e.g., non-firearms) offences. In other words, these police activities did not ‘push’ the crime to other times or locations.

Conclusion: The study demonstrates that high density police patrols, combined with certain police-initiated activities, can reduce certain firearms crimes. The fact that the reduction in crime was limited to firearms assaults and not firearms robberies is puzzling. “Certainty of arrests and occupied vehicle checks (but none of the other enforcement activities [that were] examined, were associated with reductions in nondomestic firearms assaults” (p. 446) during the period when the high intensity patrols were taking place. The study also underlines the importance of having a control group. Because there was a control group, it was possible to see that the size of the crime reduction in high intensity patrol areas that did not have enhanced police-initiated activities was not significantly greater than the reduction that occurred ‘naturally’ in the control areas. Crime rates are not consistent over time making ‘no treatment’ control groups crucial if one wants to determine whether an innovation has an impact.

Police crackdowns on bad driving can prevent serious traffic accidents.

In 2001, Canada’s traffic accident death rate was 8.9 per hundred thousand residents – about five times the country’s homicide rate for that year. Various enforcement programs have been used to try to control bad driving. Most of these programs have the goal of increasing the perceived risk of apprehension. Although there have been thousands of local police programs designed to reduce the number of serious traffic accidents, only a tiny proportion of these have received adequate evaluations.

This paper examines programs designed to crack down on problematic driving. Thirty-three high quality evaluations were found. These involved studies of the effects of random breath testing or “soberiety check points” to reduce impaired driving (15 studies), the use of speed (5 studies) and red-light cameras (4 studies), studies evaluating a combination of these two “camera” deterrents (4 studies), random “road watch” by police looking for traffic law violators (1 study), and mixed programs (4 studies) using one or more approach.

The theory behind all of these programs is the same. Rather than focusing on what to do with law violators once they are caught, these programs attempt to affect the behaviour of those unapprehended individuals who might be sensitive to the threat of punishment. If completely effective, then, nobody would be apprehended and punished, but everyone would perceive a high likelihood of apprehension if they were to offend. Given this underlying theory, it is not surprising that most programs – 23 of the 33 (70%) – were implemented along with media campaigns. There was, however, some variation on this dimension. In 13 of 15 (87%) drinking-driving programs there were media campaigns, compared to only 7 of the 13 (54%) speeding or red-light camera programs.

The results were overwhelmingly positive: 30 of the 33 programs showed reductions on such measures as fatal accidents or traffic accidents resulting in serious injuries. The three studies that did not show a reduction had one thing in common: they were “automated” systems – red light or speed cameras. It is possible that these “failures” reflect bad judgement concerning the locations in which the cameras were placed or the failure of the program to communicate the increased threat of apprehension that the cameras provided to law violators.

In some cases there was evidence that the effect of the crackdown generalized to locations not covered by the program itself. Though there was some variability in the size of the effect of these programs (e.g., the reduction in the percent of accidents with injuries ranged from 23% to 31%), there appeared to be more variability in the size of the effect for the “automated” red light or speed cameras.

Conclusion. It is clear that police practices that increase the perceived likelihood of apprehension for traffic violations can reduce the number of serious traffic accidents. It appears that police crackdowns for impaired driving as well as crackdowns of speeding and running red lights can be equally effective.

Rather than focusing on severity-based policies that increase already harsh sentences, policy makers should shift their attention to programs that use the police to make the risks and consequences of crime more clear and certain. Such a policy shift holds the promise of reducing both crime and imprisonment.

Imprisonment rates in many countries, most notably the United States, are a concern in part because of the various costs of imprisonment and the fact that high imprisonment rates appear to have little effect in reducing crime. There is a substantial amount of research suggesting that increasing the severity of sentences from current levels will not increase the (general) deterrent impact of the criminal justice system (see Criminological Highlights, 6(2)#1) and is not efficient in reducing crime through incapacitation (Criminological Highlights, 3(1)#1, 10(2)#5).

This paper points out that deterrence always depends on both certainty and severity. But variation in sentence severity—within levels that are plausible in western societies—does not appear to have much, if any, impact on crime. Given the various costs of imprisonment (financial as well as social), a very attractive criminal justice approach to crime prevention is one that reduces both crime and imprisonment levels. Incapacitation does not qualify as such a policy since it “necessarily will increase the rate of imprisonment. In contrast, if the policy also prevents crime by deterrence, then it is possible that it will be successful in reducing both imprisonment and crime” (p. 16).

In addition, to the extent that the experience of prison is criminogenic (see Criminological Highlights, 11(1)#1, 11(1)#2, 11(4)#2), policies that reduce imprisonment have an additional advantage. There are, of course, many other ways to reduce crime. However, given that substantial amounts of public money are spent on the criminal justice system, the question that should be addressed by criminal justice policy makers is a simple one: how can this “criminal justice budget” best be used?

A careful analysis of the data suggests that a fundamental shift should occur—from focusing on sentence severity to focusing on the certainty of apprehension. A shift of this sort does not mean that by increasing police budgets, crime rates will automatically be lowered. Instead, this analysis suggests that targeted increases in police activity that increase the likelihood that offenders will be apprehended can prevent crime in the first place and thereby avert the need for punishing an apprehended offender. In other words, averting crime also averts punishment. For example, regular drug testing of probationers to enforce prohibitions against drug use resulted in more certain but shorter imprisonment periods (1-2 days); this, in turn, was quite effective in deterring probationers from drug use and other probation violations. In this way, the certainty of apprehension averted the need for exacting further punishment. What is crucial, of course, is that potential offenders must believe that their likelihood of apprehension and punishment is high.

The difficulty is that achieving certainty in delivering punishments is elusive. Not all police programs or programs that simply increase the number of police in a neighbourhood—achieve high levels of real or perceived certainty of punishment. However, “the key empirical conclusions... are that at prevailing levels of certainty and severity, relatively little reliable evidence of variation in the severity of punishment having a substantial deterrent effect is available and that relatively strong evidence indicates that variation in the certainty of punishment has a large deterrent effect, particularly from the vantage point of specific programs that alter the use of police” (p. 37).

**Conclusion:** If policy makers are committed to using criminal justice budgets effectively, shifting funds from imprisonment to policing could be effective in reducing both crime and imprisonment. Since people are likely to be deterred by programs that increase the (perceived) likelihood of apprehension, those program will prevent crime and those people who are deterred will not end up in prison. These evaluations need to examine not just the impact on crime, but also other impacts on communities and residents.

Between 1995 and 2000 the U.S. Department of Justice dropped $8.8 billion into local municipalities so that they could hire more police officers and improve community policing. These cash grants had no impact on crime.

Because policing, in some jurisdictions such as the U.S. and Canada, is largely controlled by local municipalities, the role of the national government in policing is limited. In the latter half of the 1990s, however, the U.S. federal government made about 30,000 grants to 12,000 police agencies, the purpose of which was largely to hire approximately one hundred thousand additional police officers.

Prior research results suggest that the funding did not put 100,000 more police on the streets. Furthermore, it is not clear that the grants program accelerated the community police movement. However, some preliminary studies suggested that the program did reduce violent and property crime. The challenge, in any such studies, is to control for other factors that may have accounted for the association between new federal funding and a drop in crime. One factor that had not been controlled for was pre-existing law enforcement expenditures: communities that, for one reason or another, funded their police forces generously, might show decreases in crime. This study examined the impact of these federal government grants on crime in large cities only (100,000 residents or larger), controlling for ‘standard’ correlates of crime (e.g., percents of the population who were age 18-24, poor, black, or living in a female headed household, etc.). Seven different crime figures were examined (murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft). The analysis took advantage of one important fact: these federal funds were not equally distributed across cities. Some cities received a considerable amount of federal funding for additional police, etc.

The results demonstrate that there were no consistent effects of additional federal funding for police organizations on any of the crimes. Indeed, a large infusion of new federal funding to police forces was just as likely to be associated with more crime as it was with less crime. In other words, the grants to support local community oriented police “had no discernible effect on serious crime during the period covered by [the] analysis, after controlling for annual fiscal expenditures” (p. 170). Various statistical ‘checks’ on the findings were carried out to ensure that any impact of the grants program was not suppressed as a result of the particular type of analysis that was used, or because of a small number of very unusual effects in certain cities. None of these supplementary analyses challenged the main finding: the 8.8 billion dollar federal program of funding local police departments did not affect crime.

Conclusion. Multiple analyses, looking at the data in various ways, failed to find evidence that federal government grants to local police forces for the purpose of hiring more police had any impact on crime. “It is not encouraging to find that some $8 billion of taxpayer dollars may have done little reduce crime” (p. 183). On the other hand, the findings are not terribly surprising when one considers one other fact: Grants to these municipalities averaged only $407,515 per year. This constitutes only about ½ of 1% of fiscal expenditures for policing in these communities. When one considers that few additional police officers can be hired with a grant of that size, and, therefore, the impact of such a grant on ‘police on the street’ at any given moment is tiny, it is not surprising that the grants had no impact on crime.

Systematically measured neighbourhood disorder ("broken windows") does not cause crime in a community. "The current fascination in policy circles... on cleaning up disorder through law enforcement appears simplistic and largely misplaced, at least in terms of directly fighting crime" (p.638). "Broken windows" may be more prevalent in high crime areas, but the data suggest that disorder is not directly responsible for crime.

Background. The idea that "fixing broken windows" will reduce crime has been popularized, but never demonstrated empirically, by various criminologists such as George Kelling and James Q. Wilson. The notion they have popularized, based on the metaphor of broken windows, is that "public incivilities - even if relatively minor as in the case of broken windows, drinking in the street, and graffiti - attract predatory crime because potential offenders assume from them that residents are indifferent to what goes on in their neighbourhood" (p. 604). Politicians in favour of crackdowns who are looking for a political "quick fix" find "broken windows" an attractive theory. The alternate theory is that "structural constraints such as resource disadvantage and mixed land use account for both crime and disorder simultaneously" (p. 614).

This study reports a careful examination of the "broken windows" theory of crime by first getting an independent observation by researchers of how "disordered" (socially and physically) neighbourhoods (in Chicago) actually were. Social disorder (e.g., adults loitering or congregating, drinking alcohol in public, drug selling) and physical disorder (e.g., presence of garbage or litter, graffiti, abandoned cars) were quite highly correlated. Not surprisingly, "disordered" neighbourhoods were poorer, more likely to have high concentrations of immigrants, and lower in "collective efficacy" (willingness of neighbours to "do something" in response to problems, trusting one's neighbours, neighbourhood social cohesion, etc.). Collective efficacy has been found in previous studies to be an important predictor of neighbourhood crime above and beyond characteristics of the individuals in the neighbourhood.

The most important findings, however, were that measures of social and physical disorder ("broken windows") were not related to personal violence and household burglary (assessed by victimization measures) once characteristics of the neighbourhood (e.g., collective efficacy, mixed land use) had been controlled for. "The results are consistent and point to a spurious association of disorder with predatory crime" (p. 627). When one looks at officially recorded crime, "disorder" once again disappears as a predictor of homicide and burglary once measures of collective efficacy and prior crime rates are controlled for. "The key result is that the influences of structural characteristics and collective efficacy on burglary, robbery, and homicide are not mediated by neighbourhood disorder" (p. 629). The exception is the case of officially recorded measures of robbery where there is still a relationship with disorder. Whether this is due to a "complex feedback loop" (p. 637) or an artifact of official data (e.g., "citizen calls to the police or police accuracy in recording robberies is greater in areas perceived to be high in disorder" --p. 638) is not clear.

Conclusion. "The active ingredients in crime seem to be structural disadvantage and attenuated collective efficacy more than disorder. Attacking public disorder through police tactics may thus be a politically popular but perhaps analytically weak strategy to reduce crime, mainly because such a strategy leaves the common origins of both [disorder and crime], but especially the last [crime] untouched. A more subtle approach suggested by this article would look to how informal but collective efforts among residents to stem disorder may provide unanticipated benefits for increasing collective efficacy... in the long run lowering crime" (p. 638).

New York City’s attempt to snuff out violent crime by arresting those found to be smoking marijuana in public places failed.

Criminal justice officials and legislatures in many countries constantly search for easy ways to reduce crime. The appearance that something is being done to prevent or reduce crime seems to be at least as important when crime rates are decreasing (as they did in the 1990s in the U.S.) as when crime is increasing or staying the same. Between 1994 and 2000, the New York City police increased their arrest rate for the misdemeanour charge of smoking marijuana in public view (MPV) from fewer than 2,000 arrests to over 50,000 arrests per year. In 2000, arrests for MPV accounted for 15% of all felony and misdemeanour arrests in the city. Aside from any other concerns that one might have, these arrests disproportionally targeted African-Americans and Hispanics. Compared to whites, members of these two groups in New York City were, according to a previous study, more likely to be arrested, detained in custody awaiting trial, convicted, and sentenced to jail. Presumably the justification for the crackdown on MPV is simple and is based on the “broken windows” theory of crime control. By cracking down on minor crimes – in this case MPV – other more serious crimes would, it was asserted, miraculously disappear.

The miracle did not happen. This paper, using data collected by the authors of a previous study, examined the impact of MPV arrests on crime in the city’s police precincts. The statistical techniques used were similar to those used in an earlier study (see Criminological Highlights, 8(4)#1). The most simple analysis (looking at the relationship between arrests for MPV and violent crime) would appear to support the ‘broken windows’ hypothesis: violent crime was lower in locations in which MPV arrests were highest during the 1990s, controlling for the overall rate of crime in the precinct for the decade and for overall trends during the decade. When the authors added various controls (e.g., police strength in the precinct, unemployment, proportion of population that was between age 19 and 24, race), there was still an effect.

The problem is that such an analysis does not take into account a simple fact: crackdowns on crime in different parts of the city are likely to relate to pre-existing levels of crime. The locations that show the biggest drop in crime might reasonably be expected to be those that showed the largest increases in an earlier period. Indeed, the police precincts with the highest violent crime rates in 1989 experienced the largest MPV arrests in the 1990s and the largest declines in violent crime between 1989 and 2000. More importantly, the precincts with the largest violent crime decline in the 1990s were those that had the largest increase in crime between 1984 and 1989 and, coincidentally, the largest ‘crack down’ on MPV in the 1990s. When the violent crime rate in 1989 (before the marijuana crackdown) or change in violent crime between 1984 and 1989 is taken into account, it would appear that those locations with the most MPV arrests had higher, not lower, levels of violent crime.

Conclusion. “New York City’s psychedelic experiment with misdemeanour MPV arrests – along with all the associated detentions, convictions, and additional incarcerations – presents a tremendously expensive policing intervention” (p. 13). It disproportionately punished Blacks and Hispanics and did not contribute to combating serious crime in the city. If anything it led to increased violent crime. Once again, simplistic approaches to reducing serious crime are shown not to work.

The police strategy of targeting minor disorder on the street – so-called ‘broken windows policing’ – does not reduce crime.

In 1982, in an article in the Atlantic Monthly, James Q. Wilson and George Kelling suggested that if the police targeted minor instances of visible disorder – e.g., panhandling, prostitution – the rates of more serious crimes would drop. Though 25 years later the evidence supporting their theory is at best mixed, there continues to be widespread belief that this strategy works.

This study re-examined an earlier important study that purports to show beneficial effects of ‘broken windows policing’ – a study of crime in New York by Kelling and Sousa. Although Kelling and Sousa were not willing to share their data with the current authors, equivalent data were compiled from original sources which allowed for more stringent assessment of the impact of this policing strategy on crime. The problem in assessing the impact of changes in policing strategies during the 1990s is that “Any study of the influences on American crime patterns during the past 20 years is complicated by the massive period effects that have generated dramatic year-to-year changes in crime across the country… Those cities that experienced the largest increases in crime during the [beginning of] this period [the 1980s] subsequently also experienced the largest drops [in the 1990s]” (p. 291).

This same problem is evident in New York City when one looks at individual neighbourhoods. Crime dropped in New York City during the 1990s. And, crime dropped most in those neighbourhoods in which broken-windows policing was most aggressively implemented. It would appear, at first blush, that broken windows policing was a cause of the drop. However, it is also true that broken windows policing was most aggressively implemented in neighbourhoods that had experienced the largest increases in violent crime during the 1980s. The Kelling-Sousa study essentially related changes in violent crime to levels of misdemeanour arrests, ignoring the fact that the changes were, essentially, reversions to an earlier level of crime. Controlling for the size of the change (generally an increase) in violent crime during the period 1984-1989 eliminated the crime reducing impact of misdemeanour arrests during the period 1989-1998. What goes up comes down, whether or not there is a police officer or city employee nearby fixing broken windows.

The Kelling-Sousa study was not the only published study apparently showing support for the broken windows hypothesis. Another study noted that there was a relationship, for the period 1970-2000 in New York as a whole, between the rate of misdemeanour arrests and violent crime, controlling for known correlates of crime. The problem, once again, is that this ‘effect’ is driven largely by the decrease in crime that occurred in the late 1990s (the period when ‘broken windows policing’ was in vogue in New York). The problem is that attributing a drop in crime that occurred largely in one time period to a single cause is risky. The authors note that one could logically examine the ‘Broken Yankees Hypothesis’ (p. 298) by looking at the cumulative number of New York Yankee (baseball) championship wins as the possible cause, on the theory that New Yorkers are happy when their home team is winning and thus less likely to commit crime. Plugging this variable into the equation, one finds that the ‘Broken Yankee Hypothesis’ fits the data just about as well as the ‘broken windows’ hypothesis.

Conclusion. Though it can be shown that certain police activities – e.g., the targeting of ‘hot spots’ where crime is chronically prevalent – can reduce crime, the suggestion that broken windows policing will reduce violent crime is without empirical support and is most likely an artefact of the practice of focusing police resources (and, in particular, high rates of police charging of minor offenders) in those areas in which crime had been on the rise.

A high rate of arrests for minor offences was associated with a small reduction in violent crime in New York City in the 1990s.

New York City politicians and police officials have made themselves famous by suggesting that police policies that gave priority to “aggressively targeting so-called quality-of-life offences and arresting violators for vagrancy, loitering, prostitution, littering [and other minor offences]” (p. 356) were responsible for the reduction in serious crime that occurred in New York in the 1990s. The underlying theory was that arresting people for these matters “sends a message…that police are paying attention and will enforce community standards” (p. 356). Though few deny the fact that recorded crime in New York dropped, people disagree about whether order maintenance policing (OMP) was responsible for this drop.

A previous study (see *Criminological Highlights* V8N4#1) suggested that the apparent drop in overall violence was due to the fact that those locations in New York City with the biggest increase in crime in the late 1980s had the highest rate of OMP and the largest drop in crime. The suggestion was that the reduction was not due to the OMP but rather was a result of ‘mean reversion’: what goes up also comes down. This paper looks at two specific crimes – homicide and robbery – in part because rates of other violent crime (e.g., rape and assault) are more susceptible to problems of measurement. In addition, it used a different indicator of OMP – one that included violations of city ordinances as well as misdemeanours. In addition, other controls and somewhat different statistical techniques were used.

It is no wonder that New York City politicians claimed to have solved the crime problem: between 1990 and 2001, robbery and homicide rates dropped by about 76%. Though crime started dropping dramatically after 1990, the OMP arrests did not start increasing until 1994, levelling out in 1997. Nevertheless, the analysis presented in this paper suggests that there was a small impact of OMP on both homicide rate and robbery rate even after various relevant controls (e.g., amount of disorder, number of police officers, 1988 robbery or homicide rate) were taken into account statistically.

OMP activities were greatest, not surprisingly, in precincts with high growth in disorder (as measured by citizen complaints), number of police officers, drug use (measured by cocaine deaths) and high rates of felony arrests as well as in precincts with higher proportions of blacks and disadvantaged residents.

It appears that high rates of OMP were responsible for some of the decline in homicide and robbery rates. The decline in homicide and robbery rates was large: from 120 robberies per 100K residents in 1988 to 31.1 in 2001, and from 26.7 homicides per 100K residents in 1988 to 7.6 in 2001. OMP was estimated to have been responsible for some of this decline, but not a lot: about 4% of the decline in robbery rates and about 10% of the decline in homicide rates are estimated to be attributable to the increase in OMP.

**Conclusion.** It appears that those precincts that implemented Order Maintenance Policing (OMP) faithfully were more likely to experience declines in homicide and robbery than were those precincts in which this policy was implemented less thoroughly. It is possible, of course, that these same precincts more faithfully implemented other policies that related to crime. What is clear, however, is that if OMP did have an impact, it was not responsible for most of the drop in crime in New York City.

A policy of ‘cleaning up the streets’ and getting rid of those who make people feel uncomfortable may make good politics, but it does not appear to have much of an impact on crime.

**Background:** Based, in part, on the unsupported “broken-windows” theory of community order, the aggressive enforcement of “disorder offences” has become popular in many cities. Although there are data to suggest that people who live in socially and physically disordered communities experience more fear, the relationship between disorder and actual crime does not appear to exist.

This study examines the impact of “quality of life” policing. The theory is that such police tactics will send a signal to potential offenders that crime will not be tolerated. Police in Chandler, Arizona (an area just outside of Phoenix) imposed “quality of life” policing on an economically depressed area of the city. The targeted location was one in which residents complained about street level illegal drug and alcohol sales, prostitution, and general disrepair of the neighbourhoods. In November 1995, the police began an aggressive policy of enforcement of all municipal codes and county laws, making traffic stops as well as stopping and interviewing residents. Inspections were increased and people who did not comply with orders were charged. Marked and unmarked cars as well as bicycles were used to increase police presence.

The findings were mixed. The area was divided into four main “zones”. There was some decline in the number of calls to the police concerning public morals matters in three of the four zones. These decreases lasted beyond the aggressive enforcement period in only two of the four targeted locations. For physical disorder, calls to the police increased during the aggressive policing period but subsequently reverted back to normal levels in three of the four zones, presumably because the police were responding to these matters. However, the effect on “real crime” was less positive. In some instances, increases rather than decreases occurred in reports of certain crimes in some zones. Thus, although the aggressive policing strategy may have reduced calls to the police for public morals, there appeared to be some displacement of certain types of offending (e.g., drugs) to adjoining areas.

From the perspective of residents, those surveyed were more likely to think that the crime problem had increased (26%) than decreased (19%). However, they were also more likely to think that the appearance of the neighbourhood had improved (36%) than deteriorated further (10%).

**Conclusion.** “The program had a far less substantial effect on serious crime than on disorder-related crimes and violations. In other words, the benefits were restricted primarily to problems on which the project focused specifically…. It may be that “crime” and “grime” are two separate problems, and it is easier for the police to reduce disorder [than to reduce crime]” (p. 89). This paper supports the conclusion that “[q]uality of life initiatives are often employed without the benefit of careful problem identification or analysis, without any effort to identify underlying conditions and causes, and without careful consideration of a wide range of possible alternatives” (p. 880).

Policing strategies that focus on local forms of disorder can be reduce crime. However, aggressive order maintenance strategies that target individual disorderly behaviours appear to be ineffective.

Dealing with physical and social disorder appears to be a central feature of some police services’ crime prevention strategies. Whether such strategies are effective, however, is contentious (Criminological Highlights 1(4)#5, 4(5)#4, 5(1)#6, 8(4)#1, 8(5)#8, 9(1)#2, 10(3)#4, 14(5)#3), in part because the strategies used and the problems that are targeted vary considerably.

In this paper, a very thorough search of the published and unpublished research literature on the policing of disorder took place. All adequately designed studies addressing the question of whether policing disorder reduces crime were examined. To be included in the review, there had to be some kind of ‘control areas’ within the cities. Hence in all cases, the disorder-oriented police strategy was compared to a control area where, typically, policing took place in its normal fashion. Twenty-eight studies reporting 30 independent tests of policing disorder interventions were found. Two studies were from the U.K.; the rest were carried out in the U.S. In 9 of the studies, a random, controlled, experimental design was used. In the rest, an attempt was made to find equivalent areas in which the intervention did not take place.

Across all 30 tests, there was a significant effect of police interventions. Those areas in which social and/or physical disorder was targeted tended to have statistically significantly lower crime rates. However, the effect is described as ‘modest.’ To get an idea of what ‘modest’ means, imagine that in a targeted area, there were, on average 50 criminal incidents a month prior to the intervention being instituted, and that this varied such that for most (95%) of the months we would expect to find between 40 and 60 incidents. The targeted police interventions described in these 30 studies would be expected to reduce the number from 50 to approximately 48.85 incidents. However, only the community problem solving programs instituted by the police demonstrated significant crime reduction. Using the hypothetical example above, these programs would be expected to reduce the number of crimes from 50 to 48.6 crimes per month.

Those programs that attempted to carry out ‘aggressive order maintenance’ programs (e.g., focusing on minor forms of disorder such as public drunkenness, prostitution, vandalism, disorderly youth, or traditional arresting of those thought to be gang members) did not show statistically significant effects.

The effective types of programs seem to have had fairly similar impacts on violent crime, property crime, and disorder and drug offences.

Conclusion: Policing that focuses on “community problem-solving that seeks to change social and physical disorder conditions at particular places produces [statistically] significant crime reductions” (p. 581) though these effects are relatively modest in size. “When considering a policing disorder approach, police departments should adopt a ‘community coproduction model’ rather than drift toward a zero-tolerance policing model, which focuses on a subset of social incivilities….” (p. 581). This latter approach appears to be ineffective.

The police practice of “Stop, question, and frisk” appears to be an ineffective way to reduce street crime.

Stop, question, and frisk (SQF) approaches to policing urban areas have often been criticized because they target innocent people and are sometimes used in a racially biased fashion. In New York City, the documented number of police stops increased dramatically in the first decade of this century. In 2010, there were about 26 stops of Black people per 100 Black residents compared to about 3 stops of White people per 100 White residents. Because crime dropped between 2000 and 2010, it is sometimes suggested that SQF approaches were responsible for this decrease. Between 2003 and 2010 about 6.6% of stops in New York City resulted in arrest.

This study examines the impact of police stops on rates of robbery and burglary in 75 New York City precincts between 2003 and 2010. The annual rate of police stops varied from 33 to 4,381 stops per 10,000 people in the general population. Various controls were used in multivariate analyses including neighbourhood disadvantage, neighbourhood stability, the percent Black in the neighbourhood, as well as the overall trend in crime rates. In addition, the analyses were carried out examining the impact of police stops on crime in the current year as well as the impact of stops in each of the two previous years. The research question was straightforward: Do SQF activities in a given year reduce crime in that year and/or the two following years?

There was a small, but somewhat inconsistent effect of police stops on robbery rates in the precinct. Depending on the specific analysis, larger numbers of police stops in the current year or in the year before were associated with a decrease or an increase in robbery rates. The results for burglary suggest that police stops were not associated with a reduction in this form of crime. These same analyses were repeated to determine if there was a consistent effect of SQF arrests (the percent of SQF events leading to arrest and the SQF arrest rate). There were no effects. When the effect of misdemeanour arrests were examined, it was again found that there were no consistent effects on the robbery or burglary rates when full controls were included (a finding similar to previous research: see Criminological Highlights 8(4)#1, 8(5)#8).

**Conclusion:** The results “show few significant effects of several ‘stop, question and frisk’ (SQF) measures on precinct robbery and burglary rates” (p. 116) and those results that are significant do not hold across crimes or type of analyses. A cautious conclusion might be that one “cannot conclude from the current investigation that SQF has no impact on crime in New York. But we can be more certain that, if there is an impact, it is so localized and dissipates so rapidly that it fails to register in annual precinct crime rates, much less the decade-long citywide crime reductions that public officials have attributed to the policy. If SQF is effective, but its effects are highly focused and fleeting, policymakers must decide whether expansions in a policy that already produces nearly 700,000 police stops a year are warranted, especially given the ongoing controversy regarding the disproportionate impact of SQF on racial and ethnic minorities and the possibility that it reduces police legitimacy, which may erode its crime-reduction effects over the long term” (p. 117-118).

Police interactions with ordinary citizens involving ‘stop, question, and frisks’ appear to have very little effect on crime.

High rates of policing of locations known to be high in crime (crime ‘hot spots’) appear to have a modest impact on crime in that location, but the impact is apparently temporary and may only be effective if high density policing is coupled with certain types of police activity (Criminological Highlights 12(3)#3, 13(3)#2, 14(5)#3).

This study looks at the impact of “stop, question, and frisks” (SQFs) of ordinary citizens in New York City (NYC). SQFs often take place in locations identified by the police as ‘hot spots.’ This and other forms of active policing are sometimes seen as the cause of the drop in homicides in NYC. It is estimated that in 2003, there were approximately 160,000 SQF stops and 597 homicides. The number of SQF stops increased such that by 2011, there were 685,000 and ‘only’ 515 homicides. After the courts ruled them unconstitutional in 2013, the number of such stops dropped to about 47,000 in 2014 and homicides also declined to 333. This study attempts to see whether SQFs – carried out at high rates before they were found to be unconstitutional - actually have an impact on crime.

The method was to look at crime on ‘street segments’ – essentially a city block, including the two intersections – during the years (2006-11) when an unconstitutionally high number of SQFs were carried out. The goal was to see if an SQF carried out on a given street segment in a given week had any effect on crime on that same street segment the following week. Looking across all 5 NYC boroughs, the data suggest that an SQF one week reduced non-traffic related crime on that street segment in 3 of the 5 boroughs.

However, “in the peak years of SQFs in NYC, almost 700,000 SQFs would lead to only a 2% decline in crime” (p. 47). Attributing the decline in crime solely to the SQF is problematic in that it is impossible to separate out the effect of the SQF on crime from the mere presence of police. In addition, attributing this modest drop in crime to the SQF ignores the “degree that SQFs are coupled with other policing strategies” (p. 49). Specifically, “[i]n light of research findings on the effectiveness of directed patrol, the prolonged presence of police in a crime hot spot might very well be the active ingredient of SQFs, as opposed to anything that the police were doing” (p. 61). As one commentator noted “the efficacy of the SQF tactic, at least from the standpoint of marginal deterrence, is considerably more ambiguous than its advocates might like to admit” (p. 62). Finally, even if there is a small effect, it is impossible to know whether this effect relates only to only certain types of SQFs (e.g., those involving actual offenders).

Conclusion: Although the data suggest that stop, question and frisks (SQFs) may be associated with small reductions in crime in the location in which the police stop took place, one has to consider the other effects of SQFs: “The aggressive use of SQFs could erode citizens’ willingness to report crime to, or to cooperate in investigation or intelligence gathering with, the police. In a recent survey… young respondents who were stopped more frequently reported less willingness to report crimes even when they were the crime victims” (p. 63). Even if it could be shown that the apparent effects of SQFs on crime are due to SQFs and not some other correlated factor, “[t]he question is whether this approach [SQFs] is the best one for crime prevention at hot spots and whether its benefits are greater than its potential negative impacts on citizen evaluations of police legitimacy” (p. 50).

Intensive policing of minor disorder in neighbourhoods increases fear.

“Broken windows policing” has come to mean a form of policing involving crackdowns on signs of disorder (e.g., street prostitution, littered vacant lots, drug trafficking) the purpose of which is to reduce all types of criminal activity. The theory has been that if “disorder goes untreated, citizens become fearful and withdraw from the community, informal social control decreases and/or is perceived to be low by criminals, [and, as a result of this process] disorder and crime increase as criminals increase their activity in the area” (p. 504, Figure 1).

The effect of this approach on overall crime is not well established (see Criminological Highlights 8(4)#1, 8(5)#8, 5(1)#6). However, the hypothesized mechanism (reduced fear in the community) is itself important. This paper examines the impact of an intensive crackdown on street drug activity, prostitution, and other forms of street-level disorder, involving motor vehicle stops, sting operations, and generally a large increase in police presence in very small target areas.

In this study, some block-long street segments were subject to intensive policing and some were not. In addition, researchers systematically recorded signs of social disorder (e.g., people loitering, loud disputes, noticeably drunk people, homeless people) and physical disorder (abandoned buildings, graffiti, litter). Residents were interviewed and were asked about their own perceptions of disorder. The main dependent variable was the residents’ report of how safe they felt walking alone outside at night on their block. In addition, actual measures of reported crime were recorded as well as characteristics of the respondents. The analysis also controlled for residents’ pre-intervention levels of fear.

The results showed that “those living in areas that received the extra police presence were more fearful than those in other areas, controlling for levels of crime, disorder and [pre-intervention levels of fear] and various other factors [e.g., demographic characteristics of the respondents]” (p. 508). Clearly, these results suggest that ‘broken windows’ approaches to policing of troubled neighbourhoods cannot be justified by the suggestion that people in those neighbourhoods will feel more comfortable.

Dividing respondents into those who felt either ‘safe’ or ‘unsafe’ walking on their own block at night, it was clear that disorder itself had a large impact. Most (72%) of those living on the most disordered streets reported feeling unsafe, compared to only 15% of those who lived on the least disordered streets. But 57% of those who experienced extra police presence felt unsafe as compared to only 29% of those whose streets got no extra police presence during the experiment.

**Conclusion:** Given that extra police presence increased, rather than decreased, fear, it seems unlikely that ‘broken windows policing’ could reduce crime by making the streets feel more inviting for those who are likely to exercise informal social control. “Seeing a sudden increase in police presence on their block may lead residents to infer that crime has increased and that their block is more dangerous and crime prone than in the past” (p. 509). “Broken windows policing approaches that are detached from the community and pay little attention to community sentiment may in some sense be doomed to failure” (p. 510).

The perception that racial profiling by police takes place can have broad effects in the community at large: It can reduce both citizens’ assessments of the legitimacy of police actions and citizens’ general support of the police.

There is substantial evidence that “racial profiling” takes place in many locations (see Criminological Highlights 5(4)#2). In any police questioning of a citizen, it seems likely that the citizen will make attributions on why the stop took place. This paper looks at two questions: What are the consequences that flow from a situation in which a citizen explains police behaviour by attributing it to profiling? What factors shape a citizen’s conclusion that profiling takes place?

Using four separate surveys, this paper examines the hypothesis that “people will evaluate police actions using procedural justice criteria” (p. 255; See Criminological Highlights 4(4)#1). In the first study, roughly equal numbers of whites, blacks, and Hispanics who had recently been stopped by the police took part in the survey assessing the citizen’s willingness to accept the legitimacy of the police actions. The predictors of the assessment of the police actions were the same for both minority and white respondents. Not surprisingly, those who attributed the stop to profiling (on the basis of race, age or sex) were less willing to see the stop as being legitimate. But those “who experience high quality interpersonal treatment [from the police] – politeness, respect, acknowledgement of their rights – are also less likely to feel that they have been profiled” (p. 259).

A second study (of 18-26 year olds in New York) showed that both white and non-white respondents believe that profiling is prevalent and unjustified. For non-white respondents, the belief that they themselves had been racially profiled led to poor ratings of the police. The perception by young people of whether they had received respectful treatment at the hands of the police shaped both their views of whether they had been profiled and their views of the police. The third survey (of New York residents) showed, not surprisingly, that minorities were more likely than whites to believe that profiling takes place. This survey also demonstrated that for whites and non-whites the quality of the treatment that they felt they could expect from the police affected their view of whether profiling takes place. Finally, a telephone survey of New York residents found, once again, that “support for the police is undermined if the police are believed to engage in profiling” (p. 273).

Conclusion. It would appear that the belief that profiling takes place can undermine the perceived legitimacy of the police. However, these same data suggest that “the police can maintain their legitimacy by exercising their authority fairly” (p. 273). The data do not support the view that the public thinks that profiling is the result of prejudice: only 12% of whites and 33% of nonwhites thought that “when the police do stop minorities more frequently than whites, they are doing it out of prejudice” (p. 275). However, for both white and black respondents, if a police officer profiles, that officer’s behaviour is seen as less legitimate. “When people indicate that they have experienced fairness from the police and/or when they indicate that the police are generally fair in dealing with their community, they are less likely to infer that profiling takes place” (p. 276). Three aspects of procedural fairness – quality of decision making, quality of treatment, and inferences about trustworthiness – were found to significantly affect the inferences people make about their interactions with the police” (p. 277).

Canadian youths who are Aboriginal, Black, or of Arab or Middle East background are more likely than other youths be questioned by the police even when other relevant factors such as involvement in crime have been taken into account.

Disproportionate contact with the criminal justice system by various segments of society is a well established criminological fact. For example, for decades, Aboriginal people have been over-represented in Canada’s prisons – in comparison to the proportion of the population that they represent. Some of the over-representation of certain groups may be due to differences in the involvement of crime. The challenge, however, is to determine whether, in fact, members of certain groups are more likely to be stopped and questioned by the police even when involvement in crime is controlled.

This study used data from a nationally representative survey of 4,164 Canadian youths age 12-17 in 2000/1. One survey question asked them whether they had been “questioned by the police about anything they thought you did” in the year prior to being interviewed. The parent most knowledgeable about the youth was also interviewed. Youths were asked about their involvement in three types of crime: violence, property and drugs. Information was also obtained on the youth's family structure, household income, whether the youth stayed out all night or had run away, the relationship with parents, parental monitoring of the youth, and friends' involvement with drugs or other crime.

The youths were categorized as White or one of two separate groups: (1) Aboriginal, Black, and Arab/Middle Eastern youths who were thought to be particularly vulnerable to special treatment by the police; and (2) all others (largely East and South Asians). The Aboriginal/ Black/ Arab/ Middle Eastern group was found to be at ‘high risk’ of police contact (compared to Whites and other visible minorities). They are the focus of the study. This ‘high risk’ group was, however, also more likely to report involvement in violent crime (but not property or drug crime). Not surprisingly, self-reported involvement in all three types of crime increased the likelihood of contact with the police.

More important is the finding that controlling simultaneously for the three forms of self-reported delinquency did not reduce the higher likelihood of police contact for youths from this ‘high risk’ group. In addition, when other factors that were shown to be related to police contact and to membership in this ‘high risk group’ were controlled (e.g., staying out all night or running away from home, living in rental accommodation, low income), the effect of being a member of the ‘high risk’ group on police contact did not change appreciably. Interestingly, however, the impact of being a member of the ‘high risk’ group on police contact was larger for non-violent youths. Indeed, for youths who reported involvement in violence in the previous year, there was not a significant difference in the amount of contact with police for those from this ‘high risk’ group compared to the other groups. However, there was a sizable difference in level of police contact for youths who had not been involved in violent crime in the previous year: 28.5% of the ‘high risk’ minority youths had contact with the police compared to only 10.1% of the other youths.

Conclusion: Even controlling for involvement in crime as well as other relevant factors, Canadian youths who are Black, Aboriginal, or of Arab/Middle Eastern background are more likely than other youths to be questioned by the police about possible offending. This overall finding, and the fact that the effect was due largely to differential treatment of non-violent youths, lends some support to the conclusion that the difference in treatment of the two groups relates to racial targeting on the part of the police.

Black high school students in Toronto are more likely to be stopped and searched by the police than non-Black students. However, there do not appear to be differences between Black and White youths living on the street in the rate of being stopped and searched.

There is a substantial amount of evidence from many jurisdictions that Blacks are more likely to be stopped and searched by the police even when various relevant controls are taken into account. This paper replicates these findings using a survey of 3,393 high school students carried out in 2000 along with data from 396 ‘street youths’ recruited in three shelters and four drop-in centres that provide services for Toronto’s homeless.

Students from 5 randomly chosen homeroom classes in each of 30 randomly chosen Toronto high schools (public and Catholic) were sampled. Most (82%) of the youths who were asked to participate in the survey completed it. Street youths, defined as those between ages 14 and 24 who were living either on the street or in a shelter, were interviewed (face-to-face) to ensure that those who might have difficulty reading a survey would be able to answer the questions.

Most (86%) street youths reported being stopped at least once in the previous 2 years, compared to ‘only’ 39% of the high school students. 74% of the street youth had been searched at least once during this same period, compared to 18% of the high school students. Black high school students were considerably more likely to be stopped at least once than were white high school students (63% vs. 41%). 30% of high school youths of other races reported being stopped at least once. Other variables also predicted stops and/or searches including social class, the level of engagement in public activities on the street, involvement in partying, frequency of driving, involvement in illegal activities, and membership in gangs. However, while these factors independently predicted stops and searches, being Black had an impact above and beyond these factors for the high school students.

Youths who reported higher levels of involvement in illegal behaviour were more likely to be stopped by the police than youths with lower levels of involvement. For those highly involved in illegal activities, there was no difference between Blacks and Whites in the likelihood of being stopped by the police: Multiple stops were reported by 86% of the Black youths and a statistically indistinguishable 80% of the White youths. At the other end of the spectrum, however, for youths who reported no involvement in illegal activities, 4% of the White youths and 27% of the Black youths reported multiple police stops. It seems that “good behaviour does not protect Black youth from police contact to the same extent that it protects white youth” (p. 340).

Among the street youths, however, race did not predict stops or searches. 66% of the street youths met the criteria for being ‘highly involved in illegal activities.’ It would seem that “high criminality exposes people of all races to equal levels of police scrutiny” (p. 341). Hence, street youths, as a group, had a very high likelihood of being stopped and searched no matter what their race.

Conclusion: “For high school students… race attracts police attention. Among youth who engage in roughly similar types of behaviour, and similar levels of delinquency, black youth are stopped and searched more often than white youth” (p. 342). For street youths, who by definition are seen as being deviant, race becomes less important. For these youths, multiple stops and searches are part of normal existence, independent of race.

Do the police engage in disproportionate stops of people of certain races? The answer may depend on what is meant by ‘disproportionate.’

‘Racial profiling,’ or the disproportionate stopping (and/or searching) of people of non-dominant groups, is obviously a contentious issue in many countries including England, the United States, and Canada. Simply put, there are two problems in assessing whether racial profiling is taking place. First, one has to measure or estimate the numerator – the number of people of various groups who are stopped and/or searched. Second, one has to measure or estimate the denominator – the proportion of each group in the population.

Each of these measurement tasks is problematic. Getting valid data on the group membership of those stopped depends on having adequate police records, self-reports of citizens, or direct observations by third parties. Denominator data are equally, if not more, problematic. What population is one trying to estimate? The problem is that the population of residents may not reflect the population of people who are available to be stopped. Simply put, if the police are expected to stop people on the street in proportion to their membership in racial groups, one has to know the racial makeup of those on the streets not the racial makeup of the population as a whole.

This study argues that “the use of the residential population as the comparative basis [for police “stop” statistics] is problematic, not least because different sections of the population may use public space differently” (p. 890). In other words, the over-representation of any group (e.g., young males, blacks) may simply reflect the fact that the members of the group are more likely to be available in public places where the police stop citizens and therefore are at greater “risk” to be stopped. In two cities in England (Reading and Slough) observers systematically counted the numbers of white, black, Asian, and ‘other’ people in public areas where the police were known to be likely to stop and search people on the street. Thousands of people in each city were counted. These data were then compared to official records of stops and searches. Compared to census data, blacks were more likely to be stopped and searched in both cities. In Slough, for example, blacks made up 6% of the population but were the subject of 15% of the stops. However, blacks made up 17% of the available population (the population of those on the street). The data for Reading were similar. Blacks were not over-represented in stops when compared to the “available” population, but were when compared to the census figures. Asians in Slough were under-represented in stops. They made up 40% of the “available” population but were the subject of only 31% of the stops. In addition, young men had a dramatically higher likelihood of being stopped and searched than their numbers on the street would have predicted.

Conclusion. The study demonstrates the importance of considering in a more sophisticated manner what the “expected” rate of stops would be for various groups if “profiling” did not exist. In this study, resident population figures for two cities would suggest racial profiling was taking place, while available “street population” estimates would suggest that blacks in particular were not the subject of racial profiling. The analysis suggests that one not only needs analyses of profiling that take into account the “available” population, but one also needs to consider why certain locations (as opposed to certain groups) are identified as appropriate for increased police proactive stops.

African-American automobile drivers are more likely to be stopped and questioned than other drivers, when taking into account the racial makeup of those who drive. In addition, African-American drivers are particularly likely to be stopped in areas which are predominantly white.

Background. Racial profiling - or “a police initiated action that relies on the race… rather than the behaviour of an individual…” (pp. 403-4) - has been the subject of considerable controversy and research. There is substantial evidence that a black American automobile driver is more likely than a white person to be stopped and questioned by the police. To the extent that the police believe that blacks are more inclined toward criminality, they can explain such a propensity to stop/question blacks as “good police work” (p.402). This explanation should be particularly salient if the black drivers are not in a “place” in which they might be seen as “belonging.” More specifically, if a driver is seen as being “out of place,” he or she may be especially subject to surveillance in the form of proactive police stops. To the extent that blacks are seen as having a low probability of living in the suburbs or middle class areas (and, therefore, are “out of place”), they should be particularly subject to proactive police stops in these locations.

This study took advantage of the fact that police in the jurisdiction under examination have access to in-car computers, permitting them to check citizens directly without consulting anyone. Given that such computer verification can be seen as a form of surveillance and that the computer can be programmed to keep records of those persons (by way of the license plate number) who are queried, accurate records of the individuals who are subject to proactive record checks can be obtained. The department under study – in a city of 75,000 which is characterized as largely white and blue-collar, with a police force with few women and no minorities – borders a city that is predominantly black.

The results are based on comparisons drawn between the race of those proactively stopped and questioned and the race of others driving on the roads in those neighbourhoods. Thirteen percent of the drivers were African-Americans, but 27% of all proactive queries (on the mobile computer) were of this group. However, the proactive stopping of blacks was not uniform across the city. The relative ratio (i.e. relative to the proportion of drivers of each race) of blacks to whites being stopped was highest in the areas of the city located furthest from the black residential areas. “As African American drivers move from [the sectors of the city that border black residential areas] their chances of being the subject of a query increase dramatically” (p.417). In fact, they are three to four times as likely to be stopped and questioned as their numbers in the driving population would suggest.

The “hit rate” (i.e. the rate at which the computer indicated a legal problem with the car or driver) for African Americans was not significantly higher than that for whites. However, the “hit rate” for whites was higher than that for blacks in the white areas (i.e., locations distant from the black residential areas). Finally, the proactive stops of blacks were particularly pronounced for those police officers who made frequent use, generally, of the in-car computers during proactive stops. It would seem that racial profiling is most frequent for those officers who carry out the most proactive stops.

Conclusion. Compared to their numbers as drivers, blacks appear to be more likely than whites to be subject to proactive stops. This phenomenon is most pronounced when blacks are driving through white areas. These results suggest that “a focus on individual attitudes and behaviour [of police officers] misses the underlying societal and occupational structural problems that produce racial profiling” (p.423) since racial profiling was responsive to place.

When police officers stop cars for traffic violations, the likelihood that they will also conduct a search depends not only on the race of the driver and the race of the officer, but also the racial makeup of the neighbourhood in which the stop took place.

Searches of ordinary citizens that take place when there is no evidence that a serious offence has taken place are among the most intrusive actions that police can take. This paper examines a straightforward hypothesis: that the likelihood of a search of a driver stopped for a traffic violation depends on the race of both the citizen and the police officer as well as the racial makeup of the neighbourhood in which the traffic stop takes place.

It is suggested that White officers, who may be seen in American society as higher status than Black police officers, will be more likely to search people they stop than will Black police officers. Black citizens, who may be seen as lower status than White citizens, will be more likely to be searched. The hypothesis, then, is that searches are most likely to take place when a White officer stops a Black citizen. Searches would be least likely to take place when a Black officer stops a White Citizen. When the race of the officer and citizen is the same, the likelihood of a search should be between these two extremes, with White officers somewhat more likely to search White citizens than Black officers would be to search Black citizens.

This paper examines records of ordinary traffic stops by police officers in St. Louis, Missouri. Its goal was to understand the circumstances in which police carry out searches of drivers. State law requires that, for each stop, records be kept of various aspects of the stop including the race of the driver. The study examined 69,543 stops that took place in 2007 in which searches were discretionary on the part of the police officer (i.e., when there were no outstanding warrants related to the driver). Searches were most likely to take place when White officers stopped Black drivers (searches took place in 8.2% of stops) and were least likely when Black officers stopped White drivers (1.5% of stops). Between these two extremes, White Officers were more likely to search White drivers (5.1% of stops) than were Black officers who stopped Black drivers (3.9% of stops).

Perhaps the most interesting findings relate to the effect of the racial composition of the community in which the traffic stop took place. St. Louis is roughly half Black and half White and is heavily segregated by race. The income of White households is roughly twice that of Black households. Nine districts in St. Louis were identified, three of which had a low representation of Black citizens (average 26%); three had medium representation of Blacks (72%) and three had very high concentrations of Black residents (96%). In the areas with a relatively low concentrations of Blacks, the results were more or less the same as for the city as a whole. For the neighbourhoods with a medium concentration of Black residents, however, those with the highest likelihood of being searched were White drivers stopped by White police officers. In areas with very high concentrations of Black residents, White drivers stopped by White officers were, again, most likely to be searched. Situations in which both the driver and officer were Black were the least likely to result in a search. Other predictors of whether a search took place also varied across neighbourhoods suggesting, at a minimum, that police officers modify their decisions on whom to search according to the racial characteristics of the neighbourhood.

Conclusion: The results suggest that despite the increase in the number of Black officers in the U.S., Black and White citizens are treated differently when they are stopped by the police. But the data from neighbourhoods that differ in their racial composition suggest that “the racial composition of a community has a strong, [though]… not easily interpreted, influence on police search patterns” (p. 1016).

When stopped by the police, blacks and Hispanics in the U.S. are more likely than are whites to receive a traffic ticket, be arrested, or be subject to the use of force. However, they are not more likely to be carrying contraband.

**Background.** “The practice of targeting racial minorities for routine traffic and pedestrian stops [in the U.S.] can be traced back to the war on drugs, which promoted profiling as an effective policing tactic to detect drug offenders” (p.50). At the height of this American era, “drug arrest rates were five times higher for blacks than for whites despite consistent evidence… of similar rates of drug usage by the two racial groups…” (p.52). Indeed, these types of findings have challenged the notion defended by profiling advocates that “it is reasonable and efficient for police to consider race in their decision making [on whom to stop]” (p.54). However, in order to conclude that the over-representation of black citizens among those stopped does not, in fact, constitute efficient policing, it is necessary to know the “hit rate” on these stops – the proportion of searches which produce contraband. The research on this issue is mixed, with 8 of 16 published studies showing higher “hit rates” for black and/or Hispanic citizens than for whites. Unfortunately, these studies have typically been carried out in single cities or states. As such, it is not known the extent to which the findings may be generalized.

This study used data from a national survey of U.S. residents. Overall, black drivers were somewhat more likely than whites to have been stopped in the previous year. Further, blacks who were stopped also had a higher probability than white drivers of being given a ticket, searched, arrested, and subject to the use of force by the police (including the use of handcuffs). This relationship held even after the researchers statistically controlled for various characteristics of the driver (e.g., age, income), the stop (e.g., its stated purpose - an impaired driving assessment, traffic offence, vehicle defect) and the community (e.g., the location in which the stop took place - the centre of a large city, a non-central area).

More importantly, although blacks and Hispanics who were stopped were more likely to be subject to various police actions, “contraband was discovered on fewer minority drivers than on white drivers…. [Specifically,] 16% of the Caucasian drivers who were searched were found to be in possession of contraband, compared to only 7.5% of non-Caucasian drivers…” (p.76). Clearly, these findings are “[c]ontrary to the argument made by many law enforcement officials that minorities are more likely to be carrying drugs and/or weapons” (p.76).

**Conclusion.** The two major findings of this study – that blacks and Hispanics who are stopped are more likely to be subject to police actions but less likely to be found to be involved in any criminal wrongdoing – suggest that “targeting drivers solely or even partially on the basis of their race/ethnicity is not an effective, efficient, or responsible policing strategy at the national level [in the U.S.]” (p.82). It would certainly seem that it is not the drivers but the practice of racial profiling that needs to be stopped.

A meta-analysis of 27 independent findings demonstrates that minority suspects who come in contact with the police are more likely to be arrested than white suspects.

Researchers interested in the effect of race on the decision by police to arrest a suspect typically attempt to control for legal factors such as the strength of the evidence against the accused, the seriousness of the offence, the criminal record and any mandatory policies that might exist in the jurisdiction. Defining arrest as “taking a person into custody for the purpose of charging him/her with a criminal offence”, this study examines all available high quality studies carried out in the U.S. between 1966 and 2004.

A thorough search of published and unpublished sources located studies involving 27 independent data sets. Obviously these studies varied on a number of dimensions including whether the data were recorded by an observer, the police officer, or victims, whether the study focused on juveniles or people of all ages, and whether the study controlled for such factors as the amount of evidence, type of offence, the demeanour of the offender, the seriousness of the offence, the suspect’s prior record, and whether the victim made a request to the officer on whether to arrest the accused. The meta-analysis allows one to determine whether the inclusion of these variables affects the relationship between race and arrest rate.

Because some studies reported more than one estimate of the impact of race on arrest decisions, four different estimates were used: the average effect size, the largest, the smallest, and what was judged to be the methodologically best estimate of the effect. Nevertheless, the results are remarkably similar: between 19 and 24 of the 27 studies (depending on which effect size is included) show effects supporting the conclusion that minorities are more likely to be arrested than whites. Pooling across the 27 studies there was a significant effect of race. On average the arrest rate for whites was about 20%; for minorities it was about 26%. Studies varied, of course, on how adequately they controlled for legally relevant factors. However, the adequacy of the controls for legally relevant factors was not related to the race effect: even in the best studies, Blacks were more likely to be arrested than Whites. Similarly, those studies that attempted to control for the demeanour of the suspect showed effects as large as those that did not.

Conclusion: “The results are not mixed. Race matters [in police decisions on whether to arrest]. [The] finding is consistent with what most of the American public perceives, and that finding holds over time, research site, across data collection methods, and across publication types. Furthermore, controlling for demeanour, offense severity, presence of witnesses, quality of evidence at the scene, the occurrence or discovery of a new criminal offence during the encounter, the suspect being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, prior record of the suspects, or requests to arrest by victims does not significantly reduce the strength of the relationship between suspect race and arrest” (p. 498). Even though the overall average size of the effect might seem to be relatively small, “because of the interconnectedness of decisions made in the criminal justice system, even small racial differences that occur at many points in the criminal justice process will compound and produce profound effects further along in the system” (p. 498).

Black residents of both the U.S. and Canada are more likely than white residents to perceive that the criminal justice system is biased on racial grounds. In Canada, contact with the police or the courts increases the perception of bias for black residents.

**Background.** It has been suggested that social class has become more important than race in determining perceptions of criminal justice agencies. Some have suggested, for example, that it is class, not race, that determines the targets of “police misconduct” and the perception that the system is biased. These two studies suggest otherwise.

*These studies,* one carried out in Canada, the other in the U.S., both look at the role of race (and educational achievement) on respondents’ views of discrimination by the police. The American study examined opinions regarding the role of the police in providing security in neighbourhoods, confidence that the police treat people of both races equally, unfair treatment by the police, and the perception of how widespread the problem of racism against blacks is among police officers.

The Canadian study looked at the perception that certain groups are treated worse (e.g., the poor, the young, blacks) by the police and the courts. Generally speaking, Canadian respondents perceive more discrimination by the police than by criminal court judges. In addition, “black respondents are much more likely to perceive police and judicial discrimination than either Chinese or white respondents” (p. 446-7). Canadian blacks “are more likely than their white and Chinese counterparts to report that discrimination is both severe and commonplace” (p. 448). The American data are similar: controlling for education, income, age, gender, region of the country, and political orientation, “Blacks are significantly more likely than whites to view themselves as being the brunt of harsh treatment at the hands of the criminal justice system... and to believe that racism among police officers is very or fairly common” (p. 500).

**Education** does make a difference. In the US, the more educated a respondent is, the more likely it is that there will be negative appraisals of the criminal justice system’s treatment of blacks generally. Similarly, in Canada, those who were best educated were most likely to perceive the criminal justice system as being unjust.

*The most dramatic finding for Canada,* however, was that contact with the police or the courts was likely to increase perceptions of criminal injustice, particularly for blacks. This may not be too surprising given that blacks were much more likely to report that they had been stopped by the police (43% of males reported being stopped at least once in the past two years) than were whites (25%) or Chinese (19%). Hence the problem is not that blacks hold an uninformed stereotype of the police and courts based on no direct experience. When they actually have contact with the criminal justice system, their views become even more negative.

**Conclusion.** These findings -- that blacks are much more likely than whites to perceive racial bias on the part of the police and courts -- are important for a number of reasons including the fact that “people obey the law [in part] because they believe that it is proper to do so... People are more responsive to normative judgements and appeals than is typically recognized by criminal legal authorities...” (p. 461). Given that most people believe that it is the responsibility of the police and others in the criminal justice system to maintain confidence in the system, these perceptions of injustice cannot be ignored. They are also important because they are one more indicator of differential treatment of blacks by the police and other parts of the justice system.

Unproductive police stops of ordinary citizens leads to political alienation, distrust and, more generally, civic disengagement for people living in areas targeted by the police.

In some cities, the police have stepped up their stop-and-frisk activities. New York City, for example, increased the number of such stops from about 90,000 in 2002 to 700,000 in 2011; nonetheless, the proportion of stops leading to arrest was essentially unchanged at about 5-6%. One problem with large numbers of police stops is that these can be seen as a form of public shaming of those stopped, suggesting disrespect or unneeded harassment by the police.

Previous research has found that “police-initiated contacts are strongly and negatively related to the probability that an individual will later call the police in times of need” (p. 205-6). More generally, it seems that contact with the criminal justice system reduces civic engagement (Criminological Highlights 14(4)#1). It appears, then, that police interactions with citizens “shape how communities interact with the state more broadly” (p. 206). Police stops can range from those in which citizens only identify themselves to stops that lead to arrest, summons, etc. In this paper, stops were labeled “surplus” if they involved a frisk, search, or use of force but did not result in an arrest, summons, or finding of contraband. From the perspective of the target of the stop as well as those who observed or heard about it, the stop was likely to be seen as gratuitous.

In this paper, the researchers used as an indicator of civic engagement the rate of citizen calls to their municipal governments regarding their needs, concerns, and demands of the local government. These calls may involve broken streetlights, graffiti, complaints about city services, or other concerns. Calls to local government can be seen as “a way of connecting citizens to their municipal government… and fostering citizens’ confidence in the public sector” (p. 207). “By voicing their complaints, however mundane, citizens interact with government at the local level and obtain a response” (p. 208). Alternatively, people in communities who do not use this service may have disengaged from and lost trust in their civic communities. In other words, they would see their city as not having an interest in their concerns.

For this study, New York City was divided into small neighbourhood groupings (or blocks) involving about 1000 residents each. Data – on 311 calls to municipal governments and police stops – were examined during a 24 month period. In New York City, there are on average about 224 calls per 100 residents per year. The “stop rate”, the proportion of stops that were ‘surplus’, and the number of 311 calls all varied considerably across blocks.

After controlling for measures of disadvantage in the neighbourhood, high rates of ‘surplus’ stops were associated with lower rates of 311 calls (overall, and calls concerning crime and safety). In another analysis, adjacent neighbourhoods that were in different police precincts and had very different rates of surplus stops were compared. Again, those living in areas with high rates of surplus stops were less likely to make 311 calls.

Conclusion: The results demonstrate that “when police search a higher number of citizens or deploy more force in their stops of community members, people become much less likely to make claims on local government” (p. 217). The results were, however, different for the density of stops that did not involve ‘surplus’ force, suggesting that it is the “quality of policing, not merely the quantity” (p. 217) that makes the difference.

Warnings given by police to suspects concerning their rights have had a “negligible effect on the ability of the police to elicit confessions and on the ability of prosecutors to win convictions” (p. 203).

Background. When the Miranda warnings were imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1966, police and prosecutors suggested that it would no longer be possible to obtain confessions and that offenders would go unpunished. However, early studies on the actual use and effectiveness of this legal requirement did not find strong empirical support for the belief that prosecutions would be made more difficult. Rather, they suggested that warnings tended to be given most often in important cases “when failure to do so might jeopardize the admissibility of a highly valued confession” (p.233). At the same time, it was noted that most suspects did not appear to fully understand the impact and importance of the material in the warning. Furthermore, some research suggested that the required warnings neither affected the likelihood that an accused would confess nor the success of prosecutions (p.234). Although other work found a somewhat lower confession rate for certain offences, this phenomenon did not invariably translate into a lower conviction rate. In fact, it was concluded in one study that “police interrogators used the warnings to their advantage to create the appearance that a voluntary statement had been obtained” (p.234). Generally speaking, the early studies suggested that “the Miranda rules had only a marginal effect on the ability of the police to elicit confessions and on the ability of prosecutors to win convictions, despite the fact that some detectives continued to perceive a substantial Miranda impact” (p.238).

This paper contrasts these early conclusions regarding the use and effectiveness of Miranda warnings with those from more recent studies. While “quantitative claims [made by those arguing that the warnings have impeded prosecutions] have not been generally accepted in either the legal or social science community” (p.244), they underline the controversy which still surrounds this legal requirement. In an attempt to synthesize the current consensual view of the Miranda warning, this study notes the following points:

- While the police give warnings in almost all cases in which they are legally required, questioning does occur “outside” Miranda.
- The police have developed strategies which induce Miranda waivers in part by downplaying the significance of the warning or suggesting that benefits may be attributed to those individuals who talk to them.
- Waivers are given in most (78-96%) police interrogations although this percentage drops with suspects who have a criminal record. As one researcher noted, “[n]ext to the warning label on cigarette packs, Miranda is the most widely ignored piece of official advice in our society” (p.247).
- In some jurisdictions, police are trained to violate the warning.
- There appear to be fewer seriously abusive interrogations than there were 40 years ago. Nevertheless, “Miranda has not changed the psychological interrogation process that it condemned but has only motivated police to develop more subtle and sophisticated – and perhaps more compelling – interrogation strategies” (p.255).

Conclusion: The Miranda warning may “tap into a basic vein of fairness that transcends the [Supreme Court’s original] assumptions about the diminished free will of suspects facing police interrogation” (p.265). However, there is no consistent evidence that it has affected the ability of an accused person to resist giving a confession. Part of the reason for this reality appears to be because “the police adjusted to [the necessity of giving] Miranda [warnings] and learned how to comply in a way that minimizes the chance that the suspect will resist interrogation” (p.207). In other words, it would seem that police clearly include the right to confess as part of the Miranda warning.

Legally required warnings to youths about the consequences of making statements to the police do little if anything to protect youths’ rights.

Many jurisdictions have special procedures to warn youths about the consequences of making statements to the police (e.g., the U.S. *Miranda* warning). Developmental psychology suggests, however, that although youths may understand the meaning of the words they are told, they may lack the judgment and maturity to appreciate the purpose and importance of the rights they are being asked to waive.

To understand the interrogation of youths, this study examined records of 307 interrogations of 16- and 17-year-olds charged with felonies in four Minnesota counties. All were completed cases and constituted all formal police interrogations of 16-17 year-olds that took place in these counties between 2003 and 2006. The data examined included recordings of these interrogations (which were required by the state courts), the police reports related to the cases, as well as court records. Most of the youths (69%) had been arrested prior to the incident in which they were interrogated and most (57%) had been to court before. Their charges varied considerably.

To get youths to waive their rights, police used ‘standard’ interrogation techniques, including “communicating the value of talking – ‘telling her story’ – and telling the truth before they gave a *Miranda* warning” (p. 10-11). When speaking to the youths, police sometimes referred to the warning as a formality or a bureaucratic exercise, but were careful to ensure that youths indicated that they understood the warning. 93% of the youths who were interviewed waived their rights to silence and to counsel. Those youths with prior felony arrests were somewhat less likely to waive their rights (87%) than were those with no prior felony arrests (95%). But even ‘experienced’ youths were largely willing to talk to the police.

Most interrogations were very short: 77% took 15 minutes or less. Only 10% took more than 30 minutes. Most youths (80%) were cooperative with the police. It appeared that “most juveniles did not require a lot of persuasion or intimidation to cooperate” (p. 14). The police used a variety of ‘standard’ interrogation techniques that are used with adults. In 69% of the cases they used one or more ‘maximization’ techniques which are designed to “convey the interrogator’s rock-solid belief that the suspect is guilty and that all denials will fail” (p. 5). These included confronting the youth with evidence such as statements from witnesses or co-accused (54% of cases). In 33% of the cases the police accused the youth of lying and in about 30% they urged the youth to tell the truth. Another set of techniques involved “minimizing tactics [on the part of the police officer which] offer face-saving excuses or moral justifications that reduce a crime’s seriousness, provide a less odious motivation or shift blame…” (p. 15). As with adults, these were used less frequently than ‘maximization techniques’ (17% of cases). Most youths (59%) “confessed within a few minutes of waiving *Miranda* and did not require prompting by police” (p. 17). Only 12% did not make incriminating admissions.

**Conclusion:** Statements from youths were rarely excluded from court hearings. “Police [in these interrogations] acted professionally and complied with *Miranda’s* protocol – there is no ambiguity about warnings and waivers. In addition, most juveniles confess and tapes provide unimpeachable evidence of their statements” (p. 23). However, “*Miranda’s* assumption that a warning would enable suspects to resist the compulsive pressures of interrogation is demonstrably wrong” (p. 24). Youths, like adults, may understand the words in the warning, but they “lack ability to understand and competence to exercise rights” (p. 24). This article suggests youths be required to consult a lawyer before waiving their rights, because if they “cannot understand and exercise rights without legal assistance, then to treat them as if they do denies fundamental fairness and enables the state to exploit their vulnerability” (p. 26).

Canadian police services use a wide variety of different wordings when cautioning those facing interrogation. These cautions vary considerably in their verbal complexity and the ability of listeners to understand their meanings.

American research has demonstrated that the so-called Miranda warnings vary considerably in their length, readability, complexity, their use of unusual words, as well as the length and complexity of the sentences. Using cautions collected from across Canada, the first step in this study was to examine the cautions for “readability.” Perhaps the most frequently used technique for this is the “Flesch-Kincaid” score – an estimate of the (English language) reading level necessary to understand the warning. It has been suggested that no higher than a Grade 6 reading level should be acceptable for these warnings (i.e., that a person who could read at the Grade 6 level or higher would be able to understand the warning).

Using this standard most of the right-to-silence cautions (15 of the 19) were found to be acceptable. What is interesting, however, is the variability: it was estimated that someone with slightly higher than a Grade 5 level could understand the Halifax right-to-silence caution, whereas a person would need more than a Grade 8 education to understand the British Columbia caution. There was similar variation on the right-to-legal counsel cautions. It was estimated that a Grade 5 education was sufficient to understand the Charlottetown Police Department’s caution, whereas more than a Grade 8 education was needed to understand Calgary’s caution.

A limited number of cautions concerning the right-to-legal counsel were compared by having these cautions read to undergraduate students in Canada. Once again, the most important finding was that there was variability across cautions in how complete the students’ understanding was of the various warnings. On some criteria, relatively few people understood the meaning of the warning; and on other criteria, there were large differences across different wordings.

Conclusion: A caution given to a person who is being arrested or interrogated is only effective if its meaning is understood. This paper suggests that some Canadian police services have been more successful than others at developing effective cautions. More importantly, perhaps, this paper suggests that police services (or governments) could, if they were interested, develop and test the effectiveness of their warnings. This process is straightforward, but not necessarily easy. For example, the “model” warning created by the authors of the paper was not as effective, on some criteria, as warnings currently in use.

It is unlikely that warnings from Canadian police given to youths are adequately understood by them.

As with adults, Canadian police must inform accused youths of their legal rights. For example, youths have a right to legal counsel; they can consult parents or other adults, and youths can choose to have parents and/or counsel present during questioning. They are not required to make statements to the police.

The Youth Criminal Justice Act specifies that the warnings to the youth of the youth’s rights must be “in language appropriate to his or her age and understanding” (s. 146(2)(b)). However, the form of the various warnings is not specified in the legislation. Hence police services have developed special formal warnings for youths that can be read to youths when they are arrested. This study examines a simple question: Is it likely that youths understand these warnings?

There is a good deal of research (e.g., Criminological Highlights 11(3)#7) that suggests many police warnings designed for ordinary citizens are often written in ways that make them difficult to understand. In this study, 50 warning statements from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and from at least one police service in each province and territory were studied. There were 31 “unique” warnings. (The remainder were used by more than one police service). The police services that provided the warnings for the study are responsible for policing at least 90% of Canada’s population.

Two very different forms of assessment of these 31 different warning forms were employed. First, the ‘complexity’ of the forms was assessed. For example, long statements are generally more difficult to understand. The warnings varied in length from 239 to 1192 words. The statements were also assessed according to standardized measures of the school grade level needed to comprehend the statements as well as the grade level at which specific important words would be likely to be understood. The estimated grade level needed to understand the warnings ranged from approximately Grade 6 (age 12) to Grade 12 (age 18). Many of these warning statements contained words that would not be expected to be understood by those well over the age of criminal responsibility in Canada (age 12).

In a separate study, 32 students, aged 15-17, in St. Johns, Newfoundland & Labrador were read the forms used by their local police service. They were asked to indicate whether they understood what was read to them and their confidence in their comprehension of the warning. They were then asked to write down the information that they would give to a close friend who was arrested. Broadly speaking, the students were, not surprisingly, able to recall more of the warnings when tested after each section was read to them than when they were asked to recall what they had been told after all information had been delivered. However, only 22% of the respondents recalled more than half of the information contained in the warning.

Conclusion: Perhaps because warnings are often long and written in language that is difficult for youths to understand, it is not surprising that young people do not fully understand the warnings that are normally used by police. “Also of importance was the fact that participants [who were read the warnings used by their local police] reported high levels of confidence in how much they understood and almost always confirmed that they understood the rights that were presented – despite the overall low level of comprehension. This finding suggests that simply asking youths whether they understood the rights is not a useful procedure for ensuring that youths actually understand their rights” (p. 821). But, in addition, other research would suggest that even if they understand the ‘words’, youths may not be able to resist the pressures to make statements to the police (Criminological Highlights 13(4)#2).

Procedural justice is just as important for youths as it is for adults in understanding their views of the legitimacy of the police and their willingness to report crimes to the police.

A number of studies have demonstrated that the manner in which the police treat those whom they come in contact with is important in understanding citizens’ views of the legitimacy of the police and their willingness to report offences to the police (see, for example, Criminological Highlights 4(4)#1, 7(1)#4, 11(4)#1). This study examines whether the effect of fair treatment on the perceived legitimacy of the police is the same for youths as it is for adults.

A heterogeneous sample of 513 youths (age 12-17) in grades 7-10 in a medium sized Australian city were sampled along with 2611 adults (age 18-94, mean=49) from the same city. In a written survey, police legitimacy was measured by the extent of agreement with statements such as whether “Most police are honest” and “I have great respect for the police.” Respondents’ views of procedural justice by police were measured as the extent of agreement with statements such as “It depends on what mood a police officer is in whether they book you/tell you off” or “Police treat you differently depending on where you live”. Police effectiveness was measured with questions such as “How well do police do in dealing with problems that concern people in your suburb/at keeping an eye on gangs of young people?” (p. 76). Various control measures were included in regression analyses including age, gender, whether respondents were of Australian ancestry, and whether they had had recent contact with the police.

Regression analyses, carried out separately for youths and for adults, showed generally similar effects for youths and adults. Those who rated the police favourably on the measure of procedural justice were more likely to see the police as acting legitimately in the community. A similar, and independent, effect on police legitimacy was found for police effectiveness. Further, those who viewed the police favourably on the procedural justice measures were also more likely than others to report that they would report crimes (e.g., a gang beating up someone). However, one effect was significant only for youths: youths, but not adults, who saw the police as being highly effective were more likely to indicate that they would report criminal incidents to the police.

The effects of procedural justice and police effectiveness on reporting criminal incidents to the police were mediated by views of the legitimacy of the police. When adults and youths believe that the police act in a procedurally fair way, they see police as generally acting legitimately. This, in turn, appears to increase the likelihood that they would report crime to the police. The results for adults are similar to those for youths, but it would appear that views of police legitimacy in adults do not fully mediate, or explain, the relationship between views of procedural justice of the police and the reporting of crime.

Conclusion: “Procedural justice policing has many advantages over a coercive deterrence-based policing approach. The main advantage is that the motivation by young people to obey the rules and norms of society, as well as obey police directives, is self-regulatory under a procedural justice policing model. This means that... people voluntarily defer to police requests and directives and are less likely to challenge and defy police decisions” (p. 71). It appears that youths’ views of the police, once established, are related to cooperation with the police in much the same way as they are for adults. Once again, the findings demonstrate the importance of fair and respectful treatment by the police of ordinary citizens – for both youths and adults.

People who believe that the police act unfairly are likely to believe that it is all right for ordinary people to use violence for personal protection, to resolve disputes, or to achieve political goals.

Previous research has suggested that “when police act in line with the norms and values of procedural justice, members of the public tend to believe that the police have the right to [use force]” (p. 479). This study examines whether there are “empirical links between how the police [are seen to] exercise their authority (procedural justice)… and whether those [who are subject to the police] believe it is acceptable to use violence to achieve certain social and political goals” (p. 480).

Studies have suggested that those who perceive the justice system to be more legitimate are more likely to comply with the law, cooperate with the police, and support the police in their exercise of their power (Criminological Highlights, 4(4)#1, 7(1)#4, 11(4)#1, 12(5)#2). This study examines whether those who see the police as acting in a legitimate manner “also believe that one should not use violence to achieve certain goals – that is that the police have a right and just monopoly over violence in society” (p. 481).

The study was carried out in 4 boroughs of London, England. Within each of these locations, males, age 16-30 “self-identifying as members of a non-majority ethnic or racial group” (p. 483) were sampled. The acceptability of three types of violence was assessed: violence to protect oneself from attack or intruders, violence to resolve disputes or take revenge, and violence for political goals. In addition, trust in the fairness of the police, belief in the effectiveness of the police, and belief in the legitimacy of the police were assessed. Finally, fear of crime, feelings of belonging in Britain, and attitudes toward democracy were included along with various demographic measures and experiences with police stops.

Controlling for all other measured factors, “the study’s core finding is that [perceived] procedural justice explains variation in police legitimacy, which in turn is negatively correlated with attitudes to [all three types of] private violence (p. 486). In other words, the relationship of procedural justice to the acceptability of violence appears to be indirect – by its impact on the perceived legitimacy of the police. This suggests the more people perceive the police to be acting legitimately “via compliance with standards of procedural justice, the less favourable are people’s views about the acceptability of private violence” (p. 486).

There is little evidence that judgments of police effectiveness are related to attitudes concerning the legitimacy of using private violence. Independent of these effects, “A positive view of democracy and feelings of belonging to the nation are negatively correlated with approval of political violence” (p. 486).

Conclusion: Consistent with previous research, this study found that perceptions of the legitimacy of the police are correlated with perceptions that the police act in a procedurally fair manner. Those who see the police as acting with legitimacy, then, are less likely to support the use of violence for personal protection, to resolve disputes, or to achieve political goals. Although causal statements cannot be drawn from these correlational results, the findings underline the likely importance of police acting in a manner that elicits perceptions that they are acting in a procedurally fair manner.

Treatment by the police that is perceived to be unfair reduces citizens’ willingness to be law abiding because being treated badly leads people to feel angry or resentful which, in turn, makes them less likely to follow the law and obey the police.

There is considerable evidence that procedurally fair treatment by the police is important in motivating ordinary citizens to cooperate with them and to follow the law (Criminological Highlights 4(4)#1, 7(1)#4, 11(4)#1, 12(5)2, 15(1)#5, 15(3)#2). This paper, reporting the results of a survey and an experiment, examines the psychological mechanism whereby unfair treatment appears to reduce the view that obeying the law and the police is important.

In this study, a representative sample of Australians (drawn from voting lists) was asked to fill out a survey questionnaire in 2007, and again in 2009. The study focuses on those who had contact with the police in the previous 12 months. Procedural justice was measured by such questions as whether the police were polite, respectful, and fair. Those who reported that they were treated fairly, etc., by the police were less likely to report being angry, resentful, frustrated, etc., after the interaction with the police (controlling for age, gender, level of education, and income). Those who reported having been treated in a procedurally just fashion were also more likely to report willingness to comply with the law and to obey the police. However, when the reported emotional response of the respondent to the encounter was controlled for, the effect of procedural justice disappeared. This pattern of findings suggests that the relationship between being treated in a procedurally just fashion and compliance with the law and the police is mediated by negative affect created by procedurally unjust treatment. Said differently, being treated in a procedurally unjust fashion leads to feelings of frustration and anger which, in turn, reduce the likelihood of future compliance with the police and with the law.

In the second (experimental) study, Australian university students were given descriptions of one of two scenarios in which they were to imagine being stopped by the police for exceeding the speed limit by 5 km/hour. In one scenario (given to half the respondents) the police officer was described as courteous, friendly, and giving an explanation for the stop. For the other half of the respondents, the police officer was described as rude, condescending, and not explaining the purpose of the stop. Once again, being treated in a procedurally unjust fashion led respondents to report more negative affect. In addition, they reported they would, in the future, be less likely to be careful to follow all road rules, and generally would be less likely to follow the law. However, once again, when negative affect was controlled for, the effect of procedural justice disappeared suggesting that being treated in a procedurally unfair manner leads people to be angry, etc., which in turn makes them less likely to follow the law in the future.

Conclusion: “Procedural justice appears to be consistently important for influencing both emotional reactions and compliance [with the law and the police]…. By engaging with the public in a polite, respectful, and empathetic manner, police officers will be able to reduce negative sentiments and emotion directed at them, thereby increasing people’s willingness to comply with them both immediately and in the future” (p. 269). “If the police wish to be able to effectively manage citizen behaviour and promote compliance with the law, the findings… suggest that they ought to treat people with procedural justice” (p. 270).

Variation across neighbourhoods in legal cynicism – i.e., lack of support for the legitimacy of laws and lack of confidence in the police – helps explain why some Chicago neighbourhoods maintained high homicide rates even when homicide rates elsewhere were decreasing.

Previous research has shown that residents of socially disadvantaged neighbourhoods with high rates of violent crime have low levels of tolerance for violence or crime. However, “while individuals may believe in the substance of the law, antagonism toward and mistrust of the agents of the law may propel some individuals toward violence simply because they feel they cannot rely upon the police to help them resolve grievances” (p. 1191), an argument similar to that made to explain the relative reduction, over time, of homicides by the elite (see Criminological Highlights 1(3)#3). Legal cynicism is part of the culture of a neighbourhood. This conceptualization of culture views it “not as values but as a repertoire of tools that ultimately serve as a guide for action” (p. 1195).

Residents of a neighbourhood “acquire culture relationally, through their interactions in social networks” (p. 1195). Thus, for example, “cynicism toward the law does not directly cause neighbourhood violence…. Instead, the culture of a neighbourhood may be one of mistrust of agents of the law, such that “individuals will resort to illegal violence to redress a problem instead of abiding by the letter of the law” (p. 1203).

This study examines the homicide rate of 342 neighbourhoods in Chicago, looking at characteristics of neighbourhoods rather than of individuals. In Chicago, in the early 1990s, there was, not surprisingly, a positive correlation between concentrated poverty of a neighbourhood and legal cynicism, but a small negative relationship between legal cynicism and tolerance for deviance.

The level of legal cynicism was positively related to the homicide rate in the late 1990s above and beyond the impact of concentrated poverty, tolerance for deviance and other neighbourhood characteristics. More importantly, although the neighbourhood homicide rate in the early 1990s was a predictor of the neighbourhood homicide rate in the late 1990s, legal cynicism (measured in the middle of the decade) remained a predictor of late-1990s homicide rates even after controlling for the earlier homicide rate. In fact, the level of legal cynicism of the people in the neighbourhood predicted the change in homicide rates from the early 1990s to the early 2000s: neighbourhoods in which the culture was one in which the law and police were not trusted tended to be those whose homicide rates remained high, while neighbourhoods not characterised by legal cynicism tended to have decreased homicide rates.

Conclusion: It is important to remember that ‘legal cynicism’ and ‘tolerance for deviance or violence’ are quite separate constructs. But “when the law is perceived to be unavailable – for example, when calling the police is not a viable option to remedy one’s problems – individuals may instead resolve their grievances by their own means, which may include violence… In this sense, cultural frames have a constraining influence; cynicism constrains choice if individuals presume that the law is unavailable or unresponsive to their needs, thus pushing individuals to engage in their own brand of social control” (p. 1128).

Young Black Americans’ perceptions of criminal injustice depends on more than the nature of their own interactions with justice authorities.

Black Americans are more likely than others to perceive that they are treated in an unfair manner. But in addition, Black Americans living in disadvantaged neighbourhoods are especially more likely than others to have negative views of the justice system. A question raised by this paper is whether it is structural disadvantage *per se* that is important in understanding these neighbourhood and race differences or whether it is the moral and legal cynicism of the neighbourhood that is important in understanding perceptions of criminal injustice.

Over a period of 11 years, 689 African American youths (age 10-12 years old at the beginning of the study) and their families were interviewed 5 times. They were recruited from 39 neighbourhoods in two states. These neighbourhoods varied considerably at the beginning of the study in their degree of ‘structural disadvantage’ (e.g., proportion of families on public assistance, proportion unemployed). Moral and legal cynicism was measured for the neighbourhood when the youth was 19-21 years old by combining responses from those in the neighbourhood to 10 items such as “How important is it to obey the law?”, “Behaving aggressively is often an effective way of dealing with someone who is taking advantage of you”, or how ‘wrong’ it is to commit certain crimes such as stealing something, selling drugs. During these interviews, the parent and the youth were each asked if they had been treated unjustly or in a discriminatory manner by the police in the year before the interview.

When youths were 21-23 years old, their own perceptions of criminal injustice were assessed by asking them to indicate their degree of agreement/disagreement with statements such as “Police are more likely to stop and question Blacks unfairly than those in other racial groups”; “Courts are biased and unfair when it comes to deciding cases with Black suspects and White victims”; “Courts punish Blacks more harshly than Whites.” Various control variables (e.g., sex, various measures of criminal justice involvement by the youth) were also included.

Structural disadvantage of the neighbourhood only predicted perceptions of criminal injustice when neighbourhood moral and legal cynicism were not included in the prediction model. Moral and legal cynicism did, however, predict perceptions of injustice. “It is not simply structural disadvantage that generates perceptions of injustice among African Americans. Rather disadvantage promotes collective cynicism [in the neighbourhood], which is associated with appraisals of biases in the criminal justice system” (p. 535). Both personal and vicarious (parental) negative interactions with the police were also associated with increased perceptions of injustice. In addition, “individuals who [directly or vicariously] experienced negative encounters [with the police] and also reside in neighbourhoods characterized by high levels of moral and legal cynicism are [especially] likely to view the criminal justice system as being biased against them” (p. 536).

Conclusion: “For the state to secure voluntary compliance from the public, it is necessary for it to be perceived as morally credible” (p. 520). This paper suggests that the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of young Black Americans is undermined most dramatically when negative interactions with the police occur to those who live in neighbourhoods that can be characterized as already having high degrees of legal cynicism. These results are independent of individuals’ record of offending, arrests or other criminal justice contact.

Police misconduct in highly disadvantaged neighbourhoods can lead to increases in violent crime.

“Conflict between the police and public in structurally disadvantaged neighbourhoods may undermine police legitimacy ... If members of disadvantaged communities perceive mistreatment and marginalization by the police, then they may rely on informal methods to redress conflict rather than seek police assistance. Such a response to compromised police legitimacy may lead to increases in violence... as some residents cease their cooperation with formal legal authorities” (p. 470).

In this study, data from 74 local police precincts in New York City for the 22 year period from 1975 through 1996 were examined. An index of structural disadvantage was created by combining data on the proportion of female headed households with children, the percent of black residents, the proportion of households receiving public assistance, the unemployment rate, and the proportion of residents with low educational achievement. Police misconduct was operationalized as the number of officers compulsorily separated from the department due to misconduct including the number of officers allowed to resign under “questionable circumstances” (e.g., while under suspension or after having been charged). The dependent measure was the violent crime rate.

The results are quite straightforward. Precincts were divided into low, high, and extreme (structural) disadvantage. Within high and extreme disadvantage precincts, the level of police misconduct predicted the violent crime rate. The effect of police misconduct was higher in the extremely disadvantaged communities. There was no impact of police misconduct on violent crime rates in precincts characterized by low structural disadvantage.

Conclusion. The results of this study suggest that police misconduct can lead to increases in crime in the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The findings are consistent with the view that formal institutions, as well as informal institutions, can be important determinants of the crime rate in certain neighbourhoods. “In [the poorest] communities, residents may feel the most marginalized and socially dislocated and they may respond the most adversely to (real or apparent) violations of procedural justice norms by the police, who represent the most visible agents of official social control” ... These findings suggest the importance of police departments meeting procedural justice expectations, specifically in extremely disadvantaged communities” (p. 492).

The justice system is judged largely on whether it is perceived as being *fair* in the manner in which it uses its authority. Drawing from a number of different surveys, it appears that procedural fairness is more important than specific outcomes.

*Background.* “People often assume that the outcomes received when dealing with specific police officers and judges shape reactions to those encounters. In contrast… research consistently suggests that people actually react to their personal experiences primarily by judging the procedures used by the authorities” (p. 215). The manner in which people are treated, as well as whether they feel that decisions are made fairly appear to be of crucial importance. “People are willing to accept the decisions of police officers, judges, mediators, and other third party authorities when they think that those authorities are acting in ways they view as fair” (p. 216). Hence, the public’s views of criminal justice institutions are linked more to perceived justice than to specific outcomes or utilitarian concerns.

*This study* suggests that confidence in the police and the courts is related less to judgments about cost, delay, and performance than it is to perceptions of procedural justice. The findings are drawn from a number of different sources and can be summarized as follows:

- A study of Chicago residents’ views of the police and the courts compared the importance of the quality of services (competence) of these institutions with the quality of the treatment that citizens were perceived to receive (fairness). Both competence and fairness are seen as important, but “the primary influence [on the overall evaluations of the police and courts] is from the quality of the treatment” (p. 218). One's sense of obligation to obey the law is influenced by the perceived fairness of the institution, not by its performance.

- A study of high crime areas - predominantly minority neighbourhoods in Oakland, California - during a period of aggressive policing showed, once again, that the quality of police treatment of citizens (e.g., judgments about police honesty and respect for rights) rather than law enforcement performance (e.g., the impact of the police on crime) dominates the evaluations of the police, as well as residents’ willingness to pay more taxes for increased police services.

- A (U.S.) national study of people’s views of the courts found that “the primary influence on overall evaluations and overall ratings of performance [of the courts] come through judgments about the fairness of the outcomes… and the quality of the treatment they provide to members of the public” (p. 226).

- In another national study in the U.S., respondents who had been to court in the previous year were asked whether they felt that they would get a fair outcome and be treated justly if they were to go to court in the future. Ratings of the procedural fairness of their own experience were, in all cases, more important than their perception of having received the desired *outcome*.

*Conclusion.* In four different studies, it was found that the quality of the treatment which people receive, or perceive in the community, is the most important factor in determining people’s views of criminal justice institutions. Although specific outcomes are important, they are not as decisive as procedural fairness. These findings were confirmed for both white and minority groups. Results such as these serve as a reminder that it is not just what the criminal justice institutions do that is important but how they are perceived as doing it.

Citizens’ level of satisfaction with the police depends primarily on how the police treat them.

There are a number of reasons for caring how the police are perceived by the community. One reason is obvious: “Positive views of the police make the work of the police easier and more effective” (p. 317). In addition, “The degree to which people view the police as legitimate influences whether they comply with police orders or requests. More generally, people accept the decisions of police when they believe the police have acted fairly and openly with them” (p. 317).

This study, then, examines what, in an encounter between a citizen and the police, determines how the police are perceived by citizens. The conclusions are drawn from a survey carried out in 2001 of 2513 citizens of Chicago, Illinois. Respondents were asked about their contacts with the police in the previous 12 months (e.g., who initiated contact and for what purpose or in what situation) and they were asked to assess the quality of that interaction. The likelihood of being stopped by the police (in a car or on foot) was related to gender (being male), age (being young), and race (being Latino, or more dramatically, being black). Not surprisingly, those whose encounters with the police were citizen initiated were more favourable toward the police than were those who experienced police-initiated encounters. Generally speaking, there was very little variation across racial groups, age, or gender in satisfaction with citizen-initiated encounters. In other words, for citizen initiated encounters, race, gender, and age had little effect on the ratings of the police on dimensions such as whether the police responded quickly or on time, whether the police listened to the citizen, whether the police explained their actions adequately, and whether the police were polite and helpful. For police-initiated encounters, however, African-Americans and non-English speaking Latinos were less likely to be satisfied with the encounter than were whites in terms of dimensions such as whether the police were fair and polite.

For citizen-initiated encounters, overall satisfaction with the police was related to whether the citizen thought that the police had behaved well (e.g., had been helpful, polite, thorough in their explanations, etc.) and not to age or race. For police-initiated contact, there was a ‘race’ effect, but it was considerably smaller in magnitude than were the effects of the quality of the encounter itself (whether the police officers explained their actions, or whether they were perceived as fair and polite). The data would suggest, then, that the impact of race on ratings of the police is largely due to differential ratings of the quality of the police-initiated contact.

Conclusion. The findings suggest that the quality of police-citizen contacts can have important effects on how the police are seen by ordinary citizens. Giving citizens an opportunity to explain their situation and communicate their views, fair and polite treatment by the police, each have a direct impact – on all demographic groups – on how the police are perceived. “Unlike many of the outcomes of policing, including safer streets and healthier communities, these are factors that recruitment, training, and supervision by police departments can assuredly affect… Process based reactions benefit the police, because they cannot always provide desirable outcomes, but it is almost always possible to behave in ways that people experience as being fair” (p. 318).

Negative experiences with the police have large negative impacts on the way in which the police are rated by ordinary citizens. Positive interactions with the police, however, have little, if any, impact.

Most police administrators would agree with the assertion that it is important that the public have confidence in the police. There are data that suggest that individual level factors (e.g., race and age), neighbourhood-level factors, as well as individual experiences with the police affect the way in which the police are evaluated. This paper explores the hypothesis that the relationship between how people feel that they have been treated by the police and their evaluations of the police are asymmetrical. That is, citizens may have expectations that they will be treated fairly and appropriately by the police which would mean that positive encounters with the police would have little (additional) impact on their evaluations of the police. On the other hand, a single bad experience with the police may “deeply influence people’s views of [police] performance and even legitimacy” (p. 100).

Research on various types of encounters with the police suggests that citizens (e.g., victims) are less affected by the outcome of the encounter with the police than they are by the process – how they are treated by the police. If the public expects professional and respectful treatment from the police, it would follow that encounters that are consistent with this expectation would have relatively little impact. However, bad experiences with the police would be expected to have large, and lasting, impacts on people’s evaluation of the police. Psychological research has suggested that “The lessons of bad things are learned more quickly, and forgotten more slowly, than the lessons of positive experiences” (p. 106).

In this study, residents of Chicago were surveyed and asked a number of questions about how good a job they thought their local police were doing on such matters as responding to community concerns, preventing crime, keeping order, and helping victims. They were also asked questions about interactions with the police and how satisfied they were with the way in which the police handled the issue that led them to have contact with the police.

Various factors known to affect evaluations of the police were “held constant” statistically: race, age, income, marital status, level of fear of crime, the perception of the extent of the local drug and gang problem, the perception of disorder and whether any recent interactions with the police were initiated by the citizen or the police. After taking account of these factors, positive experiences with the police had essentially no impact on confidence in the police. Negative experiences, however, had substantial impacts on reducing confidence in the police. This asymmetrical effect – positive interactions with the police having little if any impact on confidence in the police, and negative interactions with the police reducing dramatically the evaluations citizens give of the police – was replicated in seven other surveys – Seattle, New York, St. Petersburg (Florida), St. Petersburg (Russian Federation), Indianapolis, Washington, D.C., and an urban sample in England & Wales.

Conclusion. “For both police-initiated and citizen-initiated encounters [with the police], the impact of having a bad experience is four to fourteen times as great as that of having a positive experience. The coefficients associated with having a good experience – including being treated fairly and politely, and receiving service that was prompt and helpful – were very small and not statistically different from zero” (p. 100). It would appear that it is more important for police administrators interested in improving citizens’ assessments of the police to focus on avoiding negative interactions with the public than on creating opportunities for positive interactions.

Offensive language by police officers is at least as important as their behaviour in determining the way they are seen by ordinary citizens.

What are the important dimensions of misconduct by the police from the perspective of ordinary citizens? Traditionally, police misconduct in relation to interactions with citizens has been categorized as involving three dimensions: the use of unnecessary force (e.g., hitting or beating a citizen), abuse of authority (e.g., threats or the refusal of the officer to give his/her badge number/name), and discourtesy or the use of inappropriate language (e.g., racial slurs, insulting language). This paper examines the relative importance of these dimensions in determining how police are seen by ordinary members of the public.

Eleven hundred New York City residents were each read a set of short vignettes describing an interaction between a police officer and a citizen. The officer’s language was described in neutral terms or in a range of different discourteous or obscene terms such as by calling the citizen a “fuckin’ piece of trash” (p. 686) or using a racial slur. Abuse of authority was manipulated by simply stating that the officer threatened to arrest the citizen or engaged in a range of different forms of abuse such as “threatening to grab or kick the civilian”, or “refusing to provide a name or badge number” (p. 686). The use of unnecessary force was injected into some scenarios by saying such things as the officer “punched the civilian” or “drew his or her gun and aimed it at the civilian” (p. 687). The event precipitating the citizen-policeman interaction was also described in various ways. Some were ambiguous (e.g., the police officer was described as simply stopping the car and asking the citizen for his or her driver’s licence, etc.) while in other cases the citizen was described as having been observed committing an offence.

One might have expected that the rated seriousness of the misconduct would increase incrementally as one moved along a continuum from offensive language through abuse of authority to the use of unnecessary force. This was not the case. Independent of the reason for the encounter, the description of the civilian’s response to the officer and various other factors, “a police officer’s discourtesy or offensive language remained highly salient as an explanation of the respondent’s evaluation of the seriousness of misconduct” (p. 691). Language, it seems, matters and it matters a lot. In particular, “unnecessary force in the presence of offensive language has a greater impact on... ratings” (p.692) than did abuse of authority (though abuse of authority did add significantly to the rated seriousness of the misbehaviour).

Conclusion: Offensive language “may be part of everyday speech [but] it carries a very different meaning when voiced by police officers” (p. 702) in an encounter with a citizen. Along with abuse of authority and use of unnecessary force, language turns out to be very important in shaping citizens’ views of the police. At the same time, however, non-cooperative behaviour on the part of the citizen does lessen, somewhat, the rated seriousness of police misconduct. The mitigating impact, however, is small compared to effects of police misbehaviour. Though the public may, under some circumstances, tolerate police misconduct, “the public’s tolerance for [police] misconduct in an encounter with a civilian does not extend to unnecessary use of force” (p. 703).

Citizen satisfaction with the police is determined largely by how citizens are treated rather than by how successful the police are in locating or charging an offender.

These days, the police, as with other public service agencies, are expected to do more with less. Some police managers have suggested that if fewer resources translates into a reduced ability to ‘get results’ (e.g., locate an offender) the public will lose confidence in the police. The findings in this paper suggest that the police are more in control of how the public views them than they might have thought.

Previous research (e.g., *Criminological Highlights* V8N2#1, V8N5#5) has suggested that the quality of the interaction between police officers and members of the public has an important effect on how the police are rated, but that this effect is asymmetric: Encounters in which citizens believe police have not shown them appropriate respect have a much larger impact than positive encounters.

In one study, residents of 16 English neighbourhoods were interviewed in 2003/4 and again a year later. In citizen-initiated contacts that took place between the two interviews (in which citizens were victims of a crime or initiated contact with the police for any other reason), being satisfied with the interaction with the police had very little impact on whether citizens thought their local police were doing a good job. Being dissatisfied with the interaction with the police, however, was a strong predictor of reduced ratings of the police.

In a second study, using British Crime Survey data from 2008/9, victims whose victimizations came to the attention of the police were asked how satisfied they were with how the police handled their personal crime incident. Respondents were asked about whether the police seemed to show interest in the victim’s incident and whether the offender was identified and charged. For property crimes, victims were also asked whether the police recovered the stolen property.

“Respondents who felt that police did not show enough interest were much less likely to be satisfied… regardless of whether the offender had been identified and/or charged. Those who felt the police had shown enough interest, by contrast, were more likely to be satisfied… regardless of what had happened in relation to the offender” (p. 413). Outcomes did matter, but the positive impact of the outcome was considerably less in cases where police seemed uninterested in the case compared to cases where citizens thought police showed appropriate interest. “If officers did not show enough interest, there was no significant difference in the probabilities of satisfaction predicted for cases where the offender was identified and charged and those cases where the offender was not identified at all. However, if officers did show enough interest, knowing that a charge had been brought appeared to boost the chance of being very satisfied…” (p. 413).

**Conclusion:** Obviously, victims do care about the outcome of their cases. However, “a criminal justice outcome alone… appears less likely to result in overall satisfaction than good interpersonal treatment and a tailored response” (p. 416) on the part of the police. Hence, police officers or police organizations that focus solely on “getting a result” (p. 417) run the risk of losing the support of the public they serve. A policing style oriented toward procedural justice is likely to have a positive impact on public satisfaction. “Policy makers and police managers might do well to emphasize the key role played by the public both in helping to detect crime and in cooperating with the police to build and maintain social order” (p. 419). If the police find it is important to have public trust and cooperation to help them apprehend offenders, then the evidence would suggest that it would helpful for them to attend carefully to the nature of their interaction with victims and other citizens.

The police have direct control over how favourably they are seen by crime victims. Although victims generally think less favourably about the police than non-victims, the police can mitigate this effect by taking victims’ concerns seriously.

One of the most common reasons for citizen-initiated contact with the police is that the citizen was a victim of crime. The most important single determinant of citizens’ assessment of the quality of the contact with the police was whether the police appeared to take the citizen’s concerns seriously. Two other factors predicted citizen satisfaction with the specific contact they had with the police: whether the citizen believed that the police followed up on the call and whether the citizen thought that the time he or she had to wait for the police was reasonable.

Both citizen- and police-initiated contact with the police were related to lower ratings of police effectiveness, even when the citizen was, overall, satisfied with the quality of the particular encounter. Not surprisingly, people who had unsatisfactory recent contacts with the police were more likely to rate the police, generally, as being unfair and not involved with the community. But victims’ contacts with police that were seen as favourable did have positive impacts on ratings of fairness and engagement of the police (compared to people who had not had recent contact with the police).

Perhaps the most important findings are those that suggest that individual police officers can enhance the overall ratings of the police. When crime victims believe that their concerns are being taken seriously by the police, they see police as not only being more engaged in the community, but also as more fair and effective. When the police follow up in any way with the crime victim, ratings of effectiveness and community engagement are higher.

People judge the legitimacy of the police by whether the police follow the law, whether the police have been procedurally fair in their dealings with citizens, the fairness of the outcome of encounters with the police, and the effectiveness of the police. The perceived fairness of the police predicts voluntary cooperation with them.

The willingness of citizens to volunteer information to the police about crime and disorder in their communities is seen generally as enabling the police to carry out their function (see, for example, *Criminological Highlights* 12(5)#2, 7(1)#4, 4(4)#1, 11(4)#1).

People may obey police either because they consider the police to be legitimate, or because they are afraid of the costs of non-obedience to the police. From the police perspective, it is clearly preferable if ordinary citizens believe in the legitimacy of the police and comply with them because they think it is the right thing to do rather than because they are afraid of being punished if they don't. Previous research has suggested that “legality or lawfulness [is] the first and most basic level of legitimacy” (p. 108). But in addition, procedural justice – that decisions within the rule of law should be impartial, consistent, and should allow citizens to “make representations of their side of the case before decisions are made” (p. 108) – is also seen as important.

A survey of residents of London, England, was carried out in which people were asked questions related to police legitimacy. In addition, they were asked about their feelings of obligation to obey the police as well as their willingness to provide the police with information voluntarily. It would appear that there are four separate, but somewhat related, aspects of police legitimacy: (1) Lawfulness: assessed by questions including “When the police deal with people in my neighbourhood, they always behave according to the law”; (2) Procedural fairness – e.g., “The police provide opportunities for unfair decisions to be corrected.” (3) Distributive fairness – e.g., “People usually receive the outcomes they deserve under the law”, and (4) Effectiveness – assessed by asking respondents how well the police address various kinds of crime.

Voluntary cooperation with the police (e.g., by offering to provide them with information) appears to be related to some extent with feelings of obligation to obey the police. But in addition, high ratings of the police on lawfulness, procedural fairness and distributive fairness were also associated with the citizens’ willingness to voluntarily provide the police with crime-related information. For people who had experienced a criminal victimization in the previous 12 months, those who believed the police were generally effective in dealing with crime were more likely to indicate they were willing to cooperate with the police. For non-victims, however, the opposite relationship was found. It would appear that non-victims thought it was less important for them to voluntarily cooperate with the police if the police were, without their help, already doing a good job.

**Conclusion:** Belief in the legitimacy of the police (acting lawfully, procedural and distributive fairness) affected people’s willingness to cooperate voluntarily with the police. Though these factors are, generally, important, the various factors that determine cooperation with the police vary across groups in society. Considering the population as a whole, then, cooperation with the police is likely to be highest if the police are seen as acting in a manner that is both lawful and fair.

The willingness of members of the Muslim community in New York to work voluntarily with the police in combating terrorism is determined, in part, by how Muslims are treated by the police and others in the community.

As in some other countries since September 11, 2001, “Muslim American communities have become a focus for anti-terror policing efforts in the United States” (p. 366). Hence it is not surprising that there is interest in “what circumstances are associated with voluntary cooperation by Muslim Americans in anti-terror policing efforts and in particular, which policing strategies enhance or diminish that cooperation” (p. 366). This study addresses this issue with data from a 2009 survey of 300 randomly selected Muslim Americans living in the New York City area.

The study focuses in large part on issues surrounding procedural justice. Research on procedural justice suggests that people are more likely to comply with the police and cooperate with them when they believe that the police authorities are acting in a legitimate and fair manner. Previous research (Criminological Highlights, 4(4)#1, 7(1)#4) has demonstrated that the more police and other justice authorities are viewed as legitimate, the more likely it is that their rules and decisions are accepted.

Muslim Americans’ views of police legitimacy in fighting terrorism were assessed by the level of agreement with statements such as “You should trust these law enforcement agents to make decisions that are good for everyone when they are investigating and prosecuting terrorism” (p. 390). Police legitimacy in fighting terrorism was greatest for those respondents who saw the police as acting in a procedurally fair manner (e.g., making decisions based on facts rather than opinions, applying the law consistently, giving people a chance to express their views before making decisions). Police legitimacy was, however, also related to the extent to which respondents identified with being American and expressed support for U.S. policies in fighting terrorism.

Those respondents who indicated that they thought that the police acted in a procedurally fair manner within their (Muslim) communities were more likely to indicate their willingness to alert the police to possible terrorism threats. In addition, those respondents who believed that anti-terrorism policies had been created in a legitimate fashion (e.g., that the community had been given an opportunity to provide input and community views were considered) were more likely to cooperate with the police in averting terrorism and they were more willing to alert the police to possible terrorism activities. Those Muslim Americans who reported experiencing discrimination at school, work, or in dealing with authorities, were less likely to be willing to cooperate with the police or report possible terrorism activities to the police. Finally, those respondents who had strong identification with America (e.g., who agreed with the statement that “Being an American is important to the way I think of myself as a person”) were more likely to be willing to alert the police.

Conclusion: Most New York Muslim respondents indicated that they would engage in cooperative actions if asked to do so by the police, and most indicated that they would report possible terrorist related activities to the police. The variation that did exist in Muslims’ willingness to combat terrorism appears to be in large part affected by the degree to which Muslims have had positive versus discriminatory interactions with others in American society. Those who felt excluded from American society through overt discrimination, for example, as well as those who reported that the police did not treat them fairly were less likely to be cooperative on terrorism matters. If the cooperation of the western Muslim communities is important, therefore, it appears that western societies have the opportunity to increase that cooperation in large part by examining and addressing aspects of their own treatment of Muslims in their communities.

Treating suspects fairly is important even in the war against terrorism.

A substantial amount of research suggests that the manner in which people are treated by the police is important in understanding how legitimate the police and other authorities such as the courts (Criminological Highlights 11(5)#1) are seen to be (Criminological Highlights, 4(4)#1, 7(1)#4). More recently it has been shown that the willingness of members of the Muslim community in New York to work voluntarily with the police in combating terrorism is determined, in part, by how Muslims are treated by the police and others in the community (Criminological Highlights 11(4)#1). This paper explores the question of whether “procedural justice” (e.g., neutrality in decision making, trust in the motives of the police, and treatment with respect) is as important in responding to threats of terrorism and in dealing with Muslim groups as it is in responding to ordinary criminal activity.

Since 2001, policing strategies in the US have changed to include concern about terrorism in addition to ordinary crime. Furthermore, policing has often focused on a new group – Muslim Americans. Using data from four different New York City surveys, this study compares Muslim Americans’ perceptions of the policing of terrorism to their perceptions of policing of ordinary crime. In addition, it examines non-Muslim views of police counterterrorism efforts. Hence it allows comparisons of the importance of procedural justice in two different domains (crime and anti-terrorism) as well as comparisons of those most affected by anti-terrorism policing (Muslim Americans) with those less likely to be targeted.

Looking at the willingness to cooperate with the police (e.g., in reporting dangerous or suspicious activities to the police and in encouraging members of the community to cooperate with the police), for all groups (Muslims, non-Muslim minorities, and whites), the perceived legitimacy of the police was related to willingness to cooperate for both ordinary policing and anti-terror policing. Perceived legitimacy of the police – for all three groups – was influenced by how fair and professional the police were seen to be. But the effects of perceptions of legitimacy relate to more than just the perceptions of the treatment of one’s own group: white respondents view the police as less fair if they target minority groups in addressing ordinary crime. Furthermore, “non-Muslims view the police as unfair and less legitimate if they target the Muslim community and if they treat Muslims disrespectfully” (p. 429). Suspicion of Muslims itself was not viewed as being unfair by Muslims or non-Muslim respondents, but targeting the Muslim community reduced the legitimacy of the police.

Conclusion: “The shift in policing from crime control to counterterrorism does not appear to have changed public expectations of police behaviour or to have altered the basis on which police are evaluated…” (p. 435). Procedural justice mechanisms are just as important for Muslim Americans as they are for non-Muslim minorities and for whites. “Even when police confront grave threats, both minority and majority populations expect law enforcement officers to respect procedural justice values and are more likely to withhold their cooperation if they do not…. Non-Muslims, who rate the threat of terror as larger than do Muslims, are nonetheless sensitive to procedural justice in counterterrorism policing, particularly the targeting and harassment of Muslims” (p. 436). “Three elements of procedural justice – neutrality in decision making, trust in the motives of the police, and treatment with respect – remain central to the definition of procedural justice and its effect on legitimacy” (p. 437). This is just as true in dealing with terrorism as it is in responding to ordinary crime.

Even in situations in which citizens face terrorist threats and attacks, the legitimacy of the local police is determined, in large part, by whether the police are perceived to be treating people in a procedurally just fashion.

“Increasing public evaluations of the legitimacy of the police is considered one of the most important goals of policing in democratic countries” (p. 5). A number of studies have highlighted the importance of perceptions of procedural justice – the fairness and appropriateness of police interactions with ordinary citizens – in understanding public assessments of, and cooperation with, the police (Criminological Highlights, V4N4#1, V7N1#4, V11N4#1, V12N5#2). The suggestion is sometimes made, however, that in situations in which people feel under severe threat – e.g., acute crises or terrorism threats – it is police efficacy rather than fairness that is seen as important.

The data for this study come from a study of public attitudes in the jurisdictions of 6 Israeli police stations, one of which (Sderot) has been “a primary target for missile threats and attacks originating from the Gaza Strip” (p. 10). It was expected that “in situations of high threat and insecurity… concerns for safety [would] take priority over issues of fair processes such as respect, dignity and participation [the main ‘pillars’ of procedural justice]” (p. 11). The five other ‘comparison’ districts had not experienced recent security threats. Only members of ‘majority communities’ were included in the analysis (i.e., Israeli Arabs, Ultra-Orthodox Jews, and other minorities were excluded).

Police legitimacy – the main dependent variable – was assessed with four questions: “The police are guided by the public’s well-being;” “The police carry out their job well;” “If a relative/friend was a victim of a crime I would encourage them to turn to the police;” and “Police presence in my area of residence is adequate” (p. 16).

Perceptions of procedural justice were measured with four questions: “The police allow citizens to express their opinion before making a decision…;” “The police explain their activities well…;” “The police treat all citizens equally;” and “Officers treat citizens they encounter with respect” (p. 15). Various other controls were also included (e.g., previous contact with the police, whether the respondent had been a crime victim, and demographic characteristics of respondents).

The results were quite straightforward. The performance/efficiency of the police was important in both the ‘high terrorism’ area and in the comparison areas, but, as predicted “under conditions of threat, evaluations [of performance] play a significantly larger role in predicting police legitimacy than when there is no specific threat in the background” (p. 18). More interesting, however, is the fact that procedural justice was equally important in predicting police legitimacy in both the ‘high threat’ and the ‘low threat’ areas.

Conclusion: “The results of the present study suggest that the desire for procedural justice is an enduring, stable trait, regardless of the security situation. Under conditions of security threats, individuals do value police performance to a greater extent when forming evaluations of police legitimacy. However, there does not seem to be a zero-sum game between performance and procedural justice: under threat, while performance increases in importance, procedural justice does not decline in importance and indeed remains the primary antecedent of legitimacy, as is the case when there is no security threat in the background” (p. 19). In more mundane terms, the police cannot afford to minimize the importance of dealing with citizens in a procedurally just fashion just because the community is facing serious external threats.

Being stopped by the police increases future offending.

There is a growing body of research suggesting that being processed by the criminal justice system can increase subsequent offending (see The Effects of Imprisonment: Specific Deterrence and Collateral Effects. Research Summaries Compiled from Criminological Highlights on our website) This study compares the impact on subsequent offending of being stopped by the police, or being stopped and arrested.

The concern, derived from labeling theory is that “a public label may lead to secondary deviance… through social exclusion and the weakening of social bonds” (p. 930), and “once the deviant label is applied and the process of social exclusion is set in motion, the labeled individual may begin to develop or adopt a deviant identity” (p. 931).

This study uses four waves of longitudinal data on 2,127 youths, collected in the context of a program evaluation, to evaluate the impact of police contact. Youths were interviewed each year for four years. Their propensity to offend was estimated on the basis of the first wave of data collection (when they were 11-12 years old) they were matched on their apparent propensity to be stopped and/or arrested by the police. Though sets of youths with the same propensity to be stopped/arrested were created, only some were, in fact stopped or arrested by the police. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the police contact was, in a sense, randomly determined since the members of the three groups were matched with those in other groups who had the same ‘propensity’ to do whatever it was that would bring them into contact with the police.

The results showed that after matching youths on their propensities to experience police contact, those who were arrested were significantly more likely to engage in delinquencies than those who were only stopped, and those stopped were more likely to engage in delinquencies than those who had no police contact. Furthermore, there was a tendency for more police contact to reduce commitment to school, reduce anticipated guilt about engaging in delinquency, and increasing the youth's belief that offending really does not hurt anyone.

Conclusion: Stop-and-frisk interactions between youths and police “may have the unintended consequence of increasing future delinquent involvement. Thus police practices of engaging in high rates of stops, many of which are ‘unproductive’ or ‘innocent,’ may be counterproductive” (p. 956). “For both youth who are stopped and youth who are arrested, delinquency amplification is partially explained by the attenuation of prosocial bonds, changes in deviant identity, and increased involvement with delinquent peers” (p. 956-7).

Contact with the police can increase the likelihood of future violent offending for those already involved in small amounts of violent crime, but not for those who, previously, were not involved in violent crime.

There is substantial evidence that for young people, contact with the youth court is more likely to increase future offending than to reduce it (see Criminological Highlights 14(6)#1). This paper examines the effect of contact with the police on subsequent offending, taking advantage of the fact that many youths who commit offences do not get apprehended for these offences.

In this study, boys in Rochester, NY, were interviewed every six months starting when they were approximately age 13 until they were about age 17. The focus of the study was on self-reported violent crime. Since most violent crime (e.g., fights between youths) does not come to the attention of the police, this was probably the best measure of involvement in violence for these youths. The measure used was the number of different kinds of violence (attacking someone with a weapon, throwing things at someone, robbery, etc.) the youth engaged in. Because the youths were interviewed regularly during this period of time, it was possible to classify different youths into different groups in terms of their involvement in crime. In this case, youths appeared to fall into three relatively distinct groups: those who reported close to no violence in early adolescence (39% of the sample), those involved in relatively little violence (49% of the sample) and those involved in a substantial amount of violence (11% of the sample). Not surprisingly, these three groups varied dramatically in how much police contact they had experienced before age 16.

Within each of the three groups, youths were identified who had and had not been picked up and formally questioned by the police for suspected involvement in crime between age 16 and age 17-18. Youths who had been in contact with the police were then matched with those who had not had police contact on a wide range of measures (using their predicted likelihood of having police contact based on their previous reported behaviour and other measures such as race, neighbourhood characteristics, family structure, peer associations, prior justice system contact, etc.). For the high offending group, separate from the other groups, however, acceptable matching was not possible. Hence it is not possible to look at the impact of police contact on this group. However, since this group would likely have had contact with the police earlier in their lives, it is likely that an additional police contact would not have much additional impact on them.

It appeared that contact with the police had very little, if any, impact on the non-offending group. For the low-offending group, however, there was an effect: police contact appeared to increase subsequent involvement in violence in the 1.5 years following the contact. "When individuals are successfully matched on 40 [variables], there is empirical evidence for a short-run labeling effect of the police contact treatment for the low offending... group" (p. 458-9).

Conclusion: The fact that police contact with youths who have, thus far in their lives, engaged in some, but not very much violence, has the effect of increasing subsequent violence suggests that the police are [faced with] a most difficult task. [In responding to possible offending by these youths] police intervention may unintentionally make the offending problem worse in the short run" (p. 459). The effect of police contact was not found for the (previously) non-offending group, in part perhaps, because they show stronger attachment to parents and school and have fewer delinquent friends.

Being arrested by the police increases the likelihood that a youth will commit further offences and, quite independently, also increases the likelihood that the youth will be arrested again.

There is a substantial literature demonstrating that criminal justice processing does not generally decrease offending and, in fact, may increase it (see *Criminological Highlights* 11(4)#3). This paper seeks to understand the mechanism whereby the arrest of young people might increase their subsequent involvement in the justice system.

There are two straightforward mechanisms whereby the arrest of a youth might increase the youth’s subsequent involvement in the justice system. First, arrest could stigmatize the youth which in turn could increase the youth’s likelihood of offending. Second, arrest could make the youth more of a target for law enforcement in the future, regardless of the youth’s rate of offending.

The study was carried out using data from a longitudinal study in Chicago, in which 12- and 15-year-olds were interviewed 3 times, with 2.5 year intervals between the 3 waves of interviews. Some of the youths were arrested between the 1st and 2nd interview. To determine the effect of arrest on subsequent offending and subsequent arrests, equivalent groups of youths were created on the basis of data collected at Wave 1 – prior to being arrested. Given that most youths commit offences, but most youths are not arrested, for most youths who were arrested (between Wave 1 and Wave 2) there were others who had the same propensity to be arrested (e.g., similar rates of self-report offending) but who weren’t arrested.

Hence two equivalent groups were created: those arrested between the 1st and 2nd interview and those not arrested who were equivalent to the arrested sample (on 79 variables). Without matching, arrested and non-arrested youths are obviously different. However, for a matched group of 38 arrested youths and 111 non-arrested youths (each arrested youth was matched with up to 3 non-arrested youths), there were no important differences between the groups before the arrest.

By the time of the third interview, the self-report violent offending of the arrested group was considerably higher than that of the youths who had not experienced arrest (but were originally equivalent). The previously arrested group was also considerably more likely to have been arrested by the time of the third interview. However, offending as reported at Wave 3 was not predictive of re-arrest. Said differently, the two effects of the original arrest – increased subsequent offending and increased subsequent arrest by the police – are not related.

**Conclusion:** Being arrested increases subsequent violent offending. And it increases the likelihood of being rearrested. Hence it appears that being arrested makes the youth more likely to offend. But quite independent of offending rates, “a first juvenile arrest seems to increase subsequent law enforcement responses to those youth compared to other youth who offend at a comparable level but have managed to evade a first arrest. This could result from increased scrutiny of the individual’s future behaviour, by police as well as others… as well as from reduced tolerance by police and actors of an arrestees’ future transgressions” (p. 363).

Being arrested does not increase youths’ perceptions that they will be caught in the future.

Deterrence theory assumes that in considering whether to commit an offence, people estimate their likelihood of being apprehended and the expected punishment they would receive if this occurs. But how do people know what their likelihood of being apprehended is? One might assume that to some extent it would depend on their own personal experiences. This study examines the impact of being arrested on youths’ estimates of whether they would be arrested by the police if they chose to offend.

The objective certainty of being apprehended for offending is likely to be impossible for potential offenders to estimate. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that if they were to be apprehended, offenders would be likely to modify their perception of the likelihood that they would be apprehended in the future. This study examines data from a panel study of American young people who were interviewed when they were 17-23 years old and again four years later. When first interviewed, they were asked to estimate the likelihood that they would be arrested (a) if they attacked someone, and (b) if they stole something worth more than $50. Four years later they were asked the same questions. The measure of interest was, essentially, the change in certainty. Respondents were also, at each point in time, asked to report any offences they had committed during the year prior to the interview. They were also asked to indicate the number of close friends whom they believed had offended. In the second interview, they were also asked if they had been arrested since the previous interview. The main results are simple to summarize: the number of times the respondent was arrested between the two interviews was unrelated to the respondent’s estimate of the change in the perceived certainty of apprehension. This was true for both theft and violence-related offences. In other words, being arrested did not change a person’s view of the likelihood of arrest in the future. Furthermore, this lack of effect was found both for those with relatively high rates of offending prior to the first interview and those with relatively low rates of offending. The analyses included the young person’s self-reported offending as a control. Those who reported a high rate of offending were less likely to think that they would be apprehended in the future. The explanation for this finding is simple: successful punishment avoidance appears to reduce perceived certainty of apprehension. But being apprehended does not affect one’s perceived likelihood of being caught. Perhaps young people figure that they have learned from their mistakes and any “deterrent” impact is counteracted by the belief that they now know better what not to do.

Conclusion. “The finding that arrests do not affect certainty perceptions contradicts one of the central tenets of deterrence theory. Punished individuals should be less apt to recidivate at least partly because they increase their estimate of the certainty of punishment” (p. 20). This does not occur, at least with people of this age and when asking about ordinary offences. It would appear that being apprehended does not cause a youth to ‘learn the lesson’ that ‘crime does not pay.’

Formal processing of youths in the youth justice system does not reduce subsequent offending. If anything, youths processed formally are more likely to re-offend than those screened out of the formal system or processed informally.

Those making decisions about how to process young offenders often have choices on how to respond to these offenders – especially when youths have committed relatively minor offences. In Canada, police are required to consider measures other than court-based procedures and it is presumed that it is better for many young offenders to be dealt with outside of the formal justice system. To some extent, Canada’s 2003 youth justice law has been successful in reducing the use of youth court (see Criminological Highlights 10(1)#1, 10(3)#1).

This paper reviews research on the impact of youth court processing on subsequent offending, comparing it to a non-youth-justice-system response to offending. It is limited to ‘random assignment’ studies in order to ensure that any findings cannot be attributed to pre-existing differences between the two groups of youths.

In all, 29 separate sets of findings, involving 7,304 youths, in studies published between 1973 and 2008 were located that met this very strict (random assignment) criterion. In each study, youths were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: normal court processing or some form of less formal processing. Across studies, the ‘less formal processing’ varied somewhat. What was important, however, was that by assigning the youths to treatment on a random basis, the two groups (‘court processing’ and ‘no formal processing’) can be considered to be equivalent. The authors looked at the longest follow-up period reported in each study (when more than one was reported). These follow-up periods were, on average about 12-13 months long (range 4 to 36 months).

Overall, court processing appeared to increase the likelihood that youths would be involved in at least some subsequent offending, though there were non-trivial differences across studies. For those 7 experiments that reported the total number of offences that the youth were involved in (instead of or in addition to simply whether the youth committed a subsequent offence), court processing also had a criminogenic effect. Youths processed by the courts were, on average, involved in more crime than those processed in other ways. Similar effects were found for severity: formal court processing of youths, if anything, increased the severity of subsequent offending.

These criminogenic effects are, however, very small. The studies were broken down in various ways (e.g., those carried out early in the period vs. later, whether the comparison involved the provision of services or the youth was not offered any services if diverted, etc.). None of the sub-sets of studies showed a significant crime-reducing impact of court processing.

Conclusion: A conservative conclusion would be that court processing does not reduce subsequent offending. “Given that the evidence indicates that there is no public safety benefit to [youth justice] system processing, and its greater costs when compared to release, even the most conservative cost-benefit analyses would favour release over [youth justice] system processing” (p. 38). Obviously some youths, because they have committed serious offences, will be brought to court in any jurisdiction and one cannot generalize the findings from these studies to those youth because these studies focused largely on youths charged with relatively minor offences. At the same time it should be noted that “the data from these studies do not support a policy of establishing [formal] diversion programs for juveniles who normally would not have been officially processed….” (p. 39).

Contact with the formal juvenile justice system increases the level of criminal activity in early adulthood.

Background. The labelling perspective suggests that contact with the justice system increases the likelihood of further delinquency. One explanation for this effect is that formal contact with the justice system has a “negative impact on conventional opportunities… and leads to cumulative disadvantage in future life chances…” (p. 1288).

This study followed a sample of Rochester, New York, youths through adolescence until they were 21-22 years old. Youths were asked if they had been arrested or had other contact with the police and whether they had experienced other, more formal, juvenile justice intervention. When the youths were young adults, self-report offending records were obtained on seven relatively serious offences (e.g., robbery, attacks with a weapon, break and enter, car thefts) as well as the youth’s involvement in drug sales.

The results demonstrated that a youth’s likelihood of graduating from high school was lowered as a result of police or juvenile justice involvement even after controlling statistically for previous offending, parental poverty, and school ability (at age 12). A separate analysis found that “experiencing official [criminal justice] intervention in adolescence is significantly associated with reduced odds in favour of staying in school in a subsequent period” (p. 1301). An analysis of self-reported criminal activity at age 19-20 demonstrated that police or juvenile justice intervention earlier in adolescence was associated with increased criminal behaviour in early adulthood. The effect of police or juvenile justice intervention “has stronger crime amplification effects among the disadvantaged [African American youths living in poverty]” (p. 1306). The effects of juvenile justice interventions on drug selling were quite similar: police or juvenile justice intervention increased the likelihood of drug selling at age 19-20. And again, “the effect of juvenile justice intervention on drug selling is stronger among those from impoverished family backgrounds” (p. 1306).

Looking at criminal involvement at age 21-22, it appears that an earlier intervention by the police increases crime rates generally through its effect of decreasing the likelihood of graduating from high school and increasing the likelihood of unemployment at age 19-21. Juvenile justice intervention appears to have a direct effect in increasing drug selling and general crime at age 21-22, but also has an indirect effect by way of decreasing the likelihood of graduating from high school which, in turn, increases the likelihood of unemployment at age 19-21.

Conclusion. It appears that police or juvenile justice intervention with young people has a reasonable likelihood of increasing the probability that the youth will, as a young adult, be involved in crime and/or drug selling. Generally speaking, these negative impacts on youths are more likely for those who come from impoverished backgrounds or are black. The argument, therefore, that it is important to apprehend and prosecute young people in order to hold them accountable for their actions should be questioned. These data suggest that for many youths – especially those from impoverished backgrounds – the best strategy may be to do as little as possible and wait for them to outgrow their criminal behaviour.

Arresting young people when they commit offences reduces the likelihood that they will graduate from high school.

In Canada in 2013, only about 45% of youths recorded as having been apprehended by the police for a criminal offence were formally charged. The rest, consistent with Part I of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, are dealt with more informally. Previous research suggests that being apprehended by the police as well as being formally processed by the justice system will, if anything, increase the likelihood of future offending (e.g., Criminological Highlights, 14(4)#5, 11(4)#3).

This paper examines the impact of arresting a youth on the likelihood that the youth will successfully complete high school. Arrests in the US are common: it is estimated that in a year, 9 out of every 100 US youths age 10-17 are arrested (15 per 100 youths in Chicago are arrested). Given that most youths commit offences, “compared with incarceration, arrest is more ‘random’ or variable in the juvenile population…” (p. 37).

The study uses data from youths in Chicago collected in three waves starting in 1995-7 (when they were 12-15 years old) and ending in 2000-2. Data on school dropout were obtained from the Chicago public schools. Arrest records came from the Chicago and Illinois State Police. Only formal arrests were counted; informal “station adjustments” or warnings by police were not considered arrests. Previous research has demonstrated the simple effect: arrested youths are more likely to drop out of school than nonarrested students, but much of this effect is, almost certainly due to pre-existing individual, family, and neighbourhood differences between those arrested and those not. The challenge is to create two groups of students who, prior to the arrest of one group, were similar. This was done using 82 different variables (individual variables including self-report offending and race, family variables including family structure and home environment, and neighbourhood and school characteristics including concentrated poverty in the neighbourhood and school).

Most of the youths who were arrested were successfully matched on these 82 variables with youths who had not been arrested. Arrested youths were more likely to drop out of school than those matched youths who were not arrested (73% vs. 51%). A second analysis was carried out on those who graduated from high school or received equivalent educational certification to see if arrest affected enrolment in a four year post-secondary college program. 34% of the nonarrested group who graduated from high school (or equivalent) enrolled in a college program; only 18% of the arrested group who managed to graduate from high school (or equivalent) enrolled in a 4-year college program.

The effect of arrest was not mediated by changes in educational expectations or school attachment of the youth or supportive friends. It is possible, therefore, that the effect of arrest on high school dropout is mediated, instead, by “institutional responses and the increasingly punitive ‘zero tolerance’ educational climate…” (p. 55).

Conclusion: “Arrest in adolescence hinders the transition to adulthood by undermining pathways to educational attainment.” (p. 54). Youths who are arrested are more likely to drop out of school than are equivalent youths who are not arrested while in high school. Given the effects of arrest on high school completion and on enrolment in 4-year post-secondary programs, juvenile arrest can, therefore, be viewed “as a life-course trap in the educational pathways of a considerable number of adolescents in contemporary American cities” (p. 55).

Being arrested and taken to court reduces a youth’s chances of finishing high school.

It is well known that youths who are heavily involved in crime are less likely to complete secondary school than are youths less involved in crime. In addition, of course, dropping out of school is an indicator of other difficulties such as poor school performance or misbehaviour in school. From a policy perspective, however, one question that needs to be asked is whether involvement in the youth justice system—above and beyond involvement in crime—is likely to have an effect on a youth’s likelihood of finishing school. Said differently, if two youths have similar offending and school backgrounds, and one happens to be apprehended for offending and taken to court, do the two youths have different likelihoods of successfully finishing high school?

By using data from an American longitudinal study, this study was able to estimate the causal relationship among these variables by following high school youths who, at age 16, had not been involved in the youth justice system. The youths’ involvement in crime as well as the youths’ records in school were assessed at that point and hence could be used as controls for what happened after age 16. When the youths were interviewed two years later, some had been arrested and taken to court, and by the time that the youths were 19 years old, some had dropped out of school. Because level of involvement in crime as well as school performance and misbehaviour in school (suspensions) could be controlled, it was possible to assess whether being arrested and being taken to court (independent of involvement in crime and performance in school) had an effect on the dropout rate.

Not surprisingly, youths who dropped out of high school were more likely to report various types of offending than did youths who completed school. Similarly, dropouts were more likely to report doing poorly in school, to have experienced poverty, and to have had various difficulties in school. However, above and beyond these effects, being arrested by the police for an offence slightly decreased a youth’s chances of graduating from high school. More importantly—indeed, independent of level of offending—being taken to court for the offence had an even greater impact on creating a high school dropout. Indeed, an analysis that contained only those youths for whom precise data could be inferred regarding when they dropped out suggests “that youths who are arrested, but who do not appear in court, actually experience no detrimental effects on their odds of high school graduation relative to non-arrested youths” (p. 474). Other analyses suggest that “the effect of court involvement is more pronounced for those with less prior involvement in delinquency” (p. 474).

Conclusion. The data are most consistent with the finding that “First-time court appearance during high school is more detrimental for education outcomes than first-time arrest without a court appearance.” This result is “consistent with one version of labelling theory [that] suggests that official sanctions stigmatize youths, inducing a deviant self-concept” (p. 477). But it is also consistent with another labelling explanation that would suggest that the effect may be due to limitations on a youth’s opportunities as a result of court involvement. Finally, of course, court involvement could put a youth in contact with other offending youths. This study obviously focuses on the impact of arrest and court involvement on the likelihood of completing high school and not on future offending. Nevertheless, to the extent that a society values secondary school completion, it would seem that policies that limit the use of court for offending youths can be justified, in part, because they are likely to lead to higher secondary school completion rates.

Records of arrests by police not leading to convictions make it difficult to get a job.

Previous research has established that those with criminal records have a more difficult time getting entry level jobs than those without records – even in situations in which the potential employer doesn’t know the nature of the record (Criminological Highlights 6(3)#2).

This study investigates the impact of non-conviction records on employment. Police, it seems, often keep records of contacts with citizens that do not lead to convictions; these records are disclosed, nevertheless, when ‘criminal record checks’ are required (see, for example, reports by the John Howard Society of Ontario http://www.johnhoward.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/johnhoward-ontario-help-wanted.pdf and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association http://ccla.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/CCLA-NCD-Report.pdf). This study attempted to discover if those arrested but not charged “may still bear the mark of a criminal record” (p. 628). Previous research (Criminological Highlights 14(3)#1) has shown that arrests not leading to a conviction are very common and that punishments are imposed on those who are arrested even if there is no finding of guilt.

In this study, an experiment was carried out in which 300 applications were made, in person, to 150 employers for entry level jobs in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region. The jobs required no special skills or licenses. Half of the applications were made by Black males in their 20’s; half were made by comparable Whites. In half of each group the applicant indicated to the potential employer that they “had been arrested, but never convicted of a misdemeanour offence. It was minor and stupid on my part, and I wanted to be upfront about it in case it came up in a background check” (p. 633). If they were asked about details they provided them, indicating that it was for a disorderly conduct misdemeanour, involving a fight… “Nobody was actually hurt. I just acted irresponsibly, but I was young and that’s all in the past” (p. 633).

The results suggest that a misdemeanour arrest had, overall, a small, but statistically significant, impact on whether the person was called back for an interview (or was offered the job). Those applying for the jobs noted, when they were in the workplace, whether there were non-white employees present at the time of their application. Using the presence of non-white employees as an indicator of workplace ‘diversity’, it seems that Blacks with arrest records applying for jobs in diverse workplaces were not disadvantaged by their records. Why, then, was the effect of a misdemeanour arrest small? In interviews carried out independently with employers, 3 reasons were noted. First, many employers made ‘personal’ rather than solely ‘on paper’ assessments of the job applicants. Second, it seemed that many employers discounted the importance of the event leading to the arrest because of its minor, common nature. Third, some employers clearly distinguished between arrests and convictions; and they interpreted the volunteering of an arrest record as showing good character.

Conclusion: When applying for entry level jobs, it would seem that people are slightly disadvantaged if they have a record of misdemeanor arrest. However, the effect is not large. Furthermore, the presence of an African-American in the workplace – which reduces the size of the effect of a low level record for other African-American – suggests the possibility that these employers are familiar with the fact that these non-conviction records do not predict workplace behaviour.

Crime can be reduced by the collective action of those who live or work in local city blocks that have drug and disorder problems. The police can help by supporting groups on the block and by coordinating services that address non-crime problems on the block.

What can be done to reduce crime in an urban area? Those living in a neighbourhood have little direct control over who lives in their neighbourhood. Similarly, it is difficult for people to create “cohesive” or “caring” neighbours. But people can do some things to reduce crime in their neighbourhoods. Police statistics are sometimes used to identify “hot spots” -- where crime and disorder are likely to occur. Typically, these “hot spots” are single city blocks which acquire characteristics that are conducive to crime. And city blocks, even more than “neighbourhoods,” turn out to be sensible sociological, as well as geographic, units to examine when attempting to prevent crime. For a crime to take place, one needs an offender (without controls) a victim (without protection) and an appropriate location.

This study identified city blocks in Oakland, California, that clearly had crime and disorder problems. On-site observations were made, and resident “place managers” were interviewed. “Place managers” are people who “live or work near problem places and who, by virtue of their proximity and interests, may have primary or personal responsibility to the street block” (p. 383). Typically four place managers per block were interviewed.

Implementing crime prevention strategies. City blocks were randomly assigned to receive special attention from a unit of the Oakland police. This unit worked with individual citizens, coordinated visits by other local government agencies (fire, public works, rodent control officers, utility companies, etc.) to ensure that all building, safety, etc., codes were enforced, as well as to ensure that owners of problematic properties were made aware of the problems (e.g., the selling of drugs). The “control” blocks got standard police patrols.

The results demonstrated two independent types of effects. First, “collective action” on the part of place managers -- meeting with community groups about problems, working with the police or community groups about problem areas, participating in a neighbourhood cleanup, participating in neighbourhood or block watch programs, etc., -- had positive effects. Signs of disorder were reduced. The number of people observed selling drugs was reduced on the blocks where there was more collective action taken by place managers. Second, above and beyond these effects, those areas targeted (on a random basis) for the police department’s “special attention” in coordinating other city services, showed positive change on these same measures. Individual action by place managers (e.g., simply calling 911 or the drug hotline, talking to building managers or tenants) did not have a positive impact.

Conclusion: Collective action by place managers seemed to be effective in reducing crime and disorder as was support from the police in dealing with aspects of the block that made it an inviting site for problems. As the authors point out “place managers play an important role in controlling drug and disorder problems... and may be most effective when they are more socially integrated with their neighbours on the street block and when they are involved in collective, rather than individual, problem solving efforts” (p. 397). Individual actions, such as simply calling the police, did not seem to be effective. “Police efforts that build working relationships with a core group of place managers may have a greater likelihood of long term success than police building one-on-one working relationships with individual place managers.” Collective neighbourhood actions appear to be important.